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Abstract
This thesis traces the emergence of the idea of what has become known as 
humanitarian intervention. The nascent concept of humanitarian intervention was 
present in the early modem period, and emerged in the writings of thinkers who wrote 
on the law of nature and the law of nations, such as Francisco Vitoria, Alberico Gentili, 
Francisco Suarez, Juan Gines de Sepulveda, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, 
Christian Wolff, Emmerich Vattel, and Edmund Burke.
My claim is that the distinctive features of the idea of humanitarian intervention have 
changed considerably over the centuries, reflecting the historical circumstances in 
which these ideas were developed. Although, on the surface, modem conceptions of 
humanitarian intervention share certain similarities with their historical namesake, they 
are in fact conceived and justified very differently. When contemporary thinkers 
invoke the authority of this illustrious heritage they tend to neglect the different 
foundations and rationale given for intervention. I argue that if we want to understand 
what shocked the moral conscience of mankind during the emergence of the idea, we 
have to understand the general historical context, that is, the conditions of belief that 
formed our conceptions of the moral obligation to save strangers. Otherwise we fail to 
understand what constitutes our humanitarian urge. For the earlier writers, debates 
were framed within a fundamentally western and Christian context, which they 
purported were universal. Most discussions revolved around questions of intervening to 
convert heathens to save their souls, saving innocents from being slaughtered and other 
crimes against the natural law such as cannibalism or sodomy. Modem conceptions of 
humanitarian intervention rest their case on very different principles, and are firmly 
grounded in a human rights culture associated with the juridical revolution in 
international relations.
As such, this thesis explores the development of the idea of humanitarian intervention 
in the early modern period in order to highlight its distinctive character. To make such 
a claim I also identify some of the main features of the contemporary idea of 
humanitarian intervention. I suggest that the development of the concept has not been 
properly understood in the modern-day literature. There is therefore a considerable gap, 
which I seek to fill.
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Introduction
‘If you would understand anything, 
observe its beginning and its development.’
- Aristotle
The purpose of this study is to explore the nascent emergence of what later became known as 
humanitarian intervention. The concept of intervening on humanitarian grounds emerged in the 
writings of thinkers on the natural law and law of nations. It became gradually more refined as 
disputes over what constituted a ‘just cause’ for intervention arose. This is something which 
has been overlooked or at best not properly understood in contemporary literature. As such, 
there is a silence in the literature that cries out to be heard, which will demonstrate that the 
notion o f humanitarian intervention has a long historical lineage. The main claim that 
underpins this research is that humanitarian intervention has an unsettled and uneven surface, 
which reflects the historical circumstances in which the ideas were developed. What I am 
arguing is that if we want to understand what shocks the moral conscience of mankind, we 
have to understand the general historical context in which we discover our moral 
consciousness, and which gives content to our humanitarian urge. Thus, there is an historical 
context which is inescapable. For the earlier writers with whom I am concerned, debates were 
framed within a fundamentally western and Christian context although they purported to be 
universal. Many discussions revolved around questions of intervening to convert heathens to 
save their souls; saving innocents from being slaughtered and other crimes against the natural 
law such as cannibalism or sodomy. In contrast, modem conceptions of humanitarian 
intervention reject all but the most ‘urgent’ of reasons for intervention, namely genocide, and 
rest their case on very different principles.
An exploration of the history of the idea of humanitarian intervention is extremely
interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it helps accentuate the distinctiveness of the earlier
formulations in comparison with the modern. The issues to which humanitarian intervention
refers have changed considerably. This demonstrates, ultimately, how such notions are
historically contingent. Thus, issues pertaining to humanitarian intervention are historically
bound and as such not easily transferable to the contemporary concepts we recognise today.
Such historical sensitivity enables us to avoid comparisons and conclusions that assume that
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the issues are perennial, and that modem day conceptions are related in some fundamental 
sense to the old.1 What I instead want to say, then, is that issues of humanitarian intervention, 
past and present, share at best a language similitude. In this way, past humanitarian concerns 
merely echo today and is linguistically perceived rather than conceptual. Secondly, in 
demonstrating the distinctiveness of early modem conceptions of humanitarian intervention we 
discover how liable they are to be used as a form o f cultural imperialism, despite the good 
intentions of those who advocate it. Thirdly, it alerts us to the fact that modem day conceptions 
are not immune from such considerations. And fourthly, the thesis demonstrates the wide range 
of what were considered grounds for humanitarian intervention.
In order to set this investigation in context I will, in this introduction, highlight some 
modem themes pertinent to the contemporary debate about humanitarian intervention and then 
draw out some issues that may assist us in understanding humanitarian intervention in a 
different historical context far removed from the human rights culture that grounds our moral 
consciousness today.
1 This relates to the methodological debate about perennial problems. Here the historian Quentin Skinner 
is somewhat o f an authority (see also historians such as Peter Laslett, W. H. Greenleaf, J. G. A Pocock, 
and John Dunn). Skinner emphasises that understanding the arguments of political philosophers entails 
reconstructing the language context in which they were formulated. As a methodological approach, I 
have, if only indirectly, been influenced by a pre-Skinner philosopher who very much influenced the 
latter. The English philosopher of history R. G. Collingwood famously contended in his An 
Autobiography that there are no perennial problems. There are only individual answers to specific 
questions. Moreover, no two statements could be viewed to be contradictory unless they were shown to 
be different answers to the same question. In Collingwoodian terms what this means is that the word 
remains the same in the question, but the meaning changes with the context. Collingwood illustrates this 
by noting that when Plato talked about the Greek polis, or state, he meant something very different than 
Hobbes, when the latter talked o f ‘the state’ in 17th Century England. Questions about the state for Plato 
and Hobbes are not perennial. The two conceptions o f the state are related, however, not as answers to the 
same question, but rather part of the same historical process. It is the process by which one conception of 
the state gradually transforms into the other. What Collingwood wanted to emphasise was that the 
business of the historian was not to envisage a timeless question to which there are different answers, but 
rather to trace and understand the process of change. See Boucher, David and Kelly, Paul (eds.): 
introduction’ to Political Thinkers -  From Socrates to the Present, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009, second edition), pp. 1 -2 3 ,  pp. 1 6 -1 8 . See also Collingwood, R. G. An Autobiography, with a 
new introduction by Stephen Toulmin, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 29 -4 3 , 60 -  64. Having 
this Collingwoodian approach to history of political thought in mind relates further to what Charles 
Taylor has called ‘conditions of belief (See Taylor, Charles: A Secular Age, (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2007)). The thinkers I explore in this study retain such a heavy 
residue of theological absolute presuppositions that without this Christian world view their ideas and 
arguments would collapse at crucial times. The world they lived in was wholly saturated with religious 
imagery and explanation, and even in cases where a philosopher were less convincing in using this 
religious and theological obeisance, the utility of invoking God’s name would still be there. However, 
these conditions o f belief have changed between then and now. In this sense, for instance, asking 
questions o f ‘humanitarian interventions’ entails careful scrutiny o f the historical context and the 
conditions of belief informing that particular context.
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Contemporary issues of humanitarian intervention
Contemporary issues of humanitarian intervention illustrate the competing tensions of the 
universalism of transnational moral standards versus the particularism of state sovereignty. The 
danger that is always to the forefront of issues o f humanitarian intervention is the fear that it 
may be invoked as a pretext to disguise self-interested ulterior motives. Resistance to its 
establishment as a settled norm is the fear o f Western, or American, hegemony in imposing a 
human rights regime that is alien, and the championing of individualism over the rights of the 
community. Recent instances of humanitarian intervention have blatantly demonstrated how 
the motivation to intervene stretches far beyond the moral. Intervention in Kosovo had as much 
to do with the stability of the West and maintaining order in the Balkans as it did with the 
prevention of ethnic cleansing. However, the blurring o f political and moral considerations has 
been a persistent feature of debates about intervention. For example, the Jesuit Sepulveda’s 
justification of intervening to save the souls of the American Indians by providing the 
necessary discipline and guidance that natural slaves have a right to expect had the 
consequence o f making a whole race of people subservient to Europeans and reduced to a 
condition of near slavery, while the Spanish enjoyed the fruits of the soil over which they 
alone, being in possession of their full faculties, could enjoy.
This is of course painting the issue with a rather broad brush, but it serves to accentuate some 
of the themes that underpin this study -  namely what are the rights and duties of states as 
representatives of the international community acting in the interests of humanity? This thesis 
demonstrates that this is not a new question and that the issue of third party responsibility for 
the community as a whole was central to the concerns of early modem thinkers, both external 
and internal to Europe. It will help us frame the study by first asking how we currently 
understand humanitarian intervention.
Humanitarian intervention has proven to be one of the great challenges and moral 
quandaries of modem international relations due to what at a glance seems to be the 
irreconcilable tension between it and the principle of sovereignty; that is, between the implied 
sanctity of territorial borders, and the universal jurisdiction implied in doctrines of human 
rights. It is an issue that is currently high on the agenda of world leaders, but despite having 
emerged as a norm it is still not fully settled, or accepted. One may call it an unsettled norm. 
Over the past decades it has generated some of the most heated debates in international 
relations among theorists as well as practitioners. At the core of the debate is the central issue 
of state sovereignty which underpins the United Nation system and international law, versus
evolving international norms about human rights and the use of force in protecting individuals 
from the most serious of violations. In the complex web of issues pertaining to legitimacy, 
legality and morality a certain climate of permissiveness regarding humanitarian intervention 
has developed which is perceived to be one o f the great challenges to sovereignty. In essence, 
humanitarian intervention is not enshrined in law but over a short period of time from the late 
1980s it has become customary to give regard to its moral efficacy, and in so doing it has been 
thrust upon the international agenda. However, it has become apparent for several scholars 
such as Nicholas Wheeler, Thomas Pogge and Martha Nussbaum that mere permissiveness 
seems insufficient to deal with crimes that shock the very core of human moral consciousness, 
whereas many legalists retort that permissiveness is corrosive of the international order: 
unauthorised humanitarian intervention, meaning humanitarian intervention not sanctioned by 
the UN Security Council, remains illegal vis-a-vis state interests affirmed by the principle of 
non-intervention. As Jennifer Welsh notes, there is a legal divide on the question of 
humanitarian intervention: those arguing for legality are either addressing a political agenda or 
the nature o f legal arguments are changing.2 The ethical philosopher Tzvetan Todorov captures 
the underlying objections to humanitarian intervention when he argued in his 2001 Amnesty 
Lectures individual human beings still get much more as citizens of a state than they do as 
citizens of the world.’
The most prominent case example of an unauthorised humanitarian intervention was 
NATO’s military actions in Kosovo in 1999, which, following Kofi Annan's retrospective 
endorsement, was subsequently approved at the UN Security Council. The principle of 
sovereignty so strongly held up in the UN, effectively ruled-out humanitarian intervention 
except in very limited cases, hence the conflict between different clauses in the Charter. It is 
only during the nineties and then against the wishes of the UN that a greater acceptance 
emerged and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was the most obvious example of this. 
However, theorists such as Rex Martin have clearly criticised this contention by stating ‘[w]e
2 Welsh, Jennifer M.: ‘ Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian Intervention’ in 
Jennifer Welsh (ed.) Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), pp. 52 -  58, p. 54; For good discussion on the legal approaches see Holzgrefe, J. L.: ‘The 
Humanitarian Intervention Debate’ in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds.) Humanitarian 
Intervention -  Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
pp. 1 5 -5 2 , p. 3 6 -4 9
3 Citied in Welsh, Jennifer M.: ‘ Taking Consequences Seriously’, p.53
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must get beyond the point where we regard all rescues unauthorized by the UN as illegal ’4 He 
notes that the UN is not the exclusive authorising agent in matters of humanitarian 
intervention, and adhering to the doctrines of just war humanitarian intervention by an 
individual nation or by a coalition of nations to prevent genocide or other gross human rights 
violations is both legitimate and justified. Such views are shared by both John Rawls and 
Michael Walzer. However, that is not to say, that the UN for that reason does not have an 
appropriate role to play in matters dealing with humanitarian intervention. The point that is 
being made is that the UN’s customary protection of sovereign integrity more often than not 
places impediments in the way o f intervention, because o f the perceived principle of non­
intervention logically ascribed to state sovereignty. And it is states, on the basis of their 
sovereignty, that form one o f the defining pillars o f the UN system and international law. In 
this way, questions of authority, legality and jurisdiction implicitly falls with the states 
themselves. It is the notion of ‘sovereignty as authority’, meaning control over borders, which 
is being upheld as part o f the UN’s project for international security and peace. However, the 
atrocities of the Second World War saw an evolving international system’s concern for human 
rights and the use of force. This has, then, entailed an evolution in the notion of sovereignty to 
focus more on ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ in which states bear a minimum respect for 
human rights. The result of this move has meant that massive human rights violations 
committed within the domestic jurisdiction of a state have been transformed into an 
international concern. The conjunction of an expanded definition of chapter VII of the UN 
charter of what constitutes a ‘threat to international security and peace’ to include human 
rights, has meant that the UN can legitimately authorise international action to address 
humanitarian crises, because they are understood as security threats.5 This is evidence of the 
partial acceptance of it as an emerging norm.
J. L. Holzgrefe has come up with a useful and broad enough description for the 
contemporary definition of humanitarian intervention. It is
4 Martin, Rex: ‘Walzer and Rawls on Just War and Humanitarian Intervention’ in Lee, Steven, P. (ed.) 
Intervention, Terrorism, and Torture -  Contemporary Challenges to Just War Theory, (Springer, 2007), 
pp. 75 -  88, p. 86
5 Welsh, Jennifer: ‘ Introduction’ in Jennifer Welsh (ed.) Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 1- 7, p. 1-2
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‘the threat or use o f force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending 
widespread and grave violations o f the fundamental human rights o f individuals other than its own citizens, 
without the permission o f the state within whose territory force is applied.’6
The list of arguments for and against the justice of humanitarian intervention is long, and it 
seems that no single dichotomy adequately captures the principal views on the justice of the 
phenomenon. Thus, the main concern here is that these disagreements testify to the evident 
reality of the norm of humanitarian intervention as well as its apparent efficacy.
The ethical divides are mainly about the proper source o f moral concerns surrounding 
humanitarian intervention as well as the appropriate object o f these concerns.7 The source of 
the moral obligations for humanitarian intervention often emerges from the idea that human 
rights are intrinsic values and are therefore a primary concern. As such this is an 
overwhelmingly liberal argument supporting humanitarian intervention when human rights are 
being seriously abused or violated. And it is here that the principle of state sovereignty always 
seems to be the stumbling block. The international jurist Fernando Teson has put forward such 
arguments and is emphatic that such choices have to be made over the mere instrumental value 
of state sovereignty. In this way, for him, states not only have a right to intervene, but also a 
moral obligation to do so. He criticises the contention that global stability has moral standing 
sufficiently to uphold a duty of non-intervention when states are engaged in ruthless human 
rights abuses. Although concerned with the effect of the military action that humanitarian 
intervention inevitably entails, he is nevertheless committed to marshalling arguments for the
o
principle of humanitarian intervention which trump the principle of non-intervention.
However, the international theorist Stephen Krasner has to a certain extent challenged 
this view by arguing that states have never enjoyed the sovereign integrity that is usually 
supposed. Thus, to question the continued viability of the sovereign state in the face of the 
acceptance of human rights, minority rights as well as the increasing role of international 
financial institutions, such as the World Bank, and globalisation, is to pose misleading 
questions. Throughout history, Krasner contends, rulers have not been motivated by some 
abstract adherence to international principles, but rather by a desire to consolidate their power. 
What he calls organized hypocrisy is the persistent violation of long-standing norms that are
6 Holzgrefe, J. L.: ‘The Humanitarian Intervention Debate’, p. 18
7 Ibid., p. 20
8 See Teson, Fernando R.: ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’ in J. L. Holzgrefe and 
Robert O. Keohane (eds.) Humanitarian Intervention -  Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 93 - 129
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being frequently violated. What underpins his criticism is the basic contention ‘that the 
international system is an environment in which the logic of consequences dominate the logics 
of appropriateness.’9 And the misconception o f sovereignty is part of this predicament. Even 
so, what is important to note in support of cosmopolitan criticisms is that the principle of 
sovereignty has, in a foundational way, come to be understood as, and actually entails, non­
intervention. This principle of non-intervention is deeply enshrined in the UN Charter. The 
critical provision o f the Charter is found in Article 2(4) in specifying that
‘All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use o f force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence o f any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.’10
And as Byers and Chesterman note, the ordinary meaning o f Article 2(4) is clear: the use of 
force across borders is simply not permitted. There are, however, the two exceptions to the 
Article applied to the Kosovo intervention, but neither makes any mention of humanitarian 
intervention. The two exceptions deal with the necessary potential use of force to maintain and 
restore international security, adopted under the Chapter VII and the last resolution before the 
intervention Resolution 1203 of 24 October 1998. Thus, there is no doubt, as already alluded 
to, that along with the qualification of sovereignty, the use of force is the source of the problem 
in the context of international justice especially in the case of humanitarian intervention. What 
is notable here, then, is the realisation of just how little a role the idea of humanitarian 
intervention played in the development of the idea of sovereignty towards an almost sacrosanct 
principle between and after the two world wars. Concerns about the norm’s potentially 
negative consequences, has meant that sovereignty has been rigidly privileged over 
humanitarian intervention. It is consequences such as the impact humanitarian intervention 
inevitably has on the territorial integrity of states, the negative side-effects of the use of force, 
the often unrealistic expectations put on an oppressed people and the potential of long term 
‘occupation’ post settlement, which raises the concerns. Up until recently, sovereignty had of 
course been seen to be the most efficient way to protect a state from aggressors, however,
9 Krasner, Stephen D.: Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999), p. 6
10 Cited in Byers, Michael and Chesterman, Simon: ‘Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law in in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. 
Keohane (eds.) Humanitarian Intervention -  Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 177 -2 0 3 , p. 181
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those calling for more interventionism in contemporary international relations emphasise the 
weakness, or even failure of state structures, many of which are conflict-ridden societies, 
where hiding behind sovereignty provides opportunities for criminal activity. 11
In this way, the political philosopher Henry Shue adamantly voices his concern for the 
proclaimed legal efficacy of the principle of sovereignty, and its perceived logical appendix 
non-intervention. He is one who firmly believes in sovereignty as responsibility and presents a 
convincing argument for a limited notion of sovereignty underpinned by the claim that rights 
necessarily imply duties. For Shue, sovereignty is inherently limited because the duties that are 
constitutive of the right of sovereignty essentially constrain the activity of states in the 
international society. Because sovereignty implies duties there can be no absolute right of non­
intervention. He firmly notes that although ‘[m]orality’s work is indirect [it is not] 
irrelevant.’12
Shue presents both a historical and philosophical argument. He uses Vattel and Wolff as 
his prime historical examples to illustrate that the first general law of international relations for 
these jurists was a positive duty of mutual aid limited only by duties to the state’s own people
I ' j
and such assistance was not necessarily to be construed as intervention. Thus, Shue wants to 
argue that the modem principle of sovereignty has been eroded over time to something which 
it did not originally imply. What Shue ultimately wants to suggest is that if sovereignty is 
conceptually to be understood as a right it must be limited. As he states, ‘the content of 
sovereignty blinds us to its form, but its form imposes unseen limits on its content.’14 Thus, 
sovereignty for states does not imply having indefeasible and total discretion. The difficult part 
is of course, to determine some specific limits, but Shue fervently emphasises that one of those 
constraints or limits on state sovereignty is fundamental individual rights. Such constraints are 
called ‘default duties’ and the point he is trying to make is that default duties ‘do not come into 
play until some more fundamental duty has not been honoured.’15 And when the primary duty 
to protect basic core rights is not performed, a secondary, default duty, must immediately come 
into play. This, of course, raises the issue of who is obliged to discharge this secondary duty, 
and as we shall see, in almost all of the thinkers discussed in this thesis, they raised the same 
concerns. However, regardless of whether this can ever be resolved, Shue’s arguments and
11 Welsh, Jennifer: ‘ Introduction’, p. 2
12 Shue, Henry: ‘Limiting Sovereignty’ in Jennifer Welsh (ed.) Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 11 -  28, p. 12 - 13
13 Ibid., p. 13
14 Ibid., p. 13-14
15 Ibid., p. 17
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those of others who have presented similar propositions (such as for instance Fernando Teson, 
Nicholas Wheeler, Allen Buchanan, Stanley Hoffmann, David Held, and indeed Stephen 
Krasner)16 relating to the need to rethink the doctrine of sovereignty, have, conceptually at 
least, done some mileage in thinking about international justice. Shue gets to the core of the 
issue by saying that 4 in my view it would be preposterous to suggest that there is a universal 
negative duty not to commit genocide, but that there is no positive duty to protect intended
* • 1 7victims.’ However, it would seem that in enforcing duties to prevent severe human rights 
violations, the most heinous being genocide, the reality of today’s international justice very 
much tips the scales in favour of non-intervention.
Even so, given this strong scepticism about the efficiency o f the modem day doctrine of 
sovereignty John Rawls retains it as central for international justice in what he calls ‘a realistic 
utopia’ in his Law o f  Peoples. Rawls’s international project has been criticised by such liberals 
as Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz and Martha Nussbaum for not taking the cosmopolitan
• 1 ftdoctrine far enough. One o f their core criticisms is that Rawls puts too much emphasis on the 
sovereign state (or Peoples in his terminology), and in this sense, when it comes to 
humanitarian intervention his conception is not far removed from that of a communitarian such 
as Michael Walzer. Both theorists argue that as a response to serious human rights violations, a 
country can justifiably go to war on the grounds of it. This is the 'supreme emergency’. 
Rawls’s notion of a duty to assist would, for instance, mean that against the South African 
apartheid ‘forceful’ diplomatic, cultural and economic sanctions, but not armed intervention, 
would be endorsed. The same would hold true in the case of violations towards women that 
falls short of genocide and mass rape. Such interventions are solely reserved for cases of mass 
murder such as genocide and instances of slavery. Rawls says ‘it may be asked by what right 
well-ordered liberal and decent (non-liberal) peoples are justified in interfering with an outlaw 
state on the grounds that this outlaw state has violated human rights.’ To this he answers ‘these
16 See, Wheeler, Nicholas: Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society,
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003); Buchanan, Allen: Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: 
Moral Foundations o f  International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Hoffmann, Stanley: 
The Ethics and Politics o f  Humanitarian Intervention, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1996); Held, David: Democracy and the global order: from  the modern state to cosmopolitan 
governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995)
17 Shue, Henry: ‘Limiting Sovereignty’ p. 18
18 See Pogge, Thomas W.: World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms, (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); Beitz, Charles: ‘Does Global Inequality Matter’ in Pogge, Thomas 
W. (ed.) Global Justice, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 106-122; Nussbaum, Martha: Frontiers o f  Justice 
-  Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007)
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peoples simply do not tolerate outlaw states. This refusal to tolerate those states is a
consequence of liberalism and decency.’19
This brings us to another relevant issue, namely, the communitarian arguments for a
much more limited understanding of the norm of humanitarian intervention, rather than state
sovereignty. This is seen not only to be the most effective way of protecting peoples’ right to
self- determination, as Michael Walzer calls it, but is also recognised by communitarians who
place an intrinsic value on state sovereignty itself. Walzer famously claims that there cannot be
a just society, until there in fact is a society ‘and the adjective just doesn’t determine, it only
modifies, the substantive life of the societies it describes.’20 Most cosmopolitans would say
that this is wrong for the reason that this is exactly what justice does -  understandings of
justice do, in a very foundational way, constitute and determine societies, and to suggest
otherwise is the same as implying that it is only after a society has been formed that it becomes 
• 21shaped by normative matters. For Walzer, the thin reiterated universalism from the thicker 
particular morals of a society would necessarily limit any cosmopolitan understanding of 
international justice. However, despite a very different conception of the universality (as it is 
the foundations) of norms, Walzer’s has restated his legalist paradigm to put more emphasis on 
the importance of the just and unjust use of force and does present an argument of 
humanitarian intervention. His hugely influential book Just and Unjust Wars has become a 
cornerstone in the conceptual debate about the legality of wars. Although he underlines the 
morally necessary idea of self-determination, he nevertheless revises the legalist paradigm to 
include humanitarian intervention in cases where genocide is taking place. As he says
‘[hjumanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of
22success) to an act “that shocks the moral conscience of mankind”.’ However, Walzer notes 
that the formula for this kind of action is permissive. For him, just interventions always require
constraint, but such constraints are often ignored. As a general rule it is best to insist on an
21absolute rule of non-intervention.
In sum, then, modem conceptions of humanitarian intervention exhibit these main 
features: the apparent irrevocable struggle between human rights and sovereignty, or as it is,
19 Rawls, John: Law o f  Peoples with ‘‘The Idea o f  Public Reason Revisited”, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), p. 81
20 Cited in Shue, Henry: ‘Limiting Sovereignty’ p. 25
21 Ibid., p. 25
22 Walzer, Michael: Just and Unjust Wars -  a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York: 
Basic Books, fourth edition, 2006), p. 107
23 Ibid., p. 108
the competing tensions of the universalism of transnational moral standards versus the 
particularism of state sovereignty; ideas about individual obligations to the wider international 
community in the interest of humanity; reconciling moral and political aspects of international 
relations; ideas about rights of people and their right to self-determination; saving strangers; 
third party intervention, and issues of just war and the use of force. What I want to suggest, as 
alluded above, is that these themes are identifiable and persistent through the early modem 
period; however, they pertain to a very different discourse. Let me illustrate this with some 
examples. For instance, the consideration of sovereignty is very different and depends on the 
perceived political contexts of the time. Shue seems to recognise this, with his explorations of 
Wolff and Vattel. This historicist exploration of sovereignty is central to his criticism of 
sovereignty, and from it emerges the interesting point that non-intervention and sovereignty 
were not always as inextricably tied as they are today. This goes to illustrate how by not 
understanding the full development of a norm, in this case sovereignty, leaves us conceptually 
impoverished because it assumes that the conceptual sacredness of sovereignty has always 
been the case. We see, then, how the idea of sovereignty is situated in a particular historical 
discourse, which is contingent upon its own development. Humanitarian intervention relates 
intimately to this development. By looking at the emergence of the idea of humanitarian 
intervention in the early modem period we are able to discover the extent to which the rise of 
the sovereign state and the principle of state sovereignty affected discussions of humanitarian 
intervention. As will be explored more in depth below, writing pre- Westphalia the idea of 
sovereignty is underdeveloped in the works of Grotius. For this reason, tensions relating to 
intervention and sovereignty appear to be negligible. This is very different from Pufendorf, 
who writing in the near aftermath of Westphalia, wrestled to come to terms with intervention, 
emphasising instead a stronger case for sovereignty as part of international justice. If one takes 
Burke’s understanding of sovereignty, writing more than a century after Pufendorf, the 
sovereign states of Europe were part of a wider moral community, the Commonwealth of 
Europe, which prescribed an inherent duty to preserve its freedoms and values by intervention 
if necessary. Although the preponderance of power of any one state in the balance of power 
threatens sovereignty, for Burke, the concept of the commonwealth was more important than 
sovereignty. Incidentally, Burke adhered to a weaker idea of sovereignty than Pufendorf, 
because his idea of intervention in revolutionary France took precedence over its sovereignty 
in that it was part of the Commonwealth of Europe. This especially underlies the argument that
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the doctrine of sovereignty has not always been formulated in such unqualified and absolutist 
terms of non-intervention. Burke will be discussed in chapter 6.
Another example of how the features o f modem ideas of humanitarian intervention are 
identifiable in the past is the idea of just war theory. It is fair to say, that for thinkers such as 
Vitoria, Suarez, Gentili and Grotius their whole law of war projects are concerned with 
constraints on state or sovereign actions in international relations as will be discussed in 
chapters 1 and 3, respectively. For these natural law thinkers a crucial component of the ju s ad 
bellum doctrine was the principle of right intent as well as a prudential outcome. These are 
ideas, which in particular have been central for Walzer’s just war theory. Although endorsing 
the requirement that the moral motive should be the dominant in the mix, Walzer posits the 
idea of mixed moral motives for just war. What Walzer wants to argue is that humanitarian 
intervention is almost always undertaken with ‘mixed motives’ and he concludes that the fact 
of mixed motives ‘is not necessarily an argument against humanitarian intervention [...] but it 
is a reason to be sceptical.’24 Like the natural law thinkers, Walzer also emphasises the 
desirability or, as it is, the necessity of a humanitarian outcome as a strong condition for the 
justness of humanitarian intervention (post ju s  bellum). However, the key issue is that Walzer 
attempts to work out a secular theory of just war; this is, as we shall see, very different from 
the natural law thinkers, who retain a strong religious foundational just war theory, based on 
the law of nature.
Another theme is the perceived duty and right of the international community to 
intervene in another state where gross human rights violations are taking place, grounded on a 
common moral necessity. This is something that Rawls has argued in his stipulation that well- 
ordered liberal and decent peoples have a right to go to war against outlaw states. Although 
somewhat different from Rawls, Burke presented this as a justification for intervention in 
France, when he argues that not only does the states of Europe have a duty to go to war against 
outlaw states, they also have a right. As such, the broader theme of Burke’s justification for 
intervention echoes in the work of Rawls but it is based on a very different platform of 
justification. What is key here is that they, although Rawls to much lesser degree than Burke, 
purport a moral international community within which states act and have duties towards if it is 
threatened. However, their two moral communities are perceived very differently, and so are
24 Walzer, Michael: Just and Unjust Wars, p. 102; this idea is o f course much debated in contemporary 
literature, and it is beyond the scope of this study to comment further on it her. It is sufficient to say that 
in debating political, legal and moral dimensions o f intervention, one can see the potential predicament of 
not defining absolute motives for grounds for just war.
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their justifications for humanitarian intervention. The moral community that Burke presents 
and which grounds his humanitarianism he calls the Commonwealth of Europe, which is 
morally grounded in the prescribed and immemorial customs and values of Europe.
Briefly stated, another modem identifiable theme that deserves mentioning here is 
perhaps the most obvious. The modem idea of saving people seems to be a very different 
concept from that of the early modem thinkers. For them, it was, more than anything else, a 
question of saving people’s spiritual life.
These few examples testify to what I have been attempting to elucidate -  namely that 
historically perceived, the very idea o f humanitarian intervention is profoundly dissimilar to 
the one we recognise today. As such, the above exploration of contemporary understandings of 
humanitarian intervention and what is at stake sets the reference-point in the way the norm has 
developed but awaits further explorative analysis of how it developed in past times against 
different legal, political, and moral backgrounds. This will be elucidated further below; 
however, for the general justification of this study, I want to show next that although some 
scholars have taken a cursory glance at past conceptualisations of the duty to intervene, they 
have not taken the care to explore the theoretical justifications.
The Proper Trajectory for the Classical Text
With the ideas such as humanitarian intervention (and sovereignty), it is not only interesting 
but also necessary to return to the classic thinkers in order to get, at least, an overview of how 
ideas develop and moreover come to be understood, for better or for worse, in any given 
context. In the example of sovereignty, thinkers such as Shue recognise the importance of this 
and as we saw use the classical thought of Wolff and Vattel for the justification of his claim 
that the inviolability of sovereignty (the absolute emphasis of non-intervention) has been 
distorted in its modem context from what it was historically perceived to be. In his call for a 
more nuanced understanding of the concept of sovereignty, Shue implicitly argues that because 
non-intervention was not absolutely ascribed to past understandings of the principle of 
sovereignty this is conceptually relevant for how we should understand it today. As such, 
Shue’s work illustrates the relevance of exploring these past ideas; however, it also illustrates 
how carelessly this can be done. This will be further elucidated below.
The relevance o f the endeavour to look at the historical development and emergence of 
norms has only recently been recognised and explored, but not to any great extent. There has 
been over the past two decades a growing interest in the classical heritage of international
15
relations. Important works by authors such as Andrew Linklater, David Boucher, Martin Wight 
and Simon Chesterman, to mention only a few, sought to trace the development of issues 
pertaining to modem international relations by emphasising the relevance of a more historical 
framework within which to understand such issues, and we should not underestimate the 
mileage these theorists have done in suggesting that there is a particular role for the history of 
ideas in international relations theory.25 For instance, by emphasising the importance of a 
historical framework within which to understand certain norms, say sovereignty, it means we 
have the tools to unlock how it has been understood and employed over time and in different 
contexts. However, there still seems to be a considerable gap in the literature in exploring 
certain of these ideas such as humanitarian intervention. Andrew Linklater has a valid 
approach for the historical trajectory of some o f the most classical thinkers, such as Pufendorf 
and Vattel, and their renewed relevance for international relations theory. However, although 
he discusses some of the same thinkers as this study in his influential work Men and Citizens in 
the Theory o f  International Relations, he does not focus on humanitarian intervention, focusing 
instead on the perennial concern o f the duties of citizens and the universal duties of men -  a 
dispute in which, of course, humanitarian intervention is implied. David Boucher emphasises 
the importance of underlying the changing foundations of norms and understanding them in 
their proper historical context and recognises this in his recent book The Limits o f  Ethics in 
International Relations -  Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Human Rights in Transition 
(2009), and while he sets out discursively to explore the highly misunderstood and contentious 
relationship between, as the title indicates, natural law, natural rights and human rights he only 
incidentally explores issues pertaining to humanitarian intervention in the early modem period.
With his work, Boucher has set the scholarly investigative precedence with which to 
conceptually explore these ideas; however, only a few other scholars can match such 
historically sensitive endeavours. Others, such as the famous international jurist Theodor 
Meron, who will be explored more in depth in chapter 3 in relation to Grotius, is an example of 
the type of superficial work that at times is being done within the field. In this way, although 
Meron recognises the importance of Grotius’s intellectual heritage for international law it is
25 See, Linklater, Andrew: Men and Citizens in the Theory o f  International Relations, (London: 
Macmillan, second edition 1990); Boucher, David: Political Theories o f  International Relations -  from  
Thucydides to the present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Boucher, David: The Limits o f  Ethics 
in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights and Human Rights in Transition, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009); Wight, Martin: International Theory: The Three Traditions, Gabriele 
Wight and Brian Porter (eds.), (London: Continuum, 2002); Chesterman, Simon: Just War or Just Peace 
-  Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
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always cursory and rather anachronistic. What he is doing, is justifying his conclusions on ill- 
conceived and historically distorted premises, by conflating natural rights with the modem 
conception of human rights, and hence assuming that humanitarian intervention is 
fundamentally the same over time. Meron’s attitude to the past is not that of the historian but 
of a jurist whose interest in the past is to somehow illustrate its contemporary relevance. This 
is what Michael Oakeshott calls the practical past, in which present day considerations dictate 
the relevance, or importance, of what one investigates. This is also the case with the feminist 
and political theorist Martha Nussbaum, who, like Meron, fails to fully explore Grotius.
Nussbaum seeks to support her foundational notion of human fellowship by drawing on
• • 26 , . . . »   ^Grotius’s foundations. This is central to her justification of the universality o f the capability
approach she is presenting - as indeed our natural state is one that seeks and flourishes in
human fellowship. However, she does this without adequately developing her own or indeed
Grotius’s in the process. This becomes particularly problematic in employing Grotius as the
foundational support in her endeavours to move beyond Rawls’s weaker notion of
humanitarian intervention and present a stronger account. Nussbaum is unable to accept the
Grotian foundations for such fellowship because in her view they would limit universal
applicability, hence the dichotomy in her Grotian origins. The root of this conceptual problem
seems to be her assumption that Grotius secularised the natural law tradition. This, as will be
made more explicit further below, is not the case. This contention is conceptually dangerous
because with a secularised account of inter-human obligation, the Grotian conceptions of
justice have no foundational basis. For Grotius, we are bound to this inter-human obligation
through his interpretation of natural law, and it is ultimately derived from what God wills for
us. Without it, Nussbaum needs to tell us why we should act in a Grotian manner, not just rely
on her identification that we should act in a Grotian manner. We may be drawn to Nussbaum’s
suggestions intuitively, but that does not make it a strong comprehensive political theory.
Nussbaum will be discussed in chapter 3. What Nussbaum and Meron in effect are doing, is
seeking epistemic authority by using elements of Grotius to add more credibility to their
projects. Although this is presumably done with the best intentions, in their search for an
intellectual heritage they are instead doing it great disservice.
Simon Chesterman is another theorist who affirms that various international jurists in 
the early modem period present grounds for war founded upon humanitarian considerations.
26 Nussbaum, Martha: Frontiers o f Justice -  Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, (Cambridge 
MA: The Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press, 2007); see especially p. 255
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However, this research is by no means adequately pursued. In his book Just War or Just Peace 
-  Humanitarian Intervention and International Law he sets out to trace the genealogy of 
humanitarian intervention. However, his first chapter ‘origin of humanitarian intervention’ 
focuses more on what he calls actual examples of what could be claimed to be humanitarian
fL
intervention in the 19 Century, namely the joint intervention of Great Britain, France and 
Russia in aid of Greek insurgents 1827, French occupation of Syria 1860 -  1, and US 
intervention in Cuba 1898. He could, nevertheless, easily have added more examples to his list. 
One may argue, for instance, that Britain’s policing of the abolition of the slave trade and later 
on, slavery, was an act of humanitarian intervention. Slavery, for instance, was something 
Burke was vehemently against. It would seem that these particular events do give credence to 
his aim to emphasise the heritage of humanitarian intervention and the place it has within pre­
charter international relations. However, this focus fails to provide us with the full picture of 
the principle -  in so far as it does not say anything how these ideas emerged, developed and 
culminated in the various interventionists’ decisions that Chesterman highlights. Without a 
fuller picture, such examples remains impoverished, because we are missing important aspects 
of their historical development and heritage, both in a legal and of course in a moral way. 
Chesterman spends little time exploring humanitarian intervention in relation to Vitoria, 
Grotius and Pufendorf. He argues that ‘it is clear that the ethical and legal origins of this 
doctrine [i.e. humanitarian intervention] stretch back much further to the moral impetus to war 
over religious differences, and the legal restraints that came to be placed on intervention as
27sovereignty emerged as the axiom of an international society of equals.’ He notes, however, 
that the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ only emerged in the 19th Century as a possible 
exception to the rule o f non-intervention developed in the 18th Century, but even so, its 
meaning was by no means clear.28 There is no doubt that notions of humanitarian intervention 
can be traced before this, and as I intend to argue, this first came into existence as a direct 
consequence of the Discovery of the New World. Although, for this thesis, I make no 
assumptions of historical events that could be said to pertain to humanitarian intervention; 
what I am suggesting is that the norms and ideas were certainly present regardless of whether 
or not they had been acted upon. Thus, even though Chesterman recognises the historical 
aspect of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, with this study I want to show that its 
derivation is much more complicated than vaguely expounding it as a principle reflected ‘in
27 Chesterman, Simon: Just War or Just Peace, p. 25
28 Ibid., p. 3
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the tension between the belief in the justice of a war waged against an immoral enemy and the 
emerging principle of non-intervention as the corollary of sovereignty,’29 and for such reasons 
deserves a much more detailed analytical exploration. This is what I set out to do in this thesis.
As such, the justification for this thesis is, in this respect, to fill the gap, and to look at 
the issues as they emerged in their historical contexts, and to show how the grounds for 
intervention change, along with the principles of justification. The point I wish to make is that 
‘crimes that shock the moral conscience of mankind’, to use Michael Walzer’s phraseology, 
have always been a concern, and arguments about how to deal with it as part of international 
justice have been at the centre of the debate for centuries. From such moral and juridical 
debates amongst natural law thinkers, a norm o f humanitarian intervention emerged. In this *
sense, there is a great tradition within the history of preventive warfare and collective security, 
issues that have been essential to United Nations (UN) projects post World War II. The 
concept o f humanitarian intervention is still developing but remains a controversial issue 
ultimately because it inherently brings about conditions that clash with the legal, moral and 
political considerations o f international relations. It is my claim that clashes pertaining to the 
principle of humanitarian intervention are traceable through history and have left in their wake 
the emergence of norms which today we would term ‘humanitarian intervention’. However, as 
emphasised, these norms are not related to the contemporary norm we today call humanitarian 
intervention, not even vestigially. We cannot assume that the principle as it developed in the 
16th to the 18th Century is the same as the principle we recognise today; if we do so, we are 
back to the conceptual lacuna where we began.
The ideas are quite distinct, mainly because the conditions of belief in them have 
changed so considerably. A religious and theological context surrounded their early 
development, which was self consciously jettisoned in modem times in order to appeal to a 
universal audience. The implication is that humanitarian intervention is not a perennial, 
ahistorical principle that relates to the same issues over time and place. What is enduring is the 
conflictual relationship between legal, moral and political ideas. And there is no doubt that the 
controversy surrounding humanitarian intervention provides sufficient illustration of just how 
contentious this relationship is. The contentiousness between such ideas have always been at 
the centre of international ethics, indeed, it has conditioned the effectiveness of international 
ethics, thus informing or even constituting principles, such as sovereignty or humanitarian 
intervention. Let me briefly illustrate my point with an example: Sepulveda, who I discuss in
29 Ibid., p. 7
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chapter 2, presented an argument for the forced Christianisation of the American Indians 
grounding it on the justification that all Christians had a duty to save the souls o f unbelievers. 
This idea o f saving the souls of Native Americans, as an instance o f humanitarian intervention 
can only be properly grasped by understanding the religious background of the day, which in a 
highly foundational way informed the political and moral framing of international relations. 
This particular example also shows how influential Aristotle was in this Christian world view. 
Las Casas did not originally deny that there were natural slaves; he intimated that blacks fell 
into this category, but he wanted emphatically to deny that the American Indians did.
Ultimately, I want to emphasise that historical notions of humanitarian intervention rest 
firmly in just war theory and therefore the law o f nature and o f nations. The foundation of such 
a norm is much less clear today, perhaps due to anti-foundational aspirations that seem to be 
the expedient groundings of modem universalism. For thinkers such as Vitoria, Suarez, 
Gentili, Sepulveda, Grotius, and Pufendorf, notions of humanitarian intervention are 
substantially grounded in natural law as well as in the religious aspects o f the period. Thus, in 
order to have a richer understanding o f how and why modem conceptions have arisen, it is 
important to understand in what respects they are continuous with or deviate from their 
predecessors. However, before illustrating the themes of how notions of humanitarian 
intervention can be understood and how they relate to the thinkers I explore, let me attempt to 
explain the moral framework of just war and the law of nature from which these issues were 
understood.
Disentangling the Vocabulary: Just War and the Law of Nature
It is gross violations o f human rights that underpin contemporary justifications of humanitarian 
intervention. It is, then, important to somehow distinguish between vocabularies of human 
rights and early modem period doctrines of natural rights, to avoid making the same mistake as 
Meron and assume that natural rights were conceived in the same way as human rights are 
today. Conceptions o f natural rights are not as easily transferrable to today’s human rights. 
One main reason is that natural rights relate much more closely to the natural law than is
• 30usually thought to be the case, and as such are strongly foundational. It is not the purpose of 
my thesis to explore the complex relations between conceptions of natural rights and 
conceptions of human rights. Natural rights are an ambiguous term and many thinkers play 
deliberately on that ambiguity. In relation to the natural law tradition, such rights are derivative
30 See Boucher, David: The Limits o f  Ethics in International Relations
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from that law that is they stand outside o f the person. Although, modem conceptions of human 
rights seek to, by and large, to sever their connection with this foundationalism in ethics 
(which seems to have been the case since 1948), nevertheless, philosophically, the justification 
of the notion of human rights varies considerably. For the modem jurist, however, what 
matters is not the philosophical ground of such rights, but the fact that they have some basis in 
law, either customary or conventional.31 While David Boucher then sets out to disentangle the 
different and often indiscriminate vocabularies pertaining to the contemporary human rights 
culture, by clarifying what separates and what unites the natural law, natural rights, and human 
rights vocabularies within the field of international relations, I, although touching upon similar 
issues, am interested in disentangling the vocabularies pertaining to humanitarian intervention. * 
I do this by using his conceptual framework.
What I am aiming to prove is that there is a discourse of humanitarian intervention, and it 
is necessary to explore the different context of how just grounds for war can be said to be 
based on humanitarian considerations. Firstly, it is relevant to explain the relationship between 
humanitarian intervention and just war theory. Second, determining that theories of just war at 
times were grounded in humanitarian considerations, where would such corresponding 
obligations or rights be said have their moral source - in the law of nature or in the law of 
nations? The moral source of humanitarian obligations forms part of the ethical dilemma of 
humanitarian intervention. If it can be said to be the law of nature, then for most of these 
thinkers, obligations of humanitarian intervention would be much more absolute and thereby 
understood to be ‘perfect’. These two main questions will form the basis of my overarching 
structure for each thinker I explore.
To address the first issue: what is just war, and how can humanitarian intervention be 
understood as being an aspect of just war? Humanitarian intervention in such instances can be 
deemed to come under conventional ju s  ad bellum, or the right to go to war as it entails 
military intervention. For most of these early writers humanitarian intervention is part of the 
jus ad bellum as saving innocent people from tyrannical oppression was perceived as the 
obligations which constituted a right to go to war, or a just cause of war. Furthermore, the fact 
that humanitarian intervention is part of just war needs to be carefully differentiated from what
31 It is important to note that many of the documents in which our modem human rights are 
specified are conventions. Even the terms o f reference o f the International Criminal Court do not 
try to ground humanitarian and human rights in natural law or natural rights philosophies, but 
instead claim that they are declaratory o f customary law.
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we might call humanitarian aid. Chesterman aptly notes that humanitarian intervention must be 
separated from what could be termed humanitarian assistance (not to be confused with Rawls’ 
duty to assist), which pertains to food, shelter, famine.32 This is an important point to make, for 
as will be apparent in chapter 5 dealing with W olff and Vattel who use famine as an example 
of how this would pertain to a state’s duty to assist other states, but only on request. Thus, in 
such instances humanitarian assistance is not an aspect of just war.
To address the second issue, the necessity of working out the moral source of 
international obligations: what is the distinction between the law of nature and the law of 
nations (or the ju s  gentium)? The relationship between natural law and the law of nations was 
one that perplexed even the most adept o f philosophers. It was more often than not ambivalent 
and ambiguous in the early modem jurists, especially some o f the thinkers explored in this 
thesis such as Vitoria, Gentili, Suarez and Grotius. The international jurist Samuel Rachel a 
contemporary of Pufendorf, was even more radical in proposing to eradicate the confusion and 
ambiguity by making a complete division between the two types of law. His arguments, 
however, did not prevail and largely went unacknowledged. Against his predecessors he, in his 
De Jure Naturae et Gentium Dissertationes noted
‘I am afraid that [they have] addressed [themselves] to this task in order to pay homage to the texts o f Roman Law 
and to give further support to the received division o f the Law of Nations into Primary and Secondary. For the 
commentators are so much under the sway of the old jurists as to say that knowledge of the Law of Nature is 
obtained by Reason, and the knowledge of the Law of Nations by Reasoning.’33
Although giving great importance to reason most of the early natural law theorists, such as 
Gentili and Suarez ground obligations to conform with the precepts of natural law in the firm 
belief that God is its author.34 This central claim is based on the belief that reason alone cannot 
create or sustain the obligation. In fact it is otherwise difficult to comprehend the moral force 
of this argument if indeed the obligations and rights that individuals and nations have under the 
natural law is not brought about by the will of God. This is implicitly argued in Gentili when 
he asserts that people who do not worship God stand for this reason outside the natural law and 
cannot enjoy its protection.35 As we shall see in the case of Suarez, reason was the instrument 
by which you discover or derive the precepts from the natural law and in this sense Suarez
j2 Chesterman, Simon: Just War or Just Peace, p. 3
33 Rachel, XXXV, p. 180
34 Boucher, David: The Limits o f  Ethics in International Relations, p. 112
35 Gentili, book 1, chaps ix, p 65
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argued that our moral obligation did not derive from reason alone. Reason is the foundations of 
natural law and provides the criterion of objective right and wrong -  it is not itself law. 
According to him, then, reason did not give you obligation, it revealed it, and ultimately it is 
God’s law that makes it obligatory. This is an important issue, because it is exactly by not 
recognising this fact in most natural law thinkers that some modem theorists have conflated 
issues of obligatory force. This is especially the case of Grotius where modem political 
theorists such as Richard Tuck, who argues that Grotius represented the shift where he 
secularised the natural law tradition. Martha Nussbaum, as already noted, asserts similar 
assumptions about Grotius, albeit more vague in her case, which leads her to overstate 
Grotius’s argument for humanitarian intervention. This will be discussed in chapter 3. If in fact * 
reason created the moral obligations pertaining to just war and humanitarian intervention, in 
the case of Grotius and other natural law thinkers, then their natural law theories would simply 
not have been forceful enough, as no foundation for obligations could be found.
It is widely held that the modem origins of the Taw of nations’ are to be found in the 
early seventeenth-century works of Suarez’s Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore (1612) 
and Grotius’s De jure belli et pacis (1625/1631). In an era of extreme growth of political 
statism and colonialism, they were aware of the basic problems of international diplomacy 
which included the just causes and conduct of war, state sovereignty, neutrality or intervention, 
maritime law, and treaties. The problem had been to determine to what extent international law 
was derived correspondingly from the universal ju s naturale and from the states’ various 
prescriptive ju s gentium. It was assumed that the universal and ethical norm of the natural law 
applied equally and concurrently to inter-national and intra-national relations. The one great 
exception to this was Hobbes’ theory that nations were related to each other as individuals in 
The state of nature’; thus his theory of international law being contractual, expedient and
• T 7secular, natural law was defined as self-preservation. It was then Hobbes who made the 
controversial move of completely identifying the two, the only difference between them being 
their different subjects. In this way Hobbes’s importance for international relations lies in the 
way that he was framing the problem rather than providing the solution. It was up to his
36 What is interesting, as will be apparent in subsequent chapters on Suarez and Grotius, is that from their 
attempt to distinguish these two systems of laws meant stirring a relatively middle path between the 
Intellectualists/Rationalists and the Nominalists/Voluntarists positions.
37 Stanlis, Peter: ‘Edmund Burke and the Law of Nations’ in the American Journal o f  International Law, 
vol. 47, no. 3 (July, 1953) p. 397 -  413, p. 397
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successors, namely Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel to provide the solution.38 Although Pufendorf 
had tried to reconcile the selfish tendencies o f mankind, he only recognized international law 
as far as it was a denomination of the natural law, and in this way agreed with Hobbes. 
However, on an important point he differed from his English predecessor in asserting that 
natural law had a sovereign capable of enforcing it, making natural law, for Pufendorf, equally 
as morally obligatory as positive law. The genius move of Pufendorf was thus to make states 
morally subjective to the law of nature. Notwithstanding, natural law was seen as the moral 
basis of international justice, but once men had been separated into corporate nations, as 
Suarez asserted, it could never be applied directly and abstractly, but always indirectly through 
the justice o f the various civil laws, customs, conventions, institutions and historical 
circumstances of each nation. This understanding of the law of nations became even more 
evident for 18th Century thinkers such as Wolff, Vattel and Burke, who took the necessary step 
to separate the two systems of laws and in conjunction of the doctrine of sovereignty the law of 
nations came more to the fore as states were seen to be the main actors of international 
relations. It was, in fact, Vattel who more than anyone else expressly established the law of 
nations solely as the law between sovereign states putting the emphasis upon the sovereign 
integrity of the state and thus placing it, and not individuals, at the centre of international law. 
From here on it was the state that became the subject of rights and duties, displacing the 
individual completely from the system of international law. In this way, the move from the 
more religious based ju s  gentium (or rights of peoples) was made to more modem customary 
law. Thus, from the early 19th Century international justice was grounded in a much more 
positivistic and legalistic framework. As such, for the purpose of my thesis it makes sense to 
stop at Burke.
Changing Reasons for Humanitarian Intervention - some historical themes
The Discovery of the New World and the juridical and theological reaction it brought in its 
wake provides ample illustration for the emergence of ideas of humanitarian intervention. In 
fact, this important event underlined the juridical debate on international ethics for the 
following three centuries and jurisprudential considerations such as the doctrine of Terra 
Nullius and theories of ownership and property rights were direct consequences of this 
normative and legal framing. It was these that determined the boundaries of the duties of
38 Boisen, Camilla and Boucher, David: ‘Hobbes and the Subjection of International Relations to Law 
and Morality’, in Raia Prokhovnik and Gabriella Slomp (eds.), International Political Theory after 
Hobbes, (London: Palgrave, forthcoming 2010)
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mankind, and in relation to the American Indians for instance, they were thus claimed firmly to 
be within this normative and legal jurisdiction. These are issues which continue to be 
contentious to this day in that the consequences of those earlier encounters in which debates 
about humanitarian considerations were discussed have continued to reverberate down the 
centuries in so far as ‘intervening’ to save souls, or to ensure personal safety entailed 
establishing sovereignty over foreign peoples and their permanent exclusion from the 
international sphere (consider for example cases such as the Aboriginals in Australia or the 
Sioux Indians in North America). Thus, from this historical context and the perceived moral 
framework of the law of nature with which it was understood, the exemplars of humanitarian 
arguments I will explore in this thesis and the underlying development of how notions of 
humanitarian intervention change, revolve around issues o f saving peoples from abhorrent 
practices such as cannibalism, human sacrifice, sodomy and worshipping false gods, 
suppressing people, to concern for rescuing people from themselves in the hope of saving their 
souls. Also, as emphasised, such issues are explored in the changing international framework 
with the emergence of the norm of sovereignty in the immediate wake o f the Peace of 
Westphalia. This is to show how the grounds for intervention change, along with the principles 
of justification against a changing international context.
What is interesting for most of the earlier thinkers explored here; they purported that 
the universality of the law of nature gave rise to certain rights and duties. It was a strong 
Christian context from which not just certain obligations arose, but also certain questions about 
the worth and dignity of human beings, which otherwise would not have arisen without such a 
world view. And with the discovery of the New World, the Indians somehow had to be 
understood within such a context. From this theological jurisprudential framework the 16th 
Century Spanish Thomists Vitoria and Suarez attempted to justify Spanish imperial rule or as it 
was spiritual enterprises in the New World. From universal law of nature and of nations the 
Spanish had certain natural rights to wage war against the Indians if they denied them safe 
passage or trade. However, from this also followed that they had certain obligations to save the 
Indians, either from abhorrent practices such as cannibalism and other crimes against the law 
of nature, to save their souls. These mutual rights and obligations were derived from the 
universal sociability of individuals in the state of nature. But for Vitoria, wars grounded in 
humanitarian considerations necessarily presupposed the principle of right intent for its 
justification. The principle of right intent is also central for Suarez, who makes it central for his 
justification that the American Indians may be subdued to instruct them to lead more civilised
lives. The Protestant Gentili is one of the first jurists who tried to reconcile the religious 
schisms of the Christian Church by more emphatically expounding the common interests of 
mankind as a way of moving beyond Catholic jurisprudence. This common law of humanity 
dictates that on behalf of innocents, war against barbarians is justified, who with their lewd 
lifestyles breaks the natural bond of humanity and violates the natural law. The perceived 
universality of the natural law meant that none of the three thinkers were ready to sanction 
wars for the purpose of avenging crimes against God, nor to punish unbelievers in the hope of 
saving their souls. This, however, was not the case with the Jesuit Sepulveda, who vigorously 
claimed that Christians have an absolute obligation to save souls that fall outside of Christian 
salvation - by force if  necessary. As already mentioned, he thus promoted the forced 
Christianisation of the Indians, in essence, to save them from themselves. Ultimately, his 
argument was founded upon the Aristotelian contention of natural slavery, a category, to which 
Sepulveda believed that the Indians belonged. Though never as forcefully or emphatically as 
Sepulveda, this type of argument was also employed by Protestant Dutchman Grotius, who, 
although associated with basing his natural law ideas on more non-sectarian grounds, unlike 
the Spanish thinkers, still appealed to theological foundations to support his theory of universal 
punishment of crimes committed against the natural law or providing assistance to an 
oppressed people. For Grotius the crime against the law of nature of killing innocents, the 
sovereign of another state has a right to punish such crimes and thereby intervene in the affairs 
of another state. However, such acts, Grotius contends, are purely permissive because it can 
only be an imperfect duty as the law of nature does not prescribe who should do the punishing, 
and also, the duty to assist others comes second. Although he presents a strong case for natural 
sociability, we have, first and foremost, a duty to preserve ourselves. Following this, for post- 
Westphalian thinkers such as Pufendorf, who struggled to come to terms with the concept of 
sovereignty in the changing circumstances of Europe, the nascent conflict between the duty of 
citizens and of men to the wider moral community was very much to the fore unlike what it 
had been in the previous thinkers. In acknowledging the ‘rights’ of states, Pufendorf was 
reluctant to give carte blanche endorsement to the principle of intervention on humanitarian 
grounds. He is important in this context because, even though he denied any notion of 
humanitarian intervention, which to a certain extent was derived from his positivistic view of 
international law in so far as it was God who was the author, he nevertheless presented an idea 
of the moral person of the state whose sovereignty was grounded in the principle of eminent 
domain. In this way, Pufendorf, more than anyone else, made real conceptual groundwork to
protect the collective rights of the Indians, by claiming against thinkers such as Grotius and 
Locke, that they had sovereign rights to their territory. Pufendorf s understanding of 
sovereignty, or eminent domain, was, more than anything else, meant to be protective of the 
rights of the American Indians and emerged to accommodate such needs, as well as the the 
protection of religious rights in a war weary Europe after the Thirty Years War (1618 - 1648). 
We see then in Pufendorf the conflict between sovereignty and universal moral principles, that 
is, between the duties of citizens and of men. This claim, in itself, was far more humanitarian 
in its conceptual scope than, for instance, what Grotius presented. Following Pufendorf, 18th 
Century jurists such as W olff and Vattel certified a new age, post-Westphalia, where the first 
serious attempts were made to move away from any religious foundations, emphasising the 
pinnacle o f the sovereign state ultimately grounded in the principle of non-intervention, 
although with certain exceptions. Rather than emphasising the principle of humanitarian 
intervention, they instead present a ‘pre-Rawlsian’ call for the duty to assist, thus reaffirming 
the boundaries of the free will and equality of states as the limits for international ethics. For 
Wolff and Vattel there were circumstances when humanitarian intervention was justifiable, but 
there was no general principle to which to appeal, and any such norm had to be severely 
constrained, but this did not undermine the fact that states had a moral duty to assist one 
another. Edmund Burke, who will be discussed in the final chapter, was much more prepared 
to endorse humanitarian intervention, but one may argue that the circumstances were different, 
and based upon what he called the common law of Europe. This common law of Europe was 
constituted by the wider moral base of the Commonwealth of Europe. Interestingly, for Burke 
the moral base of this Commonwealth of Europe could be said to function in the same way as 
the conceptually reminiscent common rights of mankind perceived by thinkers such as Gentili 
and Grotius. For Burke, saving the French people from abstract natural rights thought alien to 
the prescriptive morals of the Commonwealth of Europe solidified the conduct of member 
states towards humanitarian intervention. But ultimately it was more for Burke than that: he 
thought he was saving Europeans and not just Frenchmen, and, moreover he argued that the 
British Commonwealth should encompass the rights of Englishmen in America and India.
What this research shows, then, is that it appears that a notion of humanitarian 
intervention was more widely accepted as part of international justice in the early modem 
period, especially in thinkers writing before the Peace of Westphalia, such as Vitoria, Suarez, 
Sepulveda, Gentili and Grotius. There is, in fact, a remarkable shift in the development of the 
principle of humanitarian intervention from pre- to post Westphalia. This shift signals ideas of
sovereignty and non-intervention as foundational principles for international law and 
international relations with a notable impact on the development of the principle of 
humanitarian intervention. Unlike the modem day notion of humanitarian intervention, we see 
that the principle was highly developed in the thinkers of the 16th and 17th Centuries -  and for 
reasons of the central position the state came to occupy in relation to the law of nations the 
justification of intervention became far more equivocal in 19th and 20th Century international 
jurisprudence.39
Armed with an understanding of the historical heritage of the idea of humanitarian 
intervention and the thinkers who explored it, I am able to illuminate that history provides 
evidence for a discourse in humanitarian intervention, which stems back to the classic texts of * 
the thinkers explored in this thesis. I intend not only to demonstrate the normative history of 
humanitarian intervention, but also to address claims about obligation, rights and foundational 
morality pertaining to the complex issues of the principle. The presentation of this discourse 
not only allows me to map the different paths and justifications for the development of 
humanitarian intervention, but can be used as a medium through which I can illustrate the 
irresolvable tension in international relations between the political, moral and legal. This 
identification therefore provides not only greater insight into the trajectory humanitarian 
intervention has taken and the development of (dis)agreed norms which are accepted today, but 
also illustrates a great tradition of tension within international relati
39 Something might need to be said why I do not include a discussion of Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804). 
There are interesting comparisons to be made between Burke and Kant, and the expansion of the moral 
community. This would, however, fall outside the scope and focus o f this study. One obvious reason why 
I do not include Kant in this study is that Kant had no real theory of humanitarian intervention. He argued 
for respecting the sovereignty of each country and explicitly argued against intervening in the affairs of 
another country on the basis of arguments o f ‘helping’ or civilising them (see The Metaphysics o f  Morals 
and Perpetual Peace). Instead, he supports the idea of internal reform, and the idea of states voluntarily 
entering a peaceful federation. Although, from his work, one can read strict requirements about how the 
internal constitution o f states should be (republican) because only human freedom and rights can be 
respected, and he also argues for some strict duties and rights, he nevertheless argues that only internal 
reform should happen, and that it is not the business of other states to ensure it through intervention. He 
argues for only one cosmopolitan right: the right to visit and offer ones services to other countries, but 
again, he does not really connect it to an enforcement mechanism. He also, at one or two places, talks of 
an enemy or evil states, that wages war, which other states might be entitled to go to war with, but these 
are scattered statements, and nothing like a theory o f humanitarian intervention is present here. Although 
from Kant, using his strong moral theory to underlie the importance he gives to human freedom and 
dignity, one might be able to develop such a theory (which many neo-Kantians now try). Kant, however, 
did not; and in an attempt to develop such a theory I would make the same mistake as some of the 
theorists I challenge in this study.
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Chapter 1
Francisco de Vitoria, Alberico Gentili and 
Francisco Suarez
4 If some earthly city should decide to commit 
certain great crimes, it would have to be 
overthrown by decree of the human race’40 
- Gentili (1612)
Introduction
In 1511 the Domincan Antonio Montesinos, one of the first Domicans to arrive at the Island of 
Hispaniola (what is today the Dominican Republic) launched an attack from his pulpit against 
the behaviour of the Spanish colonialists towards the natives
‘I am the voice crying in the Wilderness [...] the voice of Christ in the desert o f this island [...] [saying that] you 
are all in mortal sin [...] on account o f the cruelty and tyranny with which you use these innocent people. Are 
these not men? Have they not rational souls? Must you not love them as you love yourself?’41
This sermon was to change the whole discourse of the Spanish enterprise in the Americas and 
spark off a fierce debate about the rights of the Indians, because what Montesinos inevitably 
brought into question was the Spanish crown’s right in America. The debates that followed 
never centred on whether the Spanish Crown might rule the Indians — no one questioned this -- 
but what Ferdinand, and later Charles V, sought from their advisors was rather what might be 
legitimately taken from the lands -  so ultimately it became a question of property. Although 
the discovery of America precipitated atrocities perpetrated by the Spanish conquistadores, 
who, motivated by greed, sought to exploit and kill the Indians for that purpose, it also inspired 
a serious intellectual debate regarding the rationality and Christianization of the Indians, and
40 Gentili, Alberico: Three Books on the Law o f  War (1612), trans. by John C. Rolfe (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1933), book I, chap. xxv, §198 (Gentili citing St. Augustine)
41 Cited in Blackwell, Peter: A History o f  Latin America -  Empires and Sequels 1450 -  1930 
(Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), p. 83
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ultimately it brought to the fore questions o f the legitimacy of European dealings with the rest 
of world.
In this chapter I want to explore notions of humanitarian intervention in the context of 
the discovery of the New World. I seek to do this in the writings of three very influential and 
important writers, Francisco Vitoria (1480 - 1546), Francisco Suarez (1548 - 1617) and 
Alberico Gentili (1552 - 1608). The main question is what obligations to intervene do these 
thinkers suggest that we have in relation to humanitarian intervention? This, then, is not merely 
the exploration of certain aspects of what could be labelled ‘humanitarian’ within the confines 
of just war theory, but also an exploration of the source of the moral obligatory nature of 
humanitarian intervention. In this way it is important to explore in some detail the relationship 
between the law of nature and the law of nations as the two systems of law from which such 
obligations would derive. However, as noted in the introduction, this relationship proved to be 
ambiguous in most of the 16th and 17th Century thinkers explored in this thesis. Many of them 
often conflated the law o f nature and the law of nations, making them almost indistinguishable. 
Indeed, most thinkers deliberately exploit the ambiguity of the relationship. However, 
regardless of a proper distinction between the law of nature and the law of nations it was by 
applying the universal standards of these two systems of law that justifications could be given 
for waging war against the Indians either through conquest or humanitarian intervention. 
Humanitarian intervention was indeed integral to just war theory, and many of the 
justifications were derived from purported contraventions of the natural law. It was based on 
the claim that the natural rights of the Spaniards were somehow being violated by the 
American Indians who had a duty to respect them. If certain of their internal societal 
arrangements, such as human sacrifice and cannibalism offended humanity, intervention to 
save innocent victims could be justified. Even where such offences were not acknowledged, 
transgressing the law of nations or nature provided sufficient excuse. So for instance 
hindrances to the rights of passage, attempts to prevent the seizure of ‘vacant land’ and gold 
found in that land were done on the ground that the world was held in common, and as such 
these impediments were unjust and gave cause for war. Sepulveda, who is the subject of the 
next chapter, went as far as to argue that the Indians were natural slaves, a contention he based 
on Aristotelian ethics, and if they resisted this natural order of dominion they gave their 
superiors grounds for just war against them. Based on this, it has been argued that regardless of 
the various legal and theological apprehensions at the time the fact remains that natural rights, 
instead of protecting the Indians against the brutality of the Spaniards, was used to justify their
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subjugation.42 Considering the historical fact of violation and exploitation of these people this 
might even be an obvious conclusion to make after exploring these thinkers. Even the most 
sympathetic commentators such as Vitoria, Suarez, and Gentili believed that the Spaniards had 
just cause for waging war against the Indians on the grounds that they had violated the 
universal natural rights which were given by nature and therefore God. However, despite this, 
there are elements in their writings that constitute genuine attempts not just to apply just war 
theory to the case of the American Indians in such a way as to make the precepts of the natural 
law universal but also seek to protect innocents against unlawful aggression and usurpation. As 
we shall see, Gentili and Suarez more unusually favoured humanitarian intervention than 
Vitoria, who seems to have a much more subtle approach to this aspect of just war theory.
It is thus necessary to look more closely at the causes of just war and in this way explore 
what moral obligations do we have to assist other people and how would this come about? 
However, before I attempt to determine the moral basis for intervention, I first want to explore 
the obligations that these thinkers suggest we have in relation to humanitarian intervention.
The obligation to intervene - the law of war and humanitarian intervention
Francisco Vitoria
For Vitoria the only legitimate justification for war (excepting God’s command43) is the 
violation of rights and therefore the exercise of dominion over the Indians and their lands was 
justifiable on the grounds that they had in some way violated the rights of the Spaniards. 
Vitoria was clear that the case of the Indians was not related to the jurisdiction of the Pope nor 
the emperor, but was rather one of natural law and natural rights of the Indians. He considers 
the claim that the Indians did not enjoy possession of their lands and whether the Spanish on 
this account can wage just war. However, to use such justification he argues, the Indians had to 
be sinners, infidels or idiots, and he found no evidence to support such claims. Vitoria rejected 
the sinners and idiots arguments by expounding a central claim, namely that the authority of a 
prince did not depend on God’s grace but God’s law. This was important for this was one of 
the main arguments that the crown’s apologists had used for the legitimate occupation of 
America. Vitoria stated that dominium must be independent of God’s grace, and derived 
instead from man as a rational being, made in God’s image, which was a fundamental 
characteristic which could not be lost through sin. As such, however irrational it might seem,
42 Boucher, David: The Limits o f  Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights and 
Human Rights in Transition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2009), p. 165
43 Ibid., p. 168
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no act could make you forfeit your natural right to property. Thus, sins such as cannibalism, 
human sacrifice, sodomy and incest were not sufficient grounds to justify intervention to 
subjugate the Indians and deprive them of their property. Further, Vitoria argued that war 
against Christians who commit such acts is not permissible, even though, they would in fact be 
more sinful. So why should such sinful practices entail just cause for war against the Indians 
when they are clearly ignorant that such practices are sinful?44 Vitoria was adamant that the 
Indians were not devoid of reason and invoked a fundamental Aristotelian principle that 
‘nature does nothing in vain.’
‘According to the truth o f the matter they are not irrational, but they have the use o f reason in their own way. This 
is clear because they have a certain order o f their affairs, ordered cities, separate marriages, magistrates, rulers, 
laws [...] Also they do not err in things evident to others, which is evidence o f the use o f reason. Again, God and 
nature do not fail for a great part o f a species in what is necessary. But the special quality in man is reason, and 
potency which is not actualized in vain.’45
Brian Tiemey argues very aptly that it is exactly this passage that Anthony Pagden has 
misunderstood in his argument that the Indians’ rationality was potential, like that of children, 
but not actual. As such, Pagden argued, invoking Vitorian jurisprudence, that the Castilian 
crown could claim the right to be the legal protectors of the Indians and their lands until they 
reached the age of reason under tutelage of the Spaniards. He even asserted that this could be 
considered an act of charity, for which we would have a moral obligation.
It is true that Vitoria rehearsed such an argument, but as Tiemey maintains, this line of 
argument would be exactly the opposite of what the Spanish scholar meant. The Indians were 
not a people whose intellect was merely potential rather than actual; such a notion would imply 
that God and nature had somehow failed.46 In fact, the logic of such an argument, as we shall 
see in the next chapter, was drawn-out by Las Casas in his defence of the Indians against 
Sepulveda’s argument that they were natural slaves. Instead he considers the Spanish claim to 
jurisdiction in relation to the ju s gentium , as we will see later. The claim of jurisdiction applied 
to the Spanish by something he called ‘right of society and natural communication.’47 Vitoria 
contended that seashores and natural harbours are absolutely necessary for man’s survival;
44 Vitoria, Francisco: Political Writings, ed. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press: 1991), p. 272 - 5
45 Cited in Tiemey, Brian: The Idea o f  Natural Rights -  Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and 
Church Law 1150 -  1625 (Cambridge: W. B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 2000), pp. 269 -  270
46 Ibid., p. 270
47 Vitoria, Political Writings, p. 280
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these have therefore, under God, been exempted from the original division of property. This 
contention gave the Spanish the right to travel into the lands of Indians.48 This right also, under 
the label ‘communication’ gave them the right to trade and the right to preach their religion 
without interference; although this did not entail its acceptance. Denial of these rights would 
give the Europeans a just cause for war. In this way, Vitoria concluded that a violation of these 
natural rights and subsequently the enforcement of them by just war was the only legitimate 
grounds for the Spanish presence in America. This is important because what Vitoria was in 
fact suggesting was that this ‘natural communication’ among men, from which were derived 
certain mutual rights and obligations precede the rights and obligations established within civil 
societies. These mutual rights and obligations derived from ‘natural communication’ sprang 
from the universal sociability of individuals in the state of nature.49
Although we have certain obligations derived from our common rights of mankind, for 
Vitoria it seems clear that these obligations do not extend to waging war on the Indians either 
to punish them for cannibalism and sodomy, nor to save them from themselves. For the 
Spaniards to act in this way would be unjust, precisely because the natural rights of the Indians 
are inviolable. As a consequence arguments of humanitarian intervention are difficult to detect 
in his work. As he stated ‘Christian princes cannot wage war on unbelievers on the grounds of 
their crimes against nature, anymore than for other crimes that are not against nature [...] For 
example they cannot use the sin of sodomy anymore than the sin of fornication as a pretext.’50 
Intervention is not justified on the grounds that their practices of human sacrifice and 
cannibalism were against the natural law, but rather because they ‘involve injustice to other
-51men.
The route by which Vitoria reaches this conclusion is by exploring the principle of 
innocence. What he is saying here is that Christian sovereigns can and should intervene and 
defend innocent people from being harmed, i.e. eaten or sacrificed in this case. Also, this cause 
would remain lawful even if the innocent did not seek or wish for such intervention. However, 
Vitoria continues to say that ‘even if they [the Indians] sacrifice criminals [not innocent] to eat, 
they still commit an injustice [...], since there is a law of nations (ius gentium), indeed a
48 This conception o f free travel and communication under the law of nations clearly reflect the pre- 
Westphalia period
49 Aguilar, Jose Manuel de.: ‘The Law of Nations and the Salamanca School of Theology’, Thom ist-A  
Speculative Quarterly Review, 9 (1946), pp. 186 -  221, p. 205
50 Vitoria, Political Writings, p. 219
51 Ibid., p. 225
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natural law, that the bodies of the dead are exempt from this injustice.’52 This is an interesting 
argument because it serves not just to complicate Vitoria’s conception of who comes under the 
category of innocent, but also his view on the relationship between the law of nature and the 
ju s  gentium. It is difficult in this context to conclude whether such injustice, the eating and 
sacrifice of criminals, could entail the same sort o f just cause for intervention as in the case of 
innocents. If this is the case, then, from what Vitoria argues, it would seem reasonable to 
suggest that it is also lawful to intervene when not so innocent people are being sacrificed. This 
contention underlines the importance of who are the innocent people that are to be the object of 
third party intervention to save lives and, in turn, punish the violators? What it also does, is to 
bring Vitoria’s ambiguity concerning against whom and by what means the injustice is being 
committed? What needs to be noted is that Vitoria in fact finds no conclusive precepts which 
absolutely prohibit the eating of human flesh. In quoting Genesis (9:3) ‘every moving thing 
that liveth shall be food for you’ Vitoria concludes that ‘this at least makes it clear that 
cannibalism is not a mortal sin, provided that it is not against charity to God or to one’s 
neighbour. [....] But on the other hand the law of nations (jus genitum) is against it, since all 
nations have always held it to be abominable’.
However, one may discern that Vitoria either retracts his defence of Indian rights, or is 
at least more ambiguous about them than he at first appears. For he in fact goes on (albeit 
timidly) to suggest that states’ tyrannical oppression of the innocent, or their practicing of 
human sacrifice, euthanasia or cannibalism, all provide just cause for intervention in 'defence 
of our neighbours'. As he asserts
‘In lawful defence o f the innocent from  unjust death, even without the p o p e’s authority, the Spaniards may 
prohibit the barbarians from  practicing any nefarious custom or rite. The proof is that God gave commandment 
to each man concerning his neighbour.’54
The barbarians, Vitoria argued are all our neighbours. ‘If there is no other means of putting an 
end to these sacrilegious rites, their masters may be changed and new princes set up.’55 This 
clearly suggests that Vitoria believed that crimes committed against innocents on such a scale 
warranted intervention to save them, although he previously had argued that such affronts to 
natural law could not give the Spanish just cause for war.
52 Ibid., p. 225
53 Ibid., p. 207
54 Ibid., p. 288
55 Ibid., p. 288
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I want to argue that Vitoria does not contradict himself here nor is he in fact ambiguous. 
Rather, it seems clear that Vitoria’s just war theory is based on a principle of intention. If the 
intention is for appropriation of the Indians lands then using cannibalism, sodomy and other 
violations against natural law as a pretext for war is not justifiable. If on the other hand the 
intention is an attempt to save the innocents from these ungodly acts then war can be justified 
because it is our duty as Christians under the law o f nature laid down by God. Thus, this 
contention underlines the fact that one of the conditions of just war theory is ‘right intent’. This 
is an aspect which subtlety informs just war theory and is extremely important in an argument 
relating to intervention based on humanitarian grounds. It seems clear, then that the ‘just’ of 
offensive warfare, such as intervention, is conditional upon the right intention of the 
intervener. As with Gentili, as will be evident below, Vitoria frequently expounds the utility of 
the common good as a necessary condition for waging just warfare. One of the main purposes 
of war is peace and security and thus, it is ‘based on the purpose and good of the whole 
world.’56 This can also be supported by emphasising what, for instance, Vitoria strictly forbids 
as causes of war, such as warring to enrich oneself, for personal glory and enlargement of 
empire. As such, Vitoria contends that ‘the sole and only cause of waging war is when harm 
has been inflicted’57, an issue that was explored above. Furthermore, right intent also includes 
the condition that the consequences should not be more harmful than the harm prevented. For 
instance, Vitoria emphasises that the effects of warfare are often cruel and horrible, not only is 
it therefore unlawful to start a war for every injury, even in justifiable wars there is a need to 
weigh the evil being fought against the outcome or consequences of war.
It is exactly the importance of ‘right intent’ and Vitoria’s recognition of it, which the 
historian James Muldoon fails to apprehend in his article ‘Francisco de Vitoria and 
Humanitarian Intervention.’58 Although, Muldoon very appropriately points out that Vitoria 
was one of the first who went against mainstream thought and claimed that violations of the 
natural law did not authorise the pope to use force to compel adherence to its principles, he 
makes the curious contention that Vitoria ‘did see the possibility of intervention but not on the 
basis of the just war theory but instead on the basis of human sociability.’59 This contention is 
problematic in several ways. First of all, humanitarian intervention is usually based on right
56 Ibid., p. 298
57 Ibid., p. 303
58 Muldoon, James: ‘Francisco De Vitoria and Humanitarian Intervention’ in Journal o f  Military Ethics, 
Vol. 5, no. 2,2006, pp. 128-143
59 Ibid., p. 139
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intent, possibility of success and also, right authority, within the subject matter of just war 
theory. In approaching this subject Muldoon appears to separate any notion that Vitoria might 
have of humanitarian intervention from any conception o f just war theory
‘While it is traditional to examine Vitoria’s thought in terms o f the development of theories of the just war, it is 
also possible to deal with his work in terms o f what we would now call humanitarian intervention, that is the right, 
perhaps even the responsibility, o f Christians to punish violators o f the natural law or to raise a primitive society 
to civilised status, in other words to intervene in another state for the welfare of those who live there.’60
Muldoon’s argument here is wholly unfounded. As I have already demonstrated, questions of 
intervening against those who violate the principles of the law of nature, or as a third party 
claiming just title to intervene in the affairs o f another country clearly pertains to just war; this 
is a firmly rooted conceptualisation of Vitoria’s own explorations of the subject. Muldoon fails 
to explain Vitoria’s basis and premises o f human sociability, giving merely random remarks 
about the universal nature of human society within his ‘pre-Grotian’ categorisation. The 
underlying reason for these conclusions is to be found in Muldoon’s failure to develop 
Vitoria’s conception of the ju s gentium. It will become clear from further expositions that 
without such an exploration any conclusions about the source of such moral obligation cannot 
have any value. He assumes that Vitoria has a clear view about what constitutes the law of 
nations, but, in fact, as will be proven elsewhere this notion remains highly ambiguous as 
Vitoria never satisfactory makes a clear distinction between the law of nature and the law of 
nations. Thus, if it is not just war theory, then Muldoon needs to show that it is a direct set of 
principles substantively apart from the just war theory. Because he does not take into account 
Vitoria’s principle of right intent, he is left with Vitoria’s apparent contradictory claims about 
humanitarian grounds for intervention under the just war theory, which is why he claims it 
under an alternative, however unsubstantiated, notion which is meant to have its basis in 
human sociability. Thus, the problem is not that Muldoon does not argue that notions of 
humanitarian intervention cannot be traced in the works of Vitoria; on the contrary, the 
problem is rather that he misunderstands the subtle foundations on which Vitoria bases these 
notions on.
Attempting to move well beyond Vitoria’s subtle foundations of humanitarian 
intervention, the Protestant jurist Gentili presents arguments for just warfare against the
60 Ibid., p. 133
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Indians much more readily. Unlike his Spanish predecessor, Gentili viewed them as a barbaric 
race that needed restriction in the common interests of mankind.
Alberico Gentili
Gentili was an Italian jurist and Protestant and later became regius professor of civil law at 
Oxford University. Although he is not one of the most famous of the natural law jurists he 
nevertheless provides an important insight into jurisprudence in relation to the discovery on the 
New World. He was one of the first o f the jurists to write extensively on the topic of piracy as 
well a developing a new doctrine of the rights and duties of ambassadors. Grotius was to a 
great extent influenced by him.
Apart from the law of self-defence in general, Gentili writes of what he calls ‘natural 
causes’ for declaring war. The grounds for these are based on considerations of necessity, 
utility or honour. Occupation o f ‘vacant land’ for instance Gentili firmly asserts as a just cause 
of war out of necessity. Avenging injuries and preventing them from happening in the future, 
vindicating violated natural rights such as rights o f passage, navigation and shelter, are wars of 
utility. Making wars on one’s own account, but instead for the common good of every one, are 
wars of honour. Finally, he also lists ‘human’ causes for making war, which appear when 
reparations are made to vindicate violated positive rights.61
The principle of humanitarian intervention can first and foremost be traced in Gentili’s 
work by emphasising his vision of the common interests of mankind, and is in this way 
characterised as wars undertaken for reasons of both utility - the utility of the common interests 
of mankind - and honour. He maintains that it is love of our neighbour and the desire to live in 
peace that confers a right to wage war against those who violate the ‘common law of 
humanity’ and wrong mankind. This idea was not limited to ‘man’s liberty’ as he also 
supports the right to wage war to protect the freedom of the seas in evoking this principle. 
Gentili states that those who live according to the precepts of God will regard an injury to 
another as one done to themselves. We have an obligation to save the injured from the hands of
ATthe injurer, as long as we do not risk our own lives in the process. He considers one such just 
cause to be intervention on behalf of the innocent against certain categories of crime in breach 
of the natural law, such as cannibalism and human sacrifice. He argued that intervention was
61 Gentili, On the Law o f  War, book I, chap. xvi - xix
62 Ibid., book I, chap. xxv, §202
63 Ibid., §113-14
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justifiable on a wide variety o f grounds including the defence of subjects of another state 
against their ruler, if he is grossly unjust and cruel to them.64
As an introduction to the chapter ‘O f an Honourable Reason for Waging War’ Gentili 
considers the just causes for making war with a discussion of the common interests of 
mankind:65
‘There remains now the one question concerning an honourable cause for waging war [...] which is undertaken 
for no private reason of our own, but for the common interest and in behalf of others. Look you, if men clearly sin
against the laws of nature and o f mankind, I believe that any one whatsoever may check such men by force of
,66arms.
Within these precepts Gentili maintained that the Spaniards were justified in waging war 
against the Indians by the fact that they practiced ‘abominable lewdness even with beasts, and 
who ate human flesh, slaying men for that purpose.’67 The justification for this was derived 
from the idea that the Indians in this way had broken the natural bonds o f union which exist 
between all men by violating natural and divine laws.
‘Therefore, since we may also be injured as individuals by those violators o f nature [....]. No rights will be due to 
these men who have broken all human and divine laws and who, though joined with us by similarity of nature, 
have disgraced this union with abominable stains.’68
In this way they forfeit their natural rights; a contention, we saw, with which Vitoria 
disagreed. For Gentili, then, there was an obligation on the part of civilized nations to act on 
behalf of the societas gentium in general in intervening where sodomy and bestiality were 
commonly practiced, and to come to the aid of victims of cannibalism and molestation. As will 
be explored in more detail later, the law of nations (or ju s  gentium) for Gentili is the law of this 
community of states, whose members are interdependent as well as independent and who 
shares common interests and have mutual relationships and understandings. From this 
community, then, certain obligations are derived and from this Gentili speak of the necessity
64 Gentili, On the Law o f  War, book 1, chap. xviii, and xix.
65 Meron, Theodor: ‘Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suarez’ in Theodor Meron War
Crimes Law Comes o f Age -  Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 122 -  130, p. 126 - 127
66 Gentili, On the Law o f  War, book 1, chap. xxv, §198
67 Ibid., §198-99
68 Ibid., §203
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and utility o f interfering in places where regimes perpetrated or condoned such abhorrent 
crimes. As he contends
‘Not only is the civil law an agreement and a bond of union among citizens, but the same is true o f the law of 
nations as regards nations, and the law of nature as regards mankind. [...] To say nothing o f the law that is 
common to us with brutes, o f our dominion over them, we surely cannot deny that what is natural to men is
69common to all men.’
Thus, Gentili can assert that wars to restore violated natural law are thus wars ‘of vengeance to 
avenge our common nature.’70 However, he does emphasise that to justify such interventions 
the grounds had to be sufficiently serious, and the violation of rights had to be by sovereigns or 
peoples, and not the random acts of individuals.71 To clarify then, if  sodomy was widely 
practiced, but it was not actually against the will o f anyone (i.e. consenting adults), which 
would nevertheless be an affront against God, who should be avenged by intervening to save 
the sodomisers against themselves.
Gentili is very clear that the pretext of religion cannot be appealed to when a ‘right of 
humanity is violated at the same time’ - for as he emphasises, ‘the innocent must be
7 9protected.’ One of the only grounds where he denies Spanish causes for waging wars against 
the Indians is the ‘pretext of religion’, that is engaging in war against the Indians for refusing
I'X •  ♦ •to receive the Christian religion. As such, this is one of the only issues, where Gentili seems 
to follow up on the implications of Spanish intentions. In relation to warfare justified out of 
necessity he does seem to indicate that the Spanish in some parts are not aiming at commerce, 
but instead at domination. He says that the Spanish ‘regarded it as beyond dispute that it was 
lawful to take the possessions of those lands which were not previously known to us; just as if 
to be known to none of us were the same thing as to be possessed by no one.’74 Only vaguely 
exploring this point further, Gentili says that apart from some isolated cases (he talks here of 
for instance trading commodities which would be against the religion and custom of that 
particular country), interference with commerce provides justifiable grounds on which to make 
war and in support of this he claims that ‘it is a common characteristic of all uncivilised
69 Ibid., §203
70 Ibid., §204
71 Ibid., §207
72 Ibid., §200
73 Ibid., §200
74 Ibid., book 1, chap. xix, §144 - 145
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peoples to drive away strangers.’75 Unlike Vitoria, therefore, Gentili seems to provide the 
Spanish with a conceptually open licence for just warfare against the Indians. Although, one 
cannot a wage just war against the Indians on the ground that they are not Christians, he does 
believe it legitimate if they are atheists. Gentili views atheists in the same way he does pirates. 
He notes
‘Faith is a special gift from God and Jesus Christ is foolishness among the heathens; but natural things are known 
naturally to all. Some kind o f religion is natural, and therefore if there should be any atheists, destitute o f any 
religious beliefs, either good or bad, it would seem just to war upon them as we would upon brutes. For they do 
not deserve to be called men, who divest themselves o f human nature, and themselves do not desire the name o f
, 7 6men.
This is also the main reason, according to Gentili, why you should not enter into a treaty with a 
barbarian, or brute, because they have no religion and are outside the bounds of normal 
morality. Importantly, for Gentili then, it is not just a question o f these barbarians being non- 
Christians, but rather non-religious; a central notion in Gentili’s international jurisprudence 
which Richard Tuck fails to detect.77 However, Tuck aptly argues that Gentili linked his idea 
of violators of nature, whom he then labels pirates or barbarians to the Aristotelian notion of 
natural slavery. Although, as Tuck notes, Gentili is cautious not to endorse the full Aristotelian 
notion in the sense that he believes that these barbarians are not bom as slaves by nature. As he 
says ‘the objection is made, that natural reason, which is the basis of the law of nations, could
70
not introduce slavery if we are all free by nature.’ Gentili takes this notion and follows 
Aquinas by noting that slavery is in this way in harmony with nature ‘not indeed according to 
her first intent, by which we are all created free, but according to a second desire of hers, that 
sinners should be punished.’79 In this way, unlike Sepulveda’s argument, Gentili reached the 
conclusion that ‘although the philosopher [Aristotle] is speaking of those who have servile 
dispositions, yet his arguments also apply to those who become slaves because of their 
wickedness and sins.’80 As such, for Gentili there certainly is an aspect of just war which can
75 Ibid., §145
76 Ibid., chap. xxv, §204
77 See Tuck, Richard: The Rights o f  War and Peace — Political Thought and the International Order from  
Grotius to Kant, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 35 - 36
78 Ibid., book III, chap. ix, §538
79 Ibid., §538
80 Ibid., §539
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be termed humanitarian grounded in obligations to avenge serious crimes against the natural 
law to save innocents and thereby the common bonds of humanity.
Francisco Suarez
Suarez was a Spanish Jesuit and is widely regarded as being the most influential scholastic 
after St Thomas Aquinas. Like most early modem jurists Suarez held that war prescribed for 
self-defence was natural and necessary. To this he also adds that sometimes an aggressive war 
may also be waged out of necessity and in such cases it is a right. Suarez was very clear that 
‘war is permissible [only if] a state may guard itself from molestation; for in other respects, 
war is opposed to the welfare of the human race on account of slaughter, material losses, and 
other misfortunes which it involves [ ...]’81
Suarez lists two main reasons why offensive warfare (aggressive) is justifiable. One is 
that if  an injury has been done to ensure reparation, such as the refusal to allow people to 
preach the gospel; set up missionary embassies, and observe the natural law. The second 
relates to the reason that whoever has inflicted injury, or violated a right, may also be duly 
punished. Suarez is adamant that this last reason is important and conducive to the overall 
welfare of the world
‘Just as within a state some lawful power to punish crimes is necessary to the preservation of domestic peace; so
in the world as a whole there must exist, in order that the various states may dwell in concord, some power for the
82punishment o f injuries inflicted by one state upon another [...] .’
Suarez was, in many ways, more attuned to Gentili in condemning barbaric practices such as 
cannibalism and human sacrifice, but was not willing to go as far as Sepulveda, as will be 
apparent in the next chapter, in intervening on the grounds of converting the Indians into 
Christians, by means of forcing them to hear the Gospel. Suarez asserted that a just cause for 
war would be to defend the innocent.
‘In order to defend the innocent, it is allowable to use violence against the infidels [...] that they may be
prevented from sacrificing infants to their gods; inasmuch as such a war is permissible in the order of charity and
81is, indeed, a positive duty if it can be conveniently waged.’
81 Suarez, Francisco: Selections from Three Works, Trans, by Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown and 
John Waldron, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), Disp. XII, iv, p. 816
82 Ibid., Disp. XII, iv, p. 818
83 Ibid., Disp. XVIII, iv, p. 770
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Here, it can be noted that Suarez also invokes the condition that the consequence of war should 
not be more harmful than what it was intended to prevent. Elsewhere he asserts that ‘it is not 
every cause that is sufficient to justify war, but only the causes which are serious and 
commensurate with the losses that the war would occasion.’84 However, even though Suarez 
recognises the importance that the sovereign who commenced the war is morally victorious, he 
does not find it essential to the further justness of the cause. One reason for this is that if this 
was absolutely true then it would be almost impossible for injured weaker states to declare 
war.
Concerning intervention to prevent sacrifice Suarez importantly asserts that the justice of
such action is limited to cases where such killing is unjust. Exploring this issue further it
becomes clear that Suarez only holds the justice of this cause valid if it is done to save
innocent people. If on the other hand, he says, the infidels are sacrificing criminals already
sentences to death, then this would not prove a sufficient cause as there would be no reason to
save them. Namely, in such cases, the infidels would not be sinning against justice, as would
be the case if they were killing innocents, but would instead be sinning against religion.85 To
this he adds that it is unlawful to avenge God for injuries done to Him by those who are
idolatrous and sin against nature. For in this instance, Suarez argues, we are dealing with
‘vengeance’ (in the strictest sense), which can never be grounds for a just war. In case of
vengeance, war could become just on both sides, which is something Suarez is careful to refute
as possible. This also underlines the principle of right intent. However, in what follows Suarez
is much emphatic about the importance of this principle. He notes that to avenge God for sins
which are against nature or which are idolatrous is a ground for war which has been virtually
accepted by various authorities. In this case, they argue that it is allowable to make war upon
that prince who commits such crimes on the grounds of defence against the innocent. Suarez
contends that this argument would be valid if the prince in question submits his subjects to
such crimes or if the whole state demanded assistance against their sovereign. As he says, ‘for
where compulsion does not intervene, defence has no place’ - an affirmation which Suarez
enforces by emphasising that if such reasoning was valid, then ‘it would always be permissible
• • 86to declare such a war on the grounds of protecting innocent little children.’
84 Ibid., Disp. XII, iv, p. 816
85 Ibid., Disp. XVIII, iv, p. 770 - 771
86 Ibid., Disp. XII, v, p. 824
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Interestingly, Suarez rejects the argument, as did Vitoria, that since the Indians are not true 
believers they forfeit their right to their possessions. They also both deny that the Emperor has 
direct temporal dominion over the world. One o f the main arguments against this for Suarez is 
that even if this title is valid, it would be impossible to ‘demonstrate its existence to the 
satisfaction of infidels, or to force them to believe in the existence of such dominion.’87 For 
this reason then, they could never be forced to obey. This contention directly relates to 
Suarez’s rejection of the view that infidels are barbarians and are incapable of governing 
themselves properly. Such a contention is grounded in the Aristotelian idea that such war is 
just by nature when people who are by nature subservient, but refuse to accept the rule of more 
civilised people. This also relates to Aristotle’s conception of natural slavery, which will be 
explored more fully in the next chapter. Suarez denied natural slavery on the grounds that ‘the 
law of nature does not o f itself prescribe such a procedure.’88 Slavery presupposes imposition 
and is introduced by human usage. Also, Suarez was very clear that slavery pertained to 
positive law more than anything else: ‘Slavery [...] is a rule o f positive law and does not 
depend on the force and exercise of natural reason, even if one assumes the existence of human
OQ
communities; and therefore it does not pertain to the ius gentium.'
In relation to justifying warfare to civilise the Indians, Suarez rehearses its humanitarian 
merits, and claims that the argument that the Indians should be ruled by more civilised people 
cannot have any general application as the abilities of unbelievers are manifest and diverse, 
and some are adapted to political life. Secondly, if this argument is to have any force then it 
must also be proved that the said people live wretched lives in general and behave more like 
beasts than humans; by, for example, not wearing clothes or eating human flesh. However, in 
this case, then, just war may be brought against them, but not to subject them, but rather so 
they may be civilised and justly governed. Thus, again, Suarez’s appeal to right intent is an 
important condition for just war. This becomes even more evident when he asserts that such a 
ground for war should only rarely, if ever, be approved ‘except in circumstances in which the 
slaughter of innocent people, and similar wrongs take place.’90 In this case Suarez argues that 
war would be defensive, not offensive.
87 Ibid., Disp. XII, v, p. 824
88 Ibid., book II, chap. xix, 8, p. 340
89 Ibid., p. 340
90 Ibid., Disp. XII, v, p. 826
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The source of moral obligation - the law of nations or the law of nature
Francisco Vitoria
Vitoria is considered to be the founder of modem international law and that this is based on his 
discussions of the American Indians, where he, irrespective of religious beliefs, establishes the 
rights and obligations of political communities.91 However, this does not mean that, in a 
‘communitarian’ sense, these political communities could somehow override the common 
rights and duties of mankind. Fundamentally, as we have seen, what Vitoria’s arguments rests 
upon is his idea that universal rights take priority over those specific communities, the 
violation of which justifies the legitimate intervention of a foreign state to restore the rights 
and if necessary punish the wrongdoers.92
Vitoria’s account of the ju s  gentium only forms a small part of his work, and it is not 
wholly consistent. However, his notion of the ju s  gentium was outlined for his followers to 
come, such as Suarez, with regards to what he called the ‘affairs of the Indians’. This issue was 
intimately related to the question of just war theory and Vitoria considered the ju s  gentium as a
A T
set of positive laws founded on the principle of natural justice. Nevertheless, this notion only 
serves to underline the ambiguity of the concept. Vitoria implies that the law of nations and 
customary law are to be equated with human positive law and not the natural law. However, 
for Vitoria like, most of the early modem jurists, this contention encompasses the ambiguous 
relationship between the law of nature and the law of nations. Suarez tried to be more specific. 
For him the law of nations occupied a point mid-way between the natural law and human 
positive law and it is exactly this position which illustrates its ambiguity. Suarez clearly sought 
to scrutinise and explain this complex relationship more closely, but he was only moderately 
successful. For Vitoria, the law of nations covered the body of those laws which was said to be 
precepts endorsed by the power of ‘the whole world, which is in a sense a commonwealth.’94 
He contended that the ju s  gentium was ‘that which is not equitable of itself, but [has been 
established] by human statute grounded in reason’95 and applicable to all nations. Although 
Vitoria wants to emphasise the juridical tie and interdependence between nations, the relation 
between natural law and law of nations for him is intimate. He contends that the law of nations
91 Jahn, Beate: The Cultural Construction o f  International Relations -  the Invention o f  the State o f  
Nature, (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 67
92 Boucher, The Limits o f  Ethics in International Relations, p. 167
93 Pagden, Anthony: ’Introduction’ to Political Writings, p. xvi
94 Vitoria, Political Writings, p. 40
95 Cited in Pagden, Political Writings, p. xvi
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‘either is or derives from natural law.’96 He suggests that some things in the law of nations are 
palpably derived from the law of nature: ‘there are certainly many things which are clearly to 
be settled on the basis on the law of nations (ius gentium), whose derivation from natural law is 
manifestly sufficient to enable it to enforce binding rights.’97 To underline the uncertain 
position of the law of nations, Vitoria is claiming, that occasionally, the law of nations is not 
derived from natural law, but is instead derived from ‘the consent of the greater part of the 
world’ which is enough to make it binding, especially, Vitoria asserts ‘when it is for the
AO
common good of all men’. Also, such enactments most certainly would have the force of law. 
Pagden contends that Vitoria’s notion o f the law o f nations was closer to the primary principles 
of the law of nature than the enactments of individual rulers because the fact that the law of 
nations relied up a universal consensus made it practically impossible to repeal. As Pagden 
contends ‘(who could imagine a legislative assembly of all the peoples of the world?).’99 
However, Vitoria does imply that even if a small minority disagree with certain conventions 
the law of nations would still be inviolable.100 Vitoria here, albeit very subtly, seem to lay the 
foundation for the move that things which manifestly do not derive from the law of nature but 
rest with the jus gentium would be based on customary law -  an idea which both Gentili and 
Suarez tried to incorporate in their attempt to separate the two. Vitoria here, particularly sought 
to address, and to a certain extent solve, the problem of the authority in the jus gentinum, that 
is, as having the force of law -  a notion which later greatly concerned Pufendorf, who came to 
the conclusion that law had to have the force of a superior.
Vitoria contended that ‘the very end and necessity, the very reasons of utility and use 
concur in respect to public power (authority) for the community and society.’101 This is the 
authority of the whole world, which in Vitoria’s thought is conceived in parallel to the 
individual state.102 However, this concept is only vaguely perceived by Vitoria, but as has 
already been suggested, the idea he is emphasising is nevertheless clear: that our rights and 
obligations go beyond the community we live in. As we have seen, from this idea there are 
then certain mutual obligations attached; but more than that: what Vitoria is emphasising, 
albeit in his own subtle ways, is the fact that because of this universal moral community of
96 Ibid., p 278
97 Ibid., p. 280 -  281 In this case Vitoria talks o f property rights over things
98 Ibid., p 281
99 Pagden, Political Writings, p. xvi
100 Vitoria, Political Writings, p. 281
101 Vitoria cited in Aguilar, ‘The Law of Nations’, p. 209
102 Ibid., p. 210
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rights the rulers of states have a duty to intervene as representatives of the whole international 
community, sanctioned by the ju s  gentium. For instance, Vitoria notes that ‘enemies remain 
subject to the ruler as to their own proper j u d g e . But more importantly, he asserts that ‘the 
prince has the authority not only over his own people but also over foreigners to force them to 
abstain from harming others; this is his right by the law of nations and the authority of the 
whole world. Indeed, it seems he has this right by natural law: the world could not exist unless 
some men had the power and authority to deter the wicked by force from doing harm to the 
good and the innocent.’104This is important, because not only does Vitoria emphasise that there 
is a duty to intervene, but also that the natural law provides the jurisdiction and the moral 
foundation for such interventions. However, as the above indicates, although there is a strong 
moral basis for such obligations under the natural law, which extends to the ju s  gentium , or is 
sanctioned by it, it is nevertheless, as Suarez was to make more explicit a generation later, 
imperfect obligations that comes under concessive or permissive natural law.
Alberico Gentili
Gentili sought to maintain the distinction between the law nature and the law of nations. He 
contends that civil law for instance is an agreement and a bond between citizens and the same 
truth can be said ‘of the law of nations as regards to nations, and the law of nature as regards to 
mankind.’105 Given this endeavour it should seem strange that he in fact appears to equate the 
two when he in fact wished to separate them.106
‘That which is not kept up disappears, and that which is not valued is not kept up. Therefore that branch of law 
[the law of nations] is buried in obscurity, and even its very existence will be called into question by some, who 
stoutly maintain that all law has its origin, not in nature but in human thought Accordingly, they will be found to 
be at variance with us, since we hold the firm belief that questions o f war ought to be settled in accordance of the 
law of nations, which is the law of nature [...] 1 regard it as established that some law of nature exist and that in
1 07accordance with this subject of war should be discussed.’
Gentili is in fact even more ambiguous than most commentators of this era because he 
emphasises that international law is a part of divine law -  a law, he recognises, which is 
difficult to come to know. It can be determined, nevertheless, by turning to authors and
103 Vitoria cited in Aguilar, ‘The law of Nations’, p. 212 -  13n
104 Vitoria, ‘On the Law of War,’ Political Writings, p. 305
105 Gentili, On the Law o f  War, book 1, chap. xxv, §202 - 203
106 Boucher, The Limits o f  Ethics in International Relations, p. 124
107 Gentili, On the Law o f  War, book I, chap. i, §5
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founders o f law, who make it intelligible. These laws have been ‘approved by the judgement of 
every age’ and ‘undoubtedly possess natural reason.’108 They maintain that such law is that 
which is common to us all and which is in use among all nations and is the result of native 
reason ‘which has established among all human beings, and which is equally observed by all 
mankind.’109 Such a law, Gentili terms natural law because an agreement made by all nations 
must be regarded as a law of nature. However, he very adamantly asserted that this was not to 
be understood that all nations actually came together at some given time and here established 
the law of nations.
However, to the German jurist Samuel Rachel (1628 - 91) there was a clear 
inconsistency which underlay Gentili’s general distinction between the law of nature and the 
law of nations. What Rachel pointed out was Gentili’s obvious confounding of the two systems 
of laws. The implication was that there could be no law of all nations other than the law of 
nature.110 And this was a notion which Rachel found to be absurd. Nevertheless, he concurred 
with Gentili’s notion that the way in which rules, which regulated the relationships between the 
nations, were consented to and received among nations was by usage. Gentilli believed that 
the conception of usage of all nations should not mean absolutely every nation; rather, being 
unwritten law it is instead like a custom and is established in the same way. It should be 
regarded, as Gentili declares, ‘as representing the intention and purpose of the entire world.’111 
To emphasise this point further Gentili believe that such customary unanimity cannot fail to be 
recognised in the same way that all races of men are agreed to the existence of God. Thus, for 
him, the law of nations is those rules or standards which all, or the majority, of (civilised) 
nations employed with regard to regulating their relations. Because the laws derive from 
natural reason which dictate what is just and right they are not accidental. As with Vitoria, 
Gentili’s discussions on the law of nations are not consistent. As was common at the time, his 
methodological approach was to subject the law of nations to the test of natural law, but he did 
not elaborate on its content (although, he does give a few indications such as the law of nations 
comprises laws that regulate matters of trade and commerce). Instead, he was at pains to 
disassociate it from metaphysics and a priori methods and sought to secure the law of nations 
in common sense and the justice and harmony of mankind. Thus, even though Gentili’s
108 Ibid., §16
109 Ibid., §10-11
110 Rachel, Samuel: Dissertations on the Law o f  Nature and o f  Nations (1676), Trans, by John Pawley 
Bate, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1916), p. XXXVI, p. 180
111 Gentili, On the Law o f  War, book I, chap. i, §11
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conception of the law of nations has its basis in natural reason and natural law, it has an 
element of positive law as well, because of the emphasis put on its establishment by custom 
and general agreement. What is most notable about this inconsistency is Gentili’s notion of 
relating the law of nations not always to nations but to the universal community of mankind. 
Nations comprised something he termed societas gentium , a community of states, which the 
law of nations was to regulate and embody the rights and obligation that existed among 
nations. Initially this meant that Gentili included both non-Catholic as well as non Christian 
nations as being part of the societas gentium. As such, infidels were afforded the common 
courtesies under the law of nations such as diplomatic immunity and treaty making powers.112 
The only ones who did not come under the protection of law, as explored previously, were 
atheists or people with no religion and for this reason were to be treated as pirates. And as we 
have already seen, the implications of this were far-reaching, because Gentili used the idea of a 
world community to justify the Spanish conquest of the New World. As with Vitoria, although 
he retained a notion of political communities that was much stronger than Gentili, the 
obligations which this ‘world community’ or societas genitum confers on people comes from 
the law of nature, which gives them their moral basis, but which is then regulated by the law of 
nations. But for Gentili, these obligations remain imperfect in the sense that saving the 
innocents from unnecessary violence or making reparations toward the broken bond of 
humanity is something we should do, but only if it does not cause unnecessary injury toward 
ourselves.
Francisco Suarez
Suarez took it upon himself to present a detailed study of the law of nature and the law of 
nations, for the purpose of proving a clear distinction between the two systems of laws. While 
Vitoria’s international jurisprudence saw more the application of general principles of justice 
to bring the discovery of the New World within the law of Christendom, building upon his 
Spanish predecessor, Suarez sought to go beyond this and develop a philosophy of law 
applicable to all concrete situations. Thus, while Vitoria formulated the principles of the 
modem law of nations, Suarez attempted more explicitly to anchor their philosophical 
conception. For this reason, his writings on the subject are painstakingly detailed and much 
more comprehensive than Vitoria’s and Gentili’s. However, contrary to what he might have 
hoped, because of his ultimate contention that the law of nations had a close affinity with the
112 Boucher, The Limits o f  Ethics in International Relations, p. 201
48
law of nature, he was equally culpable in maintaining its confusion. For the early modem 
jurists it is exactly this position which often posits the ambiguity of the law o f nations. 
Consequently, the problem remains in Suarez’s thought of incompletely distinguishing the law 
of nations and the law of nature. Although he endeavours to differentiate the two systems of 
law by explaining that they touch and overlap, nevertheless, he does not provide any 
substantive arguments showing how to work it out.
Suarez is clear that the law of nations is somehow part of the natural law and criticised 
jurists who argued otherwise.
‘Jurists usually distinguish the natural law from the ius gentium, in that the natural law is shared in common with 
brute creation, while the ius gentium is peculiar to man. [...] Furthermore, it is said to differ from the natural law, 
because it is common only to men in their mutual relations.’113
The jurists criticised here were first and foremost the roman jurists o f the Digest and 
Institutes. At the outset he criticises Aristotle and other ancient philosophers for simply not 
recognising the existence of the law of nations. He adopted St. Thomas Aquinas’s 
acknowledgement that there were two modes of the natural law, the law of nature and the law 
of nations and it was the precepts of these that Suarez set out to examine more 
comprehensively. He rejected the naturalistic element of natural law theory by emphasising 
that it was possible to have a conception of natural law applicable only to humans, but which 
was also closely related to the law of nations. However, he also rejected the view of his fellow 
Thomist, Domingo De Soto, who contended that the existence of a natural law common to man 
and animals was not credible because brutes would not be capable of true obligation nor suffer 
true injury.
Suarez adamantly asserted that ‘an understanding of the ius genitium depends upon its 
comparison with the natural law.’114 He alludes to this problem by claiming that even places 
where the two are distinguished, their relationship is very close, and similar to what Vitoria 
had posited, albeit more affirmative, he believed the ‘ius gentium constitutes an intermediate 
form [...] between natural and human law, a form more closely allied to the first of these 
extremes 15 He in this way maintained that the law of nations was used in two senses.
First, it is the law that people must obey in relations to other people. So like Vitoria and
113 Suarez, Selections from  Three Works, book II, chap. xvii, p. 3
114 Ibid., p. 2
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Gentili, Suarez is asserting the individual as the main actor of the law of nations. And second, 
it is the law that citizens within states obey, which is projected throughout the world, especially 
between civilized people. It was distinguished by its customary character unlike civil law, 
which was grounded in and written by a sovereign. What is important, is Suarez’s idea that all 
human relations are primarily regulated by the natural law, which he believes to be of divine 
origin -  the natural law is the sense in which human beings participate in divine law; the law 
nations is a supplement to this, standing, as emphasised somewhere between the law of nature 
and civil law.
Suarez believed that the reason for the often different meanings ascribed to the concept, 
causing the confusion was partly due to the ambiguous nature of the term ius. The moral right 
(jus reale) which the term sometimes refers to was the true subject matter of justice. It refers to 
the moral right of acquiring or retaining something. The other meaning (jus legale), refers to 
the rule of righteous conduct, which establishes certain equity, equality, in things. This second 
meaning was understood on basis of affirming St. Thomas Aquinas’s notion that the 
expression of a moral right is termed law. Both kinds of ju s  are divided into the natural law, 
the law of nations and civil law. However, Suarez argues that the moral right, which is founded 
upon the common usage of mankind can, in this respect, be said to be the law of nations. Thus, 
relating to the ‘subject matter of justice’ as Suarez terms it, the law of nations is a type of law - 
the type which is made by the precepts of nations. What Suarez here is conceptualizing is the 
often confusing idea of subjective rights and objective rights. Subjective rights are a kind of 
‘moral faculty’; it is, as Suarez explains ‘bestowed upon a certain moral power which every 
man has, either over his own property or with respect to what is due to him.’116 Thus, it is 
understood to be an entitlement to something and is natural when it is rooted in nature, or it is 
positive when constituted by positive law. An objective right, in contrast, is derived from 
natural law and imposed on you. It establishes rules of right conduct. Thus, it determines what 
is fair and reasonable and is the same as an objective good before any law, either natural or 
positive and in this way it does not constitute that particular law but is instead declaratory of 
it.117 Objective rights are essentially rights and duties derived from a higher power. While 
subjective rights often ran side by side with conceptions of objective rights in the medieval 
period, as Tierney and others have argued, predominantly objective accounts persisted and
116 Suarez, Selections from Three Works, book I, chapter ii, p. 5
117 Doyle, John, P.: ‘Francisco Suarez and The Law of Nations’ in Janis, Mark, W. and Evans, Carolyn 
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were dominant even in many exponents o f natural rights, as Haakonssen has ably 
demonstrated. It would be naive to characterise the transition from natural law to natural rights 
as a transition from a pre-modem to a modem conception of rights, the former having its basis 
in religion, and the latter a more secularised version, as Tony Bums has demonstrated in his 
work on Aristotle and the natural law.118
Today, as David Boucher notes, we have moved towards more of a subjective 
understanding of rights which the individual possesses and is universal for all.119 This 
differentiation is important because it ultimately determines the source of moral obligation in 
relation to just war, and humanitarian intervention because it is necessary to resolve to which 
law it refers. Does it derive its obligation from a moral right or a righteous act exercised on the 
basis of that right? For Suarez, as will be apparent despite his rather convoluted exploration of 
the nature of the ju s gentium, humanitarian intervention is seen as a moral right relating to 
what is permissible by the law of nature from where it gets it, albeit, imperfect obligatory 
force. This is something Grotius builds upon and applied in relation to his theory of 
punishment; that individuals as well as sovereign rulers have a natural right to punish 
violations of the law of nature. What Suarez is doing, is in fact conceptualising two legal 
systems of the law of nations. One has its basis as a moral right and the other its basis as the 
exercise of that right. The law of nations, in this way, holds both natural and positive rights and 
subsequently corresponding obligations. However, Suarez adamantly emphasises that the (true)
118 Tony Bums has argued that Aristotle is a natural law theorist in contrast to other commentators. 
However, Aristotle cannot be placed within mainstream natural law theory. One important reason is that, 
unlike most natural law thinkers, including the ones explored in this thesis, Aristotle does not consider 
natural law to be a standard upon which positive law is to be assessed. However, briefly stated, he does 
make crucial comments on natural justice that are central for his political thought. (See Bums, Tony: 
‘Aristotle and Natural Law’ in History o f  Political Thought, vol. XIX, no. 2, summer 1998, pp. 142 - 166) 
In this sense Tony Bums wants to argue that Aristotle embraces a natural law position which is secular 
and not religious, and of course not Christian. Aristotle’s natural law theory does not uses ‘law’ as we for 
instance see with some of the natural law theorists explored here, in particular Pufendorf, who employs 
the term ‘law’ as associated with the notion o f the command of a superior, nor is it a theory based on the 
notion of ‘natural rights.’ Although I am constrained by the scope o f my project, this is relevant to note 
when attempting to build a more nuanced picture of theories of natural law and natural rights, and also to 
place these ideas in a broader scholarly tradition. However, for what I set out to explore, these remarks 
will have to remain peripheral. For the thinkers I explore, and their natural law theories and 
corresponding sources o f obligations the religious context o f these theories are inescapable. Even, as I 
notice elsewhere, in cases where Grotius uses Aristotle it is in keep with Christian natural law tradition.
119 Boucher, The Limits o f  Ethics in International Relations, p. 152. For an in-depth study on this see this 
book. Boucher ask here the very important question ‘The issue is essentially this: if a right can for all 
intents and purposes be re-described as a duty owed by someone else, derived from a higher law, or 
fundamental moral principles, then why is it necessary to have a separate language of rights at all? 
Wouldn’t we be better off just sticking with the vocabulary o f Natural Law?’ (p. 151)
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law of nations is the ju s reale, so a moral right, which derives its moral title from its customary 
foundation.
‘The precepts o f the ius genitum were introduced by the free will and consent of mankind, whether we refer to the 
whole of human community or to the major portion thereof; consequently, they cannot be said to be written upon 
the hearts of men by the Author o f Nature; and therefore they are part of the human and nor of the natural law.’120
Suarez’s notion of subjective rights is therefore pivotal in relation to his overall natural law 
theory, and in relations to the obligations that the law of nature and nations prescribes. We will 
return to this in more detail further below. Firstly, his notion of subjective rights also brings to 
the fore Suarez’s positioning of himself in the wider medieval debate of voluntarism and 
intellectualism. Giving a full account of this debate is no easy task. No one thinker adopted 
either of the positions in their simple or pure forms. Paining with a broad brush, it can be said 
that voluntarism is the position from which moral standards are derived from the divine will, 
whereas intellectualists believed that divine will was determined or guided by independent 
standards. For the voluntarist, God is the absolute power, and His actions should not be 
explained or rationalised. The good is good because God has willed it. By an act of will God 
created morality. For the intellectualist, the good is willed by God in recognition of its intrinsic
1 “j  1goodness. Suarez attempted to reconcile the two sides. What is interesting, then, is that he 
sought to construct the middle position between these two positions, and as we shall see, this is 
also where we find Grotius. This not only testifies to the intellectual influence the Spanish 
scholar had on his Dutch contemporary, but also assists us in understanding why Grotius has 
become the object of much debate on whether or not he laid the path for the secularisation of 
the natural law tradition. I will return to explore this point in more detail in chapter 3. For 
Suarez, choosing between these two positions meant that the precepts of the natural law related 
to what was intrinsically good and what was the intrinsically evil. But the natural law was 
discerned by reason, and from this it also commanded the one or forbade the other. In 
discerning the natural law, reason also discerned what God willed for humankind. Since God
120 Suarez, Selections from Three Works, book II, chapter xvii, p. 8. John Doyle has emphasised that it is 
important that Suarez declare the customary character o f the law o f nations in order to differentiate it 
from the law of nature, because what his particular conceptualisation means is that subjective rights o f the 
law of nations, in fact cause it to collapse back into natural law. He uses the instance of self-defence and 
the case of ambassadors, where this becomes apparent. States have a positive right (objective right) under 
the law of nations to send embassies. However, once these are sent and received they come under the law 
of nature. Doyle, John: ‘Francisco Suarez and The Law of Nations’, p. 108
121 Simmonds, N. E.: ‘Grotius and Pufendorf in Nadler, Steven (ed.) A Companion to Early Modern 
Philosophy, (Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 210 -  224, pp. 217 - 219
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deliberately created human beings and endowed them with reason, he intended them to act in 
accordance with their rational nature. Suarez then drew on the voluntarism of William of 
Ockham (c. 1288 -  c. 1348), of what the latter had termed natural law by supposition: God’s 
choice of creating rational creatures was a necessary presupposition to the natural law.122 As 
we can deduce, this middle ground between these two modes of thought underlined Suarez’s 
theory of subjective natural rights. From the concessional law of nature, some natural laws 
come into play only as a consequence of certain human acts. The obvious example that Suarez 
gives us is that the precepts of natural law that forbade theft only comes into play on the 
presupposition that private property have been instituted by human acts. Another is, we have a 
moral right to action on the basis o f the precepts of the natural law; however, as will be more 
apparent further on, the exercise of such a right has its basis in human agreement -  enacted by 
human will. Thus, what Suarez gives us is a natural law that furnishes the opportunity for 
rational agents to freely choose the right action. By taking this middle ground, Suarez’s notion 
of the law of nature combines elements from both extremes. The Natural law is both indicative 
of what is in itself good, and in itself evil. But it is also preceptive in the sense that it creates 
obligations in human beings to do good and avoid evil. As Haakonssen notes, Suarez natural 
law ‘reflects the two inseparable sides of God’s nature, namely his rational judgement of good
• • • 193and evil and his will prescribing the appropriate behaviour.’ This will become more apparent 
further below in relation to preceptive or concessive natural law.
From this, let us return to Suarez’s enquiries into the law of nature and of nations, 
instead of irreparably separating the two systems of law, what he was doing is dividing the law 
of nature into two subcategories, grounded in the contention that the rational basis of the two 
laws is distinct, from the contention that the precepts relating to the two are different: the 
natural law originating from nature and the law of nations from customs. In this way, it can be 
fitting in giving them different titles. However, Suarez firmly asserts that the precepts of the 
law of nations are still very much natural and are therefore absolutely part of the natural law.124 
For the ju s  gentium to be properly distinguished from the natural law it is necessary that it is 
dependent on ‘the intervention of human free will and of moral expediency rather than of
122 Tiemey, Brian: The Idea o f Natural Rights, p. 304 -  305
12' Haakonssen, Knud: Natural Law and Moral Philosophy -  From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 22. For further discussion on this, see Haakonssen’s 
section on Suarez in this work pp. 16 -  24. He also addresses the paradox usually ascribed to Voluntarism:
‘If natural law were simply a matter of God’s will without need for reasons, then it would in principle be 
possible that God could allow humanity to hate him’( p. 21) -  however, to think that God is the object of 
hatred must surely be a contradiction in terms? For this, see especially fn. 10 on p. 21.
124 Suarez, Selections from  Three Works, book II, chapter xvii, p. 4
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necessity’, and that its principles are not manifest conclusions from the natural law.125 As 
such, Suarez is adamant that it is not enough simply to base the division either upon the natural 
law embracing only the most essential of precepts, of which its force is completely 
independent of the existence o f human society or human volition, or the law of nations is 
constituted only by those precepts that are essential for the preservation of society. Suarez thus 
concludes:
‘The ius genitum does not prescribe anything as being o f itself necessary for righteous conduct, nor does it forbid 
anything as being o f itself and intrinsically evil, whether [such commands and prohibitions] are absolute or 
whether they involve an assumption of the existence of a particular state and set of circumstances; accordingly, it 
is from this standpoint that the ius gentium is outside the realm o f natural law; neither does it differ from the latter 
in that the ius gentium is peculiar to mankind, for that characteristic pertains also to natural law, either in large 
part, or even entirely, if one is speaking o f right (ius) and law (lex) in the strict sense.’126
This does not mean, however, that the law of nations only includes certain concessions or 
permissions to perform or not to perform a given act. This hinges on the argument that the law 
of nations is not viewed in an absolute manner, but rather as a law already constituted in civil 
society. Thus, if any acts pertain to prescription, that is if the command depends upon the force 
of natural reason, then it comes under the natural law. If on the other hand those concessions 
are there for the common good of men as a condition of, but not absolute, to living well in
1 7 7society then these pertain to the law of nations. The point Suarez wishes to make is that 
natural reason not only dictates what is required, but also what is permissible. Thus, the 
important distinction to make is not of application but rather one of foundations.
'When it is said that the ius gentium confers the faculty to perform a given act righteously, I ask whether that 
faculty has its source -  in so far as it is just and righteous -  in natural reason, regarded absolutely, or in some 
human agreement. If it be answered that the source is in natural reason, then the law in question will be natural 
law, even though it be merely permissive in character. If on the other hand, the source is said to be in some human 
agreement, then, [...] to the said law is not ius gentium, as distinct from the civil law, [....]; or else if not 
withstanding this consideration it is possible for a concessive ius gentium [...] distinct from the civil law and 
constituting [...] an intermediate form between the natural law and the civil [....].’128
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From this, Suarez concludes that the source o f the law of nations is natural reason; however it 
is integral for men not in an absolute sense, but instead for them as being part of a human 
society. As such, it is distinguished from the primary law of nature as a secondary kind, much 
like Grotius was to argue later on. Thus, war falls under the law of nations not necessarily 
because it is not rendered obligatory as under the natural law that is in an absolute sense, but 
because it is perceived as being righteous. It is instead, then, part of the permissive law of 
nature. This is important because the same is the case for humanitarian intervention. Suarez 
asserts, that this kind of law then, presupposes the presence of human society. Divisions of 
property and settlements of territory, for example, also come under this law.129
However, Suarez wants to go beyond the thought that the law of nations is merely a 
concessive or permissive form of the natural law. He illustrates this point by mentioning the 
natural law concerning marriage. It is righteous and permitted under the natural law, but it not 
obligatory. One may choose to get married or not. As such, acts of occupation of land for 
settlements, building, fortification, and defence through just war theory are permitted by the 
natural law. The obligation here is upon the person not to violate such rights which pertain to 
nature. Importantly, then, the law of nations is understood as encompassing the actual exercise 
of these rights through the customs of all nations. Suarez also lists cases of acts of peace, truces 
and ambassadors as falling under this category:
For all the rules in these points have their foundations in some human agreement, in which both the power to 
contract a treaty or convention, and the obligations arising from that treaty or convention and demanding good 
faith and justice, have regard to the law of nature. Only the exercise of these powers may be termed a part of the 
ius gentium, owing accord of all nations.’130
However, he is adamant that the exercise of such powers, then, is not law itself, but rather the 
effect of law. This is an important point, which will be explored in more detail below. He 
objects to the view that because the law of nations is common to all mankind, that it can
139 With regards to the division o f nations and kingdoms, this pertains to the law of nations as this clearly 
needs the force o f human society and volition. Suarez really underlines the highly ambiguous nature of 
the system of law, by stating that although such divisions are not a necessity, it is still an act permissible 
by the force of natural reason but not in an absolute sense. Before this division the absolute existence of 
man in the state o f nature is to be assumed, and as such in this instance it cannot always be assumed that 
the jus gentium always originates from some form of human community. It is also based upon the 
primary natural principle of man as a social animal and the principle that the best way human beings may 
preserve themselves is done by the division o f property and ultimately states Suarez, Selections from
Three Works, book II, chap. xviii, p. 2 
'3(1 Ibid., p. 7
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therefore possibly have its origin in human will. It would simply not be viable for all peoples 
to agree on its precepts. Against this Suarez firmly contends that the law of nations is 
established through the customs of all nations and in this way, as I suggested, differs from the 
written civil law. This underlying customary aspect of the law of nations was something, as 
we have seen, that both Vitoria and especially Gentili alluded to, but never really sought to 
develop systematically in the way that Suarez does.
Thus, for Suarez, the law of nations was not simply to be understood as being within the 
bounds of the natural law. Although they both are common to all mankind, Suarez believed 
that they were essentially different as the above exploration has showed. The critical point 
where the two systems of laws differed was with regard to source of necessity within a given 
precept. This question of the source of necessity within precepts is important and lingers on the 
further exploration of discovering the source of moral obligation relating to just war theory and 
more importantly for this study, humanitarian intervention. Suarez understands the law of 
nations as encompassing the actual exercise of a law of nature’s concessive principle. This 
means that these concessive principles are imperfect obligations under the natural law, but 
acted upon, it is a right exercised through the customs of all nations. Thus, what Suarez is 
seeking to emphasise is the necessary connexion between concessive and prohibitive 
preceptive law. This point becomes obvious in the case of war. The existence of a precept 
prohibiting aggressive warfare must be a presupposition of the existence of the right to make 
war itself. In this context the right of defence not only results in the permission to make war, 
but also an obligation to make use of that permission. The examples that Suarez gives is the 
case of a prince who is bound to defend the state and, moreover, with regard to people are 
bound to act in defence of the common welfare, or the defence of their own lives. As Suarez 
states ‘One might say that the permission or concession [...] falls under the ius gentium; while,
M J
on the other hand, the precepts attendant [there upon] are part of preceptive natural law.’ 
Thus, just war grounded in self defence pertains to the natural law. Suarez points out that war 
have its foundation in some human agreement. Here there is an obligation arising from that 
agreement that demands good faith and justice, which in some way has regard to the law of 
nature. It is only the exercise of such powers, as has already been emphasised that may be 
deemed part of the law of nations. He concludes that the actual use of such powers is not in 
fact law but rather the effect of law; ‘for the law under discussion does not spring from such
131 Ibid., p. 6
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use; on the contrary, the use has its source in that law.’132 The law Suarez is referring to is law
as a moral right (jus reale). In this way the ju s  gentium is the moral right of peoples.
Furthermore, both the law of nature and the law o f nations include precepts and prohibitions
and concessions and permissions, however, the law of nations differs primarily from the law of
nature because it does not, as previously mentioned, derive the necessity for the precepts it
includes exclusively from natural principles. If this were the case then it would pertain to the
natural law. The necessity that may underpin the precepts of the ju s  gentium must instead be
derived from a different source. Arguably, Suarez implies that the source would be human
agreement. In affirmation of this distinction Suarez contends that ‘the ius gentium is not so
much indicative of what is [inherently] evil, as it is constitutive of evil. Thus it does not forbid
evil acts on the grounds that they are evil, but renders [certain] acts evil by prohibiting
• • • •them.’ Suarez takes this distinction further in determining that the law of nations cannot be 
the law of nature properly and strictly speaking. In support of Cicero he asserts that because 
the ju s  gentium ‘came into existence not through [natural] evidence but through probable 
inference and the common judgement o f mankind’134 it must therefore be positive and human.
As such, this leaves us to relate Suarez’s conception of the law of nations more 
specifically to the moral obligations of humanitarian intervention: Consistent with the above, 
Suarez asserts that just war comes under the ju s gentium and so must his particular notion of 
humanitarian intervention. It is clear that his understanding of just war depends not upon 
absolute moral conclusions; if this were so, then it would pertain to the natural law. Rather, just 
war is not a moral necessity as such, but, nevertheless, belongs in the realm of moral 
expediency. It depends on the imposition of a free will and in this way comes under the law of 
nations. In this sense it is a moral right. However, we also have an obligation to intervene 
when gross violations of the natural law occur. What Suarez seems to argue is that just war 
theory belongs to those concessions of the law of nature that conditions the common good of 
men, but are, however, not absolutely necessary for the welfare of societies. These precepts, 
therefore, pertains to the law of nations, but however, for this reason, implies an imperfect 
obligation. This then, is interesting in so far as it provides us with the source of the moral 
obligations to humanitarian intervention. In relation to just war it is clear for Suarez that this 
obligation comes from the common usage of mankind underpinning a moral right to action and 
the exercise of such a right has its basis in human agreement or some kind of civil
132 Ibid., p. 7
133 Ibid., book II, chap. xix, p. 2
134 Ibid., p. 4
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arrangement. As we shall see in chapter 3, although Grotius did not acknowledge his Spanish 
colleague, he, nevertheless, reached similar conclusions.
Conclusion
It is evident that for the thinkers explored here all included elements of humanitarian 
intervention with justifications based on aspects of just war. Their humanitarian arguments 
revolve around issues of saving peoples from abhorrent practices such as cannibalism, human 
sacrifice and sodomy, but also a concern for rescuing people from themselves in the interests 
of the civilising process. The issue I have sought to outline in this chapter is the question of 
whether humanitarian intervention is preceptive or concessive; or to put it in other terms, 
whether it is a perfect or imperfect duty, either derived from the natural law or from the law of 
nations. From the above discussions o f the three thinkers explored here, a notion of 
humanitarian intervention is certainly present and it is justified with reference to just war 
theories. They establish an obligation to intervene in another country on humanitarian grounds, 
but it cannot be a perfect obligation for the reason that it lacks the specification of who has the 
obligation to intervene. This also hinges on the fact that it is not deemed absolutely necessary 
for the common good. Although state practice in relation to humanitarian intervention did not 
exist at this time, arguable what these jurists affirmed is that in the absence of such a practice 
we still know what is right and wrong, which is derived from customary opinion under the jus  
gentium, a law which has its moral foundations in the natural law. And it is here we find 
emerging the precepts that in order to save innocent people from harm, or to punish them for 
crimes committed against the natural law, which stain the common bond of mankind, it is 
permissible to intervene for humanitarian reasons.
It is the complex foundational relationship of the two systems of laws which I have 
sought to explore above. What seems to be the case is that, humanitarian intervention has its 
moral foundation in the law of nature, but not in an absolute sense. Although Suarez was at 
pains to state that it cannot always be the case that the law of nations is part of the concessive 
precepts of the law of nature, it nevertheless appears to have been the case in relation to 
humanitarian intervention. For each thinker the complex relationship between the law of nature 
and the law o f nations or the ju s  gentium, manifests itself in different ways in relation to 
humanitarian intervention. For Vitoria, in terms of determining the source of the moral 
obligation to intervene on humanitarian grounds, what was interesting was that, as the only 
legitimate justification for war was the violation o f rights, to determine whether such violated
5 8
rights require intervention on humanitarian grounds, necessitates the determination of whose 
rights and what rights are being violated and by whom. The Spanish violated rights under the 
label of ‘communication’, do not, for Vitoria, seem to relate to this title. Although such rights 
belong to the ju s  gentium it is difficult, given Vitoria’s ambivalent account of the relationship 
between the ju s gentium and the law of nature, to conclude that violated rights, that would give 
just title to intervene on humanitarian grounds, would therefore pertain to the law of nature. 
However, for Vitoria, obligations of humanitarianism are derived from the natural law because 
violated rights concerning innocents pertain to natural law principles. But, such obligations 
must, nevertheless, be founded upon right intent. And the moral obligation assisting the 
innocent from being harmed is, nonetheless, actionable under the ju s genitum, but has its moral 
basis in the natural law. In this way, it can be said that Suarez’s meticulous explorations in 
relation to the natural law and the ju s  gentium are somewhat instructive in understanding his 
predecessor and fellow Thomist Vitoria.
Gentili more assertively than Vitoria emphasises the idea of a common bond of 
humanity, the societas genitum , which, if  broken, is a serious crime against humanity and 
therefore against the law of nature. Such a breach should require action on the part of 
individuals or sovereigns to make reparations in order to restore the bond and punish the 
perpetrators. And it is from here we can deduce a strong notion of humanitarian intervention in 
relation to Gentili’s just war theory. As we have seen, the question seems to be more 
complicated in relation to Suarez. For the Spanish Jesuit humanitarian intervention was not a 
moral necessity as such, in the sense that war is not a moral necessity. If a precept for Suarez 
can be said to be so, then it would be prescribed by the natural law. What he argued is that war 
can be deemed to be a righteous act, but not necessary. And in this way it falls under the law of 
nations because he understands it as encompassing the actual exercise of the law of nature’s 
concessive principle. This then means that in the case of just war and humanitarian 
intervention obligations have their source in an imperfect obligation under the natural law. In 
effect Suarez grounded the law of nations on the principle that law could be permissive as well 
as preceptive. It was the argument that natural law too did not consist only of restraints on 
power, commands and prohibitions; it could also define an area of permissiveness where 
agents were free to choose the right action. For example, ships from the various nations of the 
world are free to seek shelter in any port, but they may not wish to avail themselves of the 
right. This, as we shall see, was something which the Dutchman Grotius developed from his 
Spanish predecessor, whether he was keen to admit it or not.
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To summarise then, what all three thinkers seem to allude to is that humanitarian 
intervention is certainly permissive under the natural law. However, reasonable success is 
necessary, and the amount of good to be attained has to be weighed against potential harm. 
Thus, it is something that it is right to do, but it is not a sin if you do not. This is of course 
echoed in today’s intellectual and juridical debates about the obligation to intervene on 
humanitarian grounds. In the next chapter we will see that for Sepulveda, saving the souls of 
the Indians was an absolute obligation and a sin on the part of all Christians if you did not.
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Chapter 2
Juan Gines de Sepulveda
‘The question is whether the barbarians whom we call Indians 
are rightfully being subjected to the rule of Spanish Christians 
so that by eliminating their barbarous customs, idol-worship, and 
impious rites, their hearts could be prepared to accept the 
Christian Religion.’1 5 
Sepulveda (1549)
Introduction
As was shown in the previous chapter the discovery of America brought in its wake a serious 
intellectual and theological debate about the capacity of the Indians and how they fitted in with 
the Christian world view. Highly respected theologians such as Vitoria and Suarez, as we have 
seen, sought to make sense of the issues by attempting to anchor the questions that were raised 
to firm philosophical and moral ground. In this way, they sought to prove that the universal 
laws of nature wholly encompassed such people. As we shall see in the following chapters, 
covering the subsequent two centuries, famous political philosophers and jurists such as 
Grotius, Locke, Pufendorf and Vattel were all, in varying degrees influenced by this single 
important historical event in their philosophical enterprises.
Historically, nevertheless, this debate had already reached its height as early as 1550, just 
after Vitoria’s death, when the king of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor Charles V ordered that 
all wars of conquest were to be suspended until a group of intellectuals grappled with the 
morality of Spain’s presence and activities in America. Debates on the morality of the 
colonization of the Americas were staged in the imperial Spanish capital at Valladolid in the 
spring of 1550, where the Emperor called a Junta (Jury) of eminent doctors and theologians,
1 ’5 Sepulveda, Juan Gines de: Apology fo r  the Book on the Just Causes o f  War: Dedicated to the Most
Learned and Distinguished President, Antonio Ramirez, Bishop o f  Segovia, trans. Lewis D. Epstein
(unpublished, Bowdoin College, 1973), p. xx. Apology was a summary of an explanation of Democrates
Secundus (cf. page 60), which had been forbidden to be published. Apology was published in Rome in
1550 after the proceedings at Valladolid, and is the main work used here.
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among others his own confessor, the famous Dominican Domingo De Soto (1494 -  1560), to 
issue a ruling on the controversy.136 This conference, then, was to give an answer to whether or 
not the Indians were capable of governing themselves, and within these parameters determine 
the legality of war as a means of Christianization. However, its findings were highly 
inconclusive and it has subsequently become known as the great Valladolid Controversy. The 
fact that there was such a debate, officially sanctioned by the Crown, is testimony to the 
considerable unease felt in some quarters about the legitimacy of the Spanish occupation of the 
Americas.
In this chapter I first and foremost seek to elucidate the ideas and discussions pertaining 
to this very important debate, which I realize slightly chronologically deviates from the 
previous chapter in that Suarez and Gentili both commentated almost two generations after this 
event took place. On the one side of the debate was the Dominican Bartolome de Las Casas 
(1484 - 1566) who defended the Indians by arguing that they were free men in possession of 
the full range of rational capacities. He was a firm advocate of peaceful and persuasive 
conversion to Christianity. It is, however, his primary adversary the Jesuit Juan Gines de 
Sepulveda (1494 - 1573), who will be the main focus of this chapter. He, in contrast to Las 
Casas, justified conquest and evangelization by war. And it is here we first and foremost can 
detect a more fully developed strong principle of humanitarian intervention.
Las Casas’s testified to the brutal behaviour of the Spanish towards the Indians and gave 
an impassioned defence of the capacity of the Indians for rational thought. Given the right 
education they could not be regarded as an inferior race merely fitted for slavery. Las Casas 
eventually persuaded Emperor Charles V to seek a resolution of the issue. In this way, Las 
Casas was able to convince the Spanish Court momentarily to stop the continuation of the 
infamous encomienda system, whereby Indians were allocated to the Spanish settlers on the 
understanding that they would attain the Christian faith in return for their labour. This feudal 
system was ruthlessly exploited to the point that the Indians became almost extinct.
There was much agitation in the days leading up to the Valladolid debates for the 
revocation of the New Laws. These laws owed much to the tireless work of Las Casas in 
petitioning for the encumbering limitation of the power of the colonial elite and the Spanish 
royal assertion of authority in the Indies. These laws were to prohibit the enslavement of 
rebellious Indians captured in war and severely restrict the use of the natives as purely
1'6MacCuIloch, Diarmaid: Reformation -  Europe’s House Divided 1490- 1700, (London: Penguin
Books, 2004), p. 69
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‘working animals’ and indeed deprived the worst of the encomenderos of their Indian
137labourers. So naturally there was much intense dissatisfaction about the implementation of 
such rules and regulations. In this tense atmosphere Sepulveda had been encouraged by the 
president of the Council of the Indians to compose a treaty against Francisco de Vitoria and 
other Salamanca theologians, and of course against Las Casas’s treatises on the Indians, which 
were already proving potentially devastating to the Spanish colonial enterprise in the New 
World.
Sepulveda had already proven himself a very apposite scholar in defending the interests 
of the empire when he, in the 1530s, had composed a treatise against developing pacifist 
protests among elite Spanish students at Bologna University. Protests contending that any war, 
including defensive war, was contrary to the Catholic religion, were dangerous doctrines at a 
time when one of Europe’s main preoccupations was warfare against the Turks. His reactive 
doctrine Democrates Primus was only recently published when similar problems, this time 
concerning Spanish colonial right in the New World, began to stir up and agitate powerful 
circles within the Spanish Court. It was not, therefore, surprising that certain groups, who were 
anxious that the wars against the Indians should be explained and justified, would turn to
• * 1  ' t f iSepulveda for intellectual theological justification. Within a few days Sepulveda had 
completed his argument (Democrates Secundus) with which he sought to prove that the wars 
against the Indians were just and, moreover that they constituted the necessary and obligatory 
initial stage to their Christianization.
The sessions began in mid August-1550 and continued for about a month before the 
‘Council of Fourteen’, the juntas appointed by Charles V to preside over the debate were to sit 
in judgement of the specific issue at hand. Namely, is it lawful for the King of Spain, in order 
to subject the Indians to his rule, to wage war on them before preaching the faith? Although 
there are no documents of the actual proceedings, it seems that the two opponents did not 
appear together before the council, but instead, presented their positions separately before the 
panel of judges. Sepulveda was the first to present his arguments to the junta , and initiated the
1 3Qdebate by speaking for three hours on the first day. Sepulveda replied meticulously to each 
of Las Casas’s twelve objections which he had previously raised regarding the treatment of the
1.7 Lupher, David A.: Romans in a New World -  Classical Models in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), p. 112
1.8 Hanke, Lewis: All Mankind is One: A Study o f the Disputation Between Bartolome De Las Casas and 
.Juan Gines De Sepulveda on the Religious and Intellectual Capacity o f  the American Indians (Dekalb:
Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), pp. 60 - 62
139 Ibid., pp. 67 - 68
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Indians. The main points he levelled against Las Casas all bore testimony to his general idea 
that the Indians were a barbaric race that needed to be saved from themselves and Sepulveda 
underlined the necessity of subduing by war, if no other means were sufficient, those ‘whose 
natural condition is such that they ought to obey others.’140 The Valladolid debate brought 
Sepulveda fame as the one who most prominently and very fervently emphasised the idea of 
slavery in order to deny that Indians had proprietary rights in justification of the appropriation 
of their lands.
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore Sepulveda’s notion of natural slavery as 
one of the foundational principle of his justification for waging just war against the Indians. 
However, as part of this contention I also want to argue that within Sepulveda’s just war theory 
there is a deep motivation, which can be termed humanitarian. He supplemented his argument 
with another which related to waging just war against the Indians in order to save the innocents 
from being slaughtered. Contrary to what one may expect, and perhaps giving support to 
modem suspicions about the efficacy of the principle of humanitarian intervention, 
Sepulveda’s motivation for enslaving the American Indians was to save them from eternal 
damnation. They needed to be subdued and forced to accept Christianity because they were 
incapable of rationally receiving the word of God through education. His justification for such 
action was that the American Indians fell into Aristotle’s category of natural slavery; they were 
capable of understanding and carrying out instructions, but not of formulating and executing 
their own rational plans. It was therefore, natural, and humane, that the Spaniards fulfil their 
duty in guiding these unfortunate creatures who were barely better than beasts. Given the 
incapacity of the American Indians for rational thinking, the Spaniards were doing them a 
service in showing them the error of their ways and in making the land more productive by the 
efficient exploitation of nature.
Sepulveda and the American Indians
The first thing to be established here, is why Sepulveda thought the American Indians needed 
saving? The four main points where Sepulveda advocated just war against the Indians is a 
strong indicator how he viewed the indigenous peoples of America. As will be apparent, all of 
the charges he brought against the Indians in his debate with Las Casas, served, as far as
140 Cited in Adorno, Rolena: The Polemics o f  Possession in Spanish American Narrative, (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 128
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Sepulveda was concerned, as a strong and incisive just means to submit the Indians to Spanish 
rule.
What he claimed first and foremost was that the Indians were barbarians, and this 
notion served as his main standard for how the Indians needed to be treated. Secondly, they 
committed crimes against the natural law with their abominations, such as cannibalism, devil 
worship and human sacrifice. Third, the Indians oppressed and killed innocents among 
themselves and as will be discussed later it would, in this way, surely be a necessarily 
charitable duty to come to their aid as innocent victims of oppression. And fourth, the Indians 
were infidels who needed to be instructed in the true Christian Faith and therefore any 
obstacles standing in the way of preaching the Gospel needed to be eliminated.
All of these indicated to Sepulveda that the Indians were putting themselves, that is, 
their souls, in grave peril and needed to be saved. And one of the main steps to assure their 
salvation was to punish their crimes and force them to hear the Gospel. As we shall see, it is a 
misconception to claim that Sepulveda believed that they could be forced to be Christians. His 
main theological rationale rested on the notion that you could not force anybody to accept 
Catholicism, but instead, only force them to hear the Gospel. And as far as Sepulveda was 
concerned the pope not only had the power to force people to observe the laws of nature, but 
he could also compel them to hear the Gospel. As will become apparent, this is an important 
point to make because Sepulveda from an early stage emphasises the Christian Church’s 
jurisdiction over non-Christians and its right to punish them.
His strongest charge against the Indians, which to a certain extent necessarily 
presupposed all the other conceptions he held against the Indians, was that they were 
barbarians. For him, all barbarians were ‘by habit and most even by nature, illiterate, 
imprudent and contaminated by many barbarous vices.’141 Because of their barbaric ways 
Sepulveda believed that these people had been caught up in what he considered to be the most 
serious sins against the law of nature and therefore against God. The Indians practiced idolatry, 
blasphemy, impious superstition and what Sepulveda was especially disturbed about was that 
the Indians sacrifices human victims.142 Those barbarians, Sepulveda noted ‘used to slaughter 
many thousand innocent people in a single year at impious alters to demons.’143 According to 
the Jesuit, as many as 20,000 were sacrificed each year in New Spain alone. For Sepulveda the 
Indians were irrational beings and their inherently inferior condition made them slaves by
141 Sepulveda, Apology, p. 9
142 Ibid., p. 11
143 Ibid., p. 17
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nature. In this way then if the Indians refused to accept Spanish superiority and rule they could 
be enslaved. If the Indians denied this enslavement it would be legitimate for the Spanish to 
wage war against them and subject them to the natural order of things. As he famously 
contended:
‘Compare, then, these gifts of prudence, talent, magnanimity, temperance, humanity, and religion with those 
possessed by these half-men [homunculi], in whom you will barely find the vestiges of humanity, who not only do 
not possess any learning at all, but are not even literate or in possession of any monument to their history except 
for some obscure and vague reminiscences of several things put down in various paintings; nor do they have 
written laws, but barbarian institutions and customs. Well, then, if  we are dealing with virtue, what temperance or 
mercy can you expect from men who are committed to all types o f intemperance and base frivolity, and eat human 
flesh? And do not believe that before the arrival o f  the Christians they lived in that pacific kingdom of Saturn 
which the poets have invented; for, on the contrary, they waged continual and ferocious war upon one another 
with such fierceness that they did not consider a victory at all worthwhile unless they sated their monstrous 
hunger with the flesh o f their enemies. This bestiality is among them even more prodigious for their great distance 
from the land o f the Scythians, who also fed upon human bodies, and since furthermore these Indians were 
otherwise so cowardly and timid that they could barely endure the presence o f our soldiers, and many times 
thousands upon thousands of them scattered in flight like women before Spaniards so few that they did not even 
number one hundred.’ 144
Sepulveda did not have the first hand experience of the Indians as Las Casas, which the latter 
exceedingly pointed out. Sepulveda relied exclusively on the account of Gonzalo Fernandez de 
Oviedo y Valdes’s (1478 - 1557) General History o f  the Indians, later appointed 
historiographer of the Indies. And he then, from what we today might describe fairly dubious, 
constructed his estimation and conception of the intellectual capacities of the Indians solely on 
the basis of Oviedo, a man who had accompanied Cortez on his warring missions in the New 
World. Las Casas considered Oviedo as ‘a deadly enemy to the Indians’ and remarked that the 
latter’s History contained almost as many lies as pages.145 However, Oviedo’s work on the 
Indians had been approved by the Council of the Indies, and Sepulveda therefore noted this as 
the adequate authority to which to anchor his opinions about the Indians. Sepulveda also drew 
support for his further description of the Indians’ barbaric ways by looking to previous
l44Sepulveda, Juan Gines de, Democrates II, or Concerning the Just Causes o f the War Against the 
Indians 1547, extract translated and found in ‘the Latin Library’
http://www.thelatinlibrarv.com/imperialism/readings/sepulveda.html (accessed 13/10 2008, 20:37 )
145 Cited in Hanke, Lewis, All Mankind is One, p. 34
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authoritative views on barbarism and applied them to the Indians. He invoked the authority of 
Aquinas and noted that ‘for those are frankly called barbarians who are lacking in rational 
power either on account of environment from which dullness for the most part is found or due 
to some evil habit by which men become like brutes.’146 But as we shall see, it was Aristotle 
who was to give him his main justificatory basis for subjecting the Indians to Spanish rule.
For many commentators on the colonisation of America, property relations were a 
product of civil society. All the aboriginal people in the Americas were pre-civil (state of 
nature) and were in constant violation of the laws of nature. Sepulveda fiercely argued this 
particular point, by which he believed he had found the main fault of Vitorian jurisprudence 
and thereby a legitimate ground for the Spanish to engage in a just war against the Indians. 
Sepulveda’s view of the capabilities of the Indians was to become infamous to such a degree 
that it is only recently that his books have been translated into languages other than Latin.
His argument rested ardently on this notion that the Spanish had absolute right to rule 
as they saw fit in the Americas. He fervently noted that ‘the Spaniards rule with perfect right 
over the barbarians who, in prudence, talent, virtue and humanity are as inferior to the 
Spaniards as children to adults, women to men, the grossly intemperate to the continent, I 
might almost say as monkeys to men.’147 As such, Sepulveda contended, that Castilian 
sovereignty in America was founded on the natural law precept that civil men are granted 
dominion over all those who do not belong to this category. Central to this argument, then, was 
his contention that the Indians could not belong to this category because they were in fact 
natural slaves (and also still in the state of nature).
As I intend to show in the following, all of these descriptions serve to underline 
Sepulveda’s humanitarian reasons for saving the Indians. Not only, did the Indians need to be 
saved in terms of their ungodly acts and save their human victims from cannibalistic lewdness, 
they also needed to be saved by being brought to the true religion for eternal salvation. And for 
such reasons just war could be employed to save them. However, there is a much more 
sophisticated argument going on in Sepulveda’s general view of the Indians, and that is his 
appeal to Aristotle and the Philosopher’s notion of natural slavery as the main justification to 
subject the Indians to Spanish rule. All other justificatory reasons for war seem to be of a 
secondary order for Sepulveda, and indeed, this was also the first charge he brought against the
146 Sepulveda citing Aquinas, Apology, p. 9
147 Cited in Tierney, Brian: The Idea o f  Natural Rights -  Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and 
Church Law 11 5 0 - 1625 (Cambridge: W. B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 2001), p. 2 7 2 -2 7 3  (in 
the final version of the text, Sepulveda dropped the phrase about monkeys).
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Indians at Valladolid. What Sepulveda had hoped for was, of course, the notion of natural 
slavery as a category in applying to the Indians to serve as the overall justificatory foundation 
for war against them. On this, however, Sepulveda would be mistaken, because ultimately, as I 
will explore in the concluding remarks, applying the category of natural slavery to the Indians 
would be viewed as heresy.
What is important to take from this, then, is that Sepulveda believed the incapacities of 
the Indians, as described above, were in fact a consequence of what Aristotle termed, natural 
slavery. In other words, they were not fully human. This brings us to explore the concept of 
natural slavery in more detail and how Sepulveda employed this concept in relation to 
justifying war against the Indians.
Natural slavery and just war
The notion of natural slavery invoked the epistemic authority of Aristotle, whose teachings had 
been incorporated into Christian theology in the 13th century by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 
1274). One of Aristotle’s fundamental claims was that a category person exists who may be 
considered natural slaves on account of the limited rational capacity. He argued that a certain 
part of humanity was bom by nature to be slaves to others. According to Aristotle, these 
groups of people lacked a fundamental quality, namely practical reason. Thus, they did not 
have the capacity to understand and deliberate on the same basis as those who did.
Aristotle said
‘Therefore whenever there is the same wide discrepancy between human beings as there is between their body 
and soul or between man and beast, then those whose condition is such that their function is the use of their bodies 
and nothing better can be expected of them, those I say, are slaves by nature. It is better for them [...] to be ruled 
thus. For the ‘slave by nature’ is he that can and therefore does belong to another, and he that participates in 
reason so far as he can recognize it but not so that he can possess it (whereas the other animals obey not reason 
but emotions) ,l48
The notion of natural slavery was central to the debate about the capacities of the Indians even 
before Valladolid. Vitoria had rehearsed such an argument some 20 years before Valladolid, 
but his contention remained vague and inconclusive even to his contemporaries. Vitoria at first 
seemed to accept Aristotle’s notion of natural slavery, by saying that ‘as Aristotle elegantly
148 Aristotle The Politics, ed. Sinclair, T.A. and Saunders, T. J. (London: Penguin Classics, 1962),
1254a 17 -1255a3, pp. 6 8 -6 9
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and accurately observed, some are slaves by nature, namely those who are better fitted to serve 
than to rule.’149 However as Tierney notes, Aristotle might have been surprised at how Vitoria 
interpreted this category. Vitoria had said that ‘to this I answer that Aristotle certainly did not 
understand that such people belong by nature to others and have no dominion over themselves 
and over other things.’150 In this way, Tierney argues that Vitoria seemed to ignore or not 
assimilate Aristotle’s aspects of natural slavery into his political thought, but was instead 
‘envisaging a status for those who were servants by nature radically different from the chattel 
slavery of Ancient Greece and Rome.’151 Vitoria as we have seen, did argue that the Indians 
had a natural right to property. Thus, the Indians may have been servants by nature, but this did 
not prevent them from holding true dominium, nor could it justify them being treated as civil 
slaves. When Vitoria talked of civil slavery he talked of slavery as a legal condition defined in 
law. His notion of civil slavery is therefore very different from that of natural slavery. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, Vitoria was adamant that the Indians were in fact rational 
creatures who possessed natural rights to property (he believed they had ownership rights). 
What he sought with his exploration of Aristotle was to distinguish the idea of civil and legal 
enslavement under Roman law from Aristotle’s natural slavery, in order to demonstrate that in 
fact neither could justify appropriating the Indians’ land nor make them forfeit their ownership 
rights. Those who were legally enslaved, as prisoners of war, for example, could indeed own
i  c j
nothing, but no one was this kind of slave by nature.
The notion that such a category as natural slavery existed and perhaps that it could even 
be applied to the Indians was highly criticised by one of Vitoria’s pupils, Melchior Cano (1525 
- 1560), who was later one of the presiding juntas (judges) at Valladolid. Cano was 
perplexingly disappointed that his master had not taken a more apparent stand against 
Aristotle’s doctrine of natural slavery. Cano rejected any Aristotelian authority on this point. In 
fact, he stated that Aristotle had misunderstood the very idea of slavery, by describing it as a 
category of nature, when it could only be a category under law. Also, in relation to this, even 
if Aristotle’s somewhat provincial claim that the wise (i.e. Athenians) should always rule the 
foolish was to be argued, this could never be transferred to the issue of dominion. To this he 
argued from Vitoria that in the same way that dominion was not derived from God’s grace,
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neither was it derived from wisdom.153 Vitoria, as we saw in the previous chapter, had rejected 
one of the main arguments used by the apologist of the Crown for the legitimate occupation of 
America, namely that sinners and idiots forfeit their rights to property. He had done so by 
expounding a central claim that is, that the authority of a prince did not depend on God’s grace 
but God’s law. Vitoria, in arguing against W yclif s radical notion of the doctrine of dominion, 
stated that dominium must be independent of God’s grace, and derived instead from man as a 
rational being, made in God’s image, which was a fundamental characteristic which could not 
be lost through sin. On this point, following Pope Innocent IV’s defence of the rights of 
infidels in the mid-thirteenth Century, Vitoria in conclusion quoted the words of Matthew 5.45 
‘God makes his sun rise on the good and the evil [...].’154 As such, however irrational the 
Indians might seem (and he argued that they were in fact rational), no act could make you 
forfeit your natural right. Barbarians, he contended ‘are not impeded from being true lords 
(<domini\ publicly and privately, on account of the sin of infidelity or any other mortal sin.’155 
Sepulveda, of course, was no exception in appealing to Aristotelian ethics as the basis for his 
theological jurisprudence. However, more than anyone else, Sepulveda had the scholarly 
authority to invoke Aristotle as he did. He was, in fact, the foremost scholar of Aristotle, and 
his translation of the Greek philosopher’s Politics into Latin remained one of the most widely 
read editions for decades to come.
It was especially by his argument that the Indians were a barbaric race that he sought 
to augment the Aristotelian notion of natural slavery. Being barbarians they were therefore 
slaves, for all barbarians were natural slaves and ought humbly to submit to their Spanish 
masters. If they refused to do so, war could be prosecuted justly in the same manner as one 
might hunt down a wild beast.156 Among the Indians passion ruled over reason, so they must 
be servants by nature, for among human beings there are some
‘who by nature are masters and others who by nature are slaves. Those who surpass the rest in prudence and 
intelligence, although not in physical strength, are by nature masters. On the other hand, those who are dim-witted
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and mentally lazy, although they may be physically strong enough to fulfil all the necessary tasks, are by nature 
slaves.’ 157
Of the 18 references to Aristotle’s Politics Sepulveda’s work, only three offered direct 
support to the doctrine of natural slavery; however he invoked Aristotle’s general principle 
that every composite entity has a dominant and a subordinate part. Moreover, one of the 
citations went hand in hand with Sepulveda’s general aim of not only justifying war against the 
Indians but in addition the appropriation of their property and political dominium.
‘Therefore, the art o f war also will be by nature in some sense an art o f acquisition [...] since the art of hunting is a 
subcategory o f the art o f war that ought to be used against both beasts and those men who, though by nature for to 
be ruled, prove unwilling, since this sort o f war is just by nature.’158
Being aware of both Vitoria’s contrary use of Aristotle’s doctrine of natural slaves and of 
course the general notion that slavery was a category that pertained only to civil law, 
Sepulveda was at great pains to distinguish the philosophical concept of servitude from that of 
the status of slavery found in legal and civil law. Indians who cooperated would share the fate 
of the non-Canaanite enemies of the Israelites as described in Deuteronomy 20 by being 
inclined to offer service under tribute and in time as they became more civilised they would 
receive better treatment. Naturally, for Sepulveda, the subjugation of the Indians was 
principally for their own good. And thus, if they resisted the dominion of their ‘natural 
masters’, then they would be liable to become slaves by right of war.159 In this sense then, 
Sepulveda appealed to the law of nations with regards to enslavement of prisoners of war. 
Sepulveda also formulated the notion of natural slavery as a general principle taken from St. 
Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, in the sense, as Aquinas had quoted (Prov.l 1:29) that ‘he 
who is foolish will serve the wise.’ However, Sepulveda also sought to establish its authority 
by its historical confirmation. ‘Let it be established’ Sepulveda noted that ‘therefore, with the 
authority o f the wisest men, that it is just and natural for the wise, upright, and humane to rule 
of those who are unlike ourselves. For the Romans had this justification for ruling over many 
people with a lawful and just rule [...].’160
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Although David Lupher properly and aptly argues that Sepulveda is rather cavalier in 
his use of Augustine, to the point where he suppresses some of his general opinions of the 
sinful behaviour o f the Romans themselves, in particular their vices of their constant pursuit of 
worldly glory, Sepulveda sought to establish the notion that the vices of these barbarians 
needed to be remedied or corrected by the wise and the noble in the world as decreed by God. 
‘No law forbids us to seek glory -  that is, good fame’, Sepulveda expounded, ‘for as the 
Philosopher says {Ethics 10), the hunger for noble things is praiseworthy -  though it ought to 
be sought rationally, not so much as an end of action as a cause of virtue.’161 This was to be a 
recurrent argument in Sepulveda’s defence of the colonialists’ claim of just war in the New 
World, for what Sepulveda was ultimately arguing was the unselfish duty and obligations on 
the part of the Spanish to civilise the natives.
However, Sepulveda was not advocating war against the Indians in order to subject 
them to slavery itself; rather it was to forcibly restrain them from committing crimes against 
the natural order of things. War was a necessary mean to combat their resistance in obeying the 
natural law. As will be demonstrated in the following, Sepulveda believed crimes against the 
natural law to be a direct affront to God and it was thus incumbent upon the Spanish to avenge 
and restrain such crimes. He noted that
‘The end of just war is to live in peace and tranquillity, with justice and virtue, and eliminating the opportunity for 
evil men to harm and sin: in sum, to provide for the public good of mankind. This is the end of all laws rightfully 
passed in accord with a state founded on a natural basis.’162
Punishing crimes against the law of nature for humanitarian reasons
Sepulveda insisted that the Indians’ blatant crimes against nature gives just cause for war and 
justifies the right of the Spanish to punish them. And as far as he was concerned, this would 
then also be the remedy to put them on the right path to salvation and in forcing them to follow 
the natural law. In fact, he argued that even if the Indians possessed natural rights, they had so 
blatantly misused them that they are now forfeited. The result is that they have no private 
property rights, and indeed no inviolable exclusive use-rights as a result of their ungodly 
practices.163 As he contended, wars had to be waged ‘in order to uproot crimes that offended
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nature.’164 This was a humanitarian obligation which all Spanish, whether secular or religious 
had to observe. Thus, what Sepulveda was doing was establishing the pope’s jurisdiction in the 
New World, a claim, which had been highly contested by most of the Spanish Thomists, 
including Vitoria and Suarez. In evidence of his argument he cited at length Pope Alexander 
V i’s bull of 1493, and thus firmly asserted that it was permitted for Christians by public as 
well as pontifical authority to persecute and punish idolatry
‘All power over humanity in heaven and earth was given to Christ, and Christ, moreover, communicated this 
power to Peter as his vicar and to his successors, as Thomas teaches, and if properly exercised in those matters 
that pertain to salvation o f the soul and in spiritual benefits, nevertheless it is not excluded from temporal goods 
insofar as they are directed to the spiritual. The Pope therefore has universal power over nations not only to 
preach the Gospel but also to compel the nations, if the chance presents itself to preserve the law of nature, to 
which all men are subject [...].’165
What Sepulveda was arguing here was that the colonialists could also make use of the 
property and gold of the Indians in so far as their primary concern was directed towards 
spiritual matters, which meant the Christianization of the natives. Thus, in effect, what 
Sepulveda seem to allude to here, is the notion of right intent as the basis of the just war 
against the Indians. But here, Sepulveda was adamant that ‘if any nation perpetrates mortal
♦ • 1 f \ f \sins, it must not immediately be said that it does not keep the law of nature.’ Indeed, if such 
a standard were demanded, it would not be possible to keep to the law of nature anywhere on 
earth. What Sepulveda instead asserted was another Aristotelian notion that the acts and deeds 
of people ‘must be decided by their public customs and institutions, and not things rightly or
I s - t
wrongly done by individuals.’ He goes on to argue that such nations that by its institutions 
sanction and prescribe idolatry have not been destroyed by the judgement of God, but rather by 
the ‘common law of nature.’
As will be apparent in the following chapter, the notion of punishment was something 
Grotius particularly sought to emphasise as a principle of just war theory and humanitarian 
intervention. To punish human beings who transgress the law of nations, with gross violations 
such as cannibalism and unnecessary killings, is our natural right. Unlike Sepulveda, Grotius
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presented a right to punishment what was permissive under the natural law; however, this was 
not an absolute duty. For Grotius, the imperfectness of the duty to punish crimes against the 
law of nature was rooted in the recognition of the difficulty in determining who should do the 
punishing. For Sepulveda the right to punish seem to be anchored in an absolute duty 
prescribed by the law of nature and divine law. And furthermore, he seems to be perfectly clear 
to whom this duty correlates, namely, all Christians. The monstrous obscenities in which the 
Indians engaged demanded action and not only were the Indians’ souls in grave peril, so too 
were those of Christians if they idly stood by, and so they needed to be forced, if necessary, to 
fulfill their duty to help these people. It is very clear, then, that Sepulveda’s jurisprudence 
places a perfect obligation upon all Christians to punish crimes against nature. With this in 
place, Sepulveda’s notion of humanitarian intervention becomes firmly rooted in this 
obligation, because, inevitably for Sepulveda crimes against nature are serious crimes against 
humanity that demands moral and legal resolutions. As such, to punish perpetrators of the 
natural law is also to save them and their potential innocent victims. With this idea, Sepulveda 
provided an absolute moral and legal basis for humanitarian intervention grounded in just war 
theory. This requires us to explore in more detail the foundations of such wars.
Sepulveda’s notion of humanitarian intervention
In one of Sepulveda’s main arguments for just war (his third levelled against Las Casas), he 
maintained that the Indians killed innocents among themselves, and it would therefore be a just 
enterprise to save them. He argues:
‘The proof of their savage life, similar to that of beasts, may be seen in the execrable and prodigious sacrifices of 
human victims to their devils; it may also be seen in their eating human flesh, their burial alive of the living 
widows of important persons, and in other crimes condemned by natural law, whose description offends the ears 
and horrifies the spirit of civilized people. They on the contrary do these terrible things in public and consider 
them pious acts. The protection of innocent persons from such injurious acts may alone give us the right, already 
granted by God and nature, to wage war against these barbarians to submit them to Spanish rule.’168
Thus, Sepulveda sought to uphold the traditional doctrine of the Church that all men are 
obliged to aid innocents who are being unjustly killed. He based this on the extension of papal 
power as written in Ecclesiasticus 17:12 ‘and he gave to every one of them commandment 
concerning his neighbour.’ In this aspect Vitoria had, albeit timidly, presented similar
168 Cited in Hanke, All Mankind is One, p. 86
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arguments (in relation to the principle of right intent). Here, Sepulveda commented that the 
great ‘Defender of the Indians’ was not acting in the best interest of the Indians by denying any 
principle of intervention on this point
i  would contend that those who attempt to obstruct this expedition so the barbarians would not come to this 
Christians’ terms do not humanly favour the barbarians as they themselves wish to seem but cruelly begrudge 
them most of the greatest goods, such goods that are either altogether removed or for the most part hindered by 
their cowardly and churlish proposal.’169
Sepulveda believed part of the many vicissitudes which are characteristic of human affairs 
were to encourage us, rather than deter us, from providing salvation for the barbarians. He 
importantly notes, that that which is necessary is established by laws and institutions and the 
rest ‘is left to be administered at the discretion of just princes and righteous men, who as 
declared by the Philosopher [i.e. Aristotle], excel in handling matters insofar as the reason of 
the public good shall demand.’170
From this argument of just war arose a second that Sepulveda emphasised most 
vehemently. He argued that war would be a just means to preach the faith in the New World. 
He drew on the Bible for authority on this issue and concluded that pagans should be 
Christianized by force. The issue was, of course, that the Indians’ souls were in grave danger. 
‘If anyone doubts’ Sepulveda contended ‘that all men who wander outside the Christian 
religion will perish in eternal death, he is not Christian. Therefore, the barbarians are rightfully
171 • •compelled to justice for the sake of their salvation.’ This duty of Christianisation could be 
done in two ways: by peaceful ways of teaching and encouragement or by employing a certain 
degree of force and instilling fear of punishment. Sepulveda, however, was adamant that the 
enterprise of converting the Indians by peaceful means would prove futile
‘Certain [...] learned men172 [...] have proposed that it is necessary to send deputies and warn the barbarians to 
desist from idolatry and publicly admit the Christian preachers before preparing for war so that if they acquiesce 
to our demands, the salvation of their soul could be provided without recourse to war; but if however, it should be 
impossible to obtain these concessions from them, then they may be compelled to perform these commands 
having been subdued by just arms of war. If such warnings [...] could be made without great difficulty and
169 Sepulveda: Apology, p. 40
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expediently, it were not to be repudiated or overlooked [...]. Yet just as admonition must be abandoned as useless 
in the case o f brotherly reproof [...] so in respect to this type o f admonition in the war against the barbarians, it 
must be decided to abandon it altogether should it seem on prudent reflection likely to prove useless.’173
In fact, Sepulveda noted that such warning might hinder any pious expedition in bringing 
salvation to the barbarians and would thus ultimately impede any intended conversion, which, 
he firmly asserts, is the purpose of such wars. If force were not employed in their 
Christianisation, but instead, for instance, they were impelled by fear, then once the source of 
fear were removed then the natives, Sepulveda contended, would without a doubt cast out the 
preachers and revert to their old customs of idolatry. On this note he concluded that by using 
force against the Indians ‘more is accomplished toward their conversion in one month than 
would be accomplished in a hundred years by preaching alone without pacifying the 
barbarians.’174 However, this would not be done to force them to believe, but would instead 
remove all obstacles in preaching the true word of the Gospel and its propagation. He argued, 
that ‘such force would be useless since nobody can be made faithful if the will, which cannot 
be forced, resists.’175 Sepulveda drew on several historical examples as his authority on this 
point, mostly on Constantine who had passed laws prohibiting the sacrifices of pagans. 
Sepulveda’s key argument was that in prohibiting people from doing evil, a ‘great service’ is 
done to human kind. As we shall see in the next chapter, Grotius drew on similar arguments, 
but from a different perspective. As Grotius and Gentili did later, Sepulveda was asserting the 
common bond of humanity established by divine and natural law to treat all men as our
176neighbours, if ‘we can do so without disadvantage to ourselves.’ God had given human 
beings commandments concerning their neighbours, and thus, for Sepulveda, we have a duty to 
obey such divine laws. If we do not, then we commit heresy. Sepulveda’s contention that the 
Indian culture was vastly inferior to that of the Spanish was, as we have seen, theoretically 
expressed in his use of Aristotle’s doctrine of natural slavery. I want to argue that it is also in 
similar terms that motivation for humanitarian war needs to be understood. Firstly, Sepulveda 
profoundly believed that that Spanish dominion in the Americas should be viewed as a simple 
act of generosity. After all, as he contended, ‘for the barbarians it ought to be even more 
advantageous than for the Spaniards, since virtue, humanity and the true religion are more
173 Sepulveda, Apology, pp. 29 - 30
174 Ibid., p. 32
175 Ibid., p. 19
176 Ibid., p. 22
76
valuable than gold and silver.’177 In fact, Sepulveda asked how the Indians could ever truly and 
adequately repay the kings of Spain for the generosity they had bestowed upon the Indians who 
were indebted to their noble Spanish benefactors for introducing many useful and necessary 
things that were otherwise unknown in America.178
However, it was ultimately more than mere generosity which underlies his just war 
theory. The Spanish has a clear moral obligation to civilise and Christianised the Indians. It 
seemed obvious that the Indians were not reasonable enough to be left to their own devices, 
and they thus needed rescuing -  from themselves. As we shall see, unlike, Las Cases, 
Sepulveda did not support the prevalent notion that the consequences of war should not be 
more harmful than what is being prevented. For instance, Vitoria emphasises that the effects of 
warfare are often cruel and horrible, not only is it therefore not lawful to start a war for every 
injury done; also outcomes need to be weighed. However, Sepulveda, on the other hand, 
argued that ‘the loss of a single soul dead without baptism exceeds in gravity the death of 
countless victims, even if they were innocent.’179 And it is from such statements that we find a 
clear notion of humanitarian intervention in the thought of Sepulveda.
The last thing to explore in this chapter is Las Casas’s case against Sepulveda to 
illustrate just how much the two thinkers differed. As we shall see, Las Casas had an extremely 
restricted view of the possibility of humanitarian intervention, in that he lamented its probable 
injustice rather than its potential efficacy. More to the point, what Las Casas in fact sought to 
prove in his case against Sepulveda was that the Indians did not need to be saved from 
themselves, but rather from the brutality of the Spanish conquistadores.
The Case against Intervention: Las Casas’s case against Sepulveda
Las Casas sought adamantly to disprove Sepulveda on all the charges he had levelled against 
the Indians to justify Spanish Christian hegemony; especially Sepulveda’s main claim that the 
Indians were barbarians and therefore could be considered as natural slaves. The Spanish could 
then, forcibly if necessary, civilise and rule. Las Casas was at great pains to refute this very 
issue; not the Aristotelian doctrine of natural slavery as such, but rather Sepulveda’s argument 
that this category somehow applied to the Indians. He did this by arguing how Sepulveda had 
not only grossly generalised Aristotle’s doctrine, but also completely falsified it. He 
demonstrated this by differentiating between the types of barbarism that Aristotle put forward
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and then argued that Sepulveda had misunderstood and conflated these. The only barbarians, 
Las Casas contended, who may be properly placed in Aristotle’s category of natural slaves are 
the ones that
‘Lack the reasoning and way of life suited to human beings [...] they have no laws which they fear or by which all 
their affairs are regulated [...] they lead a life very much that of brute animals [...] Barbarians of this kind (or 
better wild men) are rarely found in any part of the world and are few in number when compared to the rest of 
mankind.’180
Thus, Las Casas sought to prove that natural slaves were few in number and are to be
101
considered mistakes of nature much like those men bom with six toes on their feet. He cited 
Aristotle by saying that ‘nature always follows the best course possible [...] and lavishes
1 S')greater care on the nobler things.’ The Indians therefore could not possibly belong to this 
category because ‘the works of nature are the works of the supreme intellect who is God [....]. 
For this reason it is in accord with divine providence and goodness that nature should always 
or for the most part produce the best and the perfect, and rarely and exceptionally the imperfect 
and very bad.’183 In fact Las Casas more or less accused Sepulveda of being a heretic from his 
untrue statements about the capacities of the Indians. ‘Who’, Las Casas noted ‘except one who 
is irreverent toward God and contemptuous of nature, has dared to write that countless 
numbers of natives across the ocean are barbarous, savage, uncivilised, and slow witted when,
184if they are evaluated by an accurate judgement, they completely outnumber all other men?’
If then, the Indians were in fact the way Sepulveda had described them, then this would be the 
same as saying that God’s design is ineffective, because with such natural endowments the 
barbarians would not be able to seek Him out, know -, love -, or indeed be saved by Him. It is 
the will of God, Las Casas asserted, to save all men. And on this particular point the Junta at 
Valladolid agreed with Las Casas, and declared that to doubt the Indians rational capacities 
would be heretical.
The second point with which Las Casas strongly disagreed with Sepulveda was his 
contention that crimes against the law of nature could be punished. Attempting to refute this
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claim, Las Casas went to the heart of the matter. He asserted that such punishment would 
require jurisdiction, and neither Charles V nor the Pope could claim such over the infidels. 
First of all, this was so because the Church could only punish the faithful. Christians could 
therefore not punish the Indians for their idolatry or human sacrifice. His basic argument here 
was that although Christian rulers had a right to punish heretics for failure to obey God’s word, 
the Indians had never been instructed to the Christian faith and as such fell outside any such 
jurisdiction. For instance, Las Casas proclaimed that although idolatry was a serious crime, 
nevertheless, the act is done out of ignorance inasmuch as they think they are worshiping the 
true God. In this way then, the sin is done accidently and not out of unbelief or maliciousness.
IOC f
Thus, the Indians’ sin of idolatry did not permit punishment even if  the Church had 
jurisdiction.
What Las Casas was inevitably arguing was that Spain’s only purpose in the New 
World was spiritual rather than political or economic. This is of course an important point to 
make, because this would in effect severely restrict all colonial enterprise in the New World. 
Moreover, in relation to this, neither did Las Casas believe that specific crimes such as 
cannibalism and human sacrifice committed against nature could warrant intervention. 
Although he argued that human sacrifice was a wrong, Las Casas firmly asserted that this 
could not justify intervention. He was especially against Sepulveda’s contention that the unjust 
death of innocent persons, for instance by the acts of cannibalism, could somehow justify war 
to save them. Las Casas noted that
‘Although we admit that it is the business o f the Church to prevent such an evil [the unjust death of innocent 
persons], it nevertheless must do this with such discretion as not to give rise to some greater evil to the other 
peoples that would be a hindrance to their salvation and would thereby frustrate the fruit and purpose of Christ’s 
passion. [....] Since the rescue of this kind of oppressed persons, who are killed as sacrifice or for purposes of 
cannibalism, cannot be accomplished [...] unless we take up arms, we should most carefully consider the tumult, 
sedition, killing, arson, devastation, and furor of the goddess of war necessarily attend the prevention of evil.’186
Thus, Las Casas’s beliefs rested on a strong pacifist conviction that war should be avoided at 
all costs. In these arguments he drew on St. Augustine who opposed the use of force to punish 
crimes of nature. For Las Casas, then, one must choose the ‘lesser of two evils’, which in this 
case meant not going to war. Even though some persons would escape punishment, this would
be the lesser evil, for would, 4he be a very good doctor who cuts off the hand to heal the
1 8 7finger?’ What Las Casas inevitable wanted to show was that in relation to Spanish policies 
against the Indians, this justification could hardly be just. Interestingly, what Las Casas voiced 
was not an absolute stand against any notion of humanitarian intervention, but his intuitive 
morality in this sense only went so far; for as he asserted, using the words of St. Augustine: 
4God does not reward the good that is done, but the good that is done well.’188 This of course, 
to some extent, resonates with the more modem just war theory of what Michael Walzer terms 
the importance of a 'humanitarian outcome’. What Sepulveda was proposing, Las Casas 
believed, could hardly have an 'humanitarian outcome’. Lastly, following from these 
statements against the Indians, Las Casas was at great pains to argue against one of the most 
important of Sepulveda’s claims, namely that it was part of just war to force the Indians to hear 
the Gospel. Las Casas strongly believed that on this particular point Sepulveda had 
misinterpreted the Bible. He had distorted God’s word to such a degree that it lost its meaning. 
How could God, Las Cases asked, have commanded killing pagans in order to save them from 
their ignorance? Indians and pagans alike had to be, not violently punished, but rather 
peacefully converted to Christianity. Las Casas noted that
‘Christ did not teach that those who refuse to hear the gospel must be forced or punished. Rather, he will reserve 
their punishment to himself on the day of judgement, just as he also reserves the punishment of those who refuse 
to believe. [...] Therefore, just as by punishing unbelievers who refuse to accept the gospel the Church would be 
usurping a right the Lord reserves for himself, so also would it be called a usurper if it forced unbelievers to listen 
to the gospel.’189
However, as we have seen, Sepulveda was adamant in his conviction that to convert the 
barbarians by peaceful means would be impossible. In the end then, it came down to the 
overall conviction of the rational capacities of the Indians, which remained the core 
foundational difference between the two thinkers.
Conclusion
Given the importance ascribed to the conference of Valladolid in being a culmination of 
philosophical, political and theological issues brought about by the discovery of a new world,
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it is not only important to consider why the conference at Valladolid proved to be so 
inconclusive, but also why an important thinker such as Sepulveda seemed to have been 
(purposely) forgotten by history. Firstly, one of the problems seem to be that no actual records 
of the proceedings have been found to this date, which therefore, to a certain extent, forces 
historians to rely on Sepulveda’s and Las Casas’ later account. Not surprisingly, both claimed 
to have prevailed at Valladolid. It did, however, became clear that the debates resulted in the 
weakening of the encomienda system but ultimately not in the better treatment of the Indians 
by the Spanish.
In relation to my query, concerning Sepulveda, it is interesting that Sepulveda’s views 
on the American Indians later earned him, albeit somewhat anachronistically, the designated 
title of ‘the father of modem racism’, which, to a certain extent goes a long way to explain his 
apparent obscurity compared with Las Casas.190 Amongst scholars, Sepulveda’s real doctrine 
has long been in doubt. Additionally, Sepulveda’s was never satisfied himself that he was ever 
understood properly. In the years immediately preceding the conference in Valladolid 
Sepulveda’s treatise had found little support among the universities in Spain and he 
subsequently found it exceedingly difficult to have it printed anywhere. In fact Democrates 
Alter never received official approval for publication in the author’s lifetime, and the edited 
version of it, Apologia pro libro de justis belli causis (the main work used for present study), in 
which Sepulveda presented his main arguments from the Valladolid discussions, was ordered 
by Charles V to be confiscated within Spanish territories. It is notable, as Lewis Hanke asserts 
that even Las Casas had problems obtaining a copy in preparing his defence of the Indians at 
Valladolid.191 The explanation for such intellectual ostracism is markedly to be found in his 
Aristotelian philosophy. As we saw, it was Las Casas and in particular Vitoria who had put 
forward the strong belief in the common origin of mankind and God’s will for the perfection of 
man and this had to be extended over the whole world {oikumene). And if this was to be so all 
peoples had to have sufficient enough intellect to grasp Christian teachings, otherwise the 
obligations God had given Christians would have been contradictory. For instance, Vitoria said
1 0 9that ‘God and nature never fail in the things necessary.’ As such, the Indians were eventually 
viewed as humans endowed with reason and the doctrine of natural slavery became heretical.
190 Sepulveda manuscripts where first republished in 1870, but only parts of it. It was not until the Latinist 
Angel Losada in 1951 published a Latin edition a full version of Sepulveda’s works were available.
Losada later did a translation of Democrates Secundus into Spanish; however, no published editions are 
available in English.
191 Hanke, Lewis: All Mankind is One, p. 63
192 Cited in Cited in Jahn, The Cultural Construction o f  International Relations, p. 66
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Thus, Sepulveda’s use of Aristotle as a foundational principle for his just war theory against 
the Indians proved to be highly problematic and irreconcilable with the established teachings 
of the church despite his assiduous effort to prove otherwise. Arguably then, Aristotle’s belief 
that natural slaves have the capacity for rationality must have been viewed inconstant with the 
demands of Christian doctrine and ultimately revealed the difficulties of reinterpreting Greek 
philosophy into Christian thought. However, Sepulveda did not contend that the Indians had 
no souls. Following Aristotle, it was not that the Indians were animals, they merely acted like 
them. Although they could not possess reason they could still recognise it and in this way they 
were human, albeit a poor specimen, that ought to be instructed in the true faith - by force if 
necessary.
What I have sought to emphasise in this chapter, is that it is interesting that in 
Sepulveda’s just war theory seems to be a clear example where humanitarian intervention is 
not necessarily a good thing, which, given the pretentious efficacy the principle of 
humanitarian intervention claims today, is an important aspect -  an aspect which often seems 
obscured in modem intellectual debates about international justice. The example of Sepulveda 
demonstrates that universalist principles derived from one culture (European) may be imposed 
on another culture in order to argue that they fall well below its standards and may therefore be 
forced to act in accordance with them. This was partly what Las Casas sought to contest.
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Chapter 3
Hugo Grotius
‘It is in harmony with nature that man 
should be helped by man’193 
- Hugo Grotius (1625)
Introduction
In this chapter I explore humanitarian intervention in the writings of the man who is widely 
regarded to have secularized the natural law tradition, the Dutchman Hugo Grotius. I will pay 
special attention to what looks like a particularly fruitful avenue of enquiry: the notion of third 
party intervention, which he, unlike his predecessors, spends a good deal o f time surveying. In 
addition, I will contest the idea that Grotius presents a secular view o f the international system, 
anchored somehow in the pre-Westphalian world. It is true, to a certain extent, that Grotius 
presents a novel idea of sovereignty which has been seen as the theoretical framework from 
which the Westphalian state system sprung. I will contend that despite claims of Grotius’s 
modernity, he was very much arguing within a natural law context. Rather than a secularisation 
of natural law, Grotius was instead offering a non-sectarian view of the natural law in an 
attempt to address not only the European religious disputes, but also disputes internal to the 
Netherlands, which had a profound impact on his political and personal life.
As with the previous chapters, exploring Grotius’s notion of humanitarian intervention 
entails looking at his just war theory and exploring the source of its obligations. If the 
obligation stems from the natural law then some obligations would, in some sense, be absolute, 
whereas if it is from the law of nations then it is voluntary. I want to argue here, that any 
notion of humanitarian intervention that Grotius has, will solely rely on his theory of 
punishment. We have a natural right to punish and obligation to punish human beings who 
transgress the law of nature, engaging in such gross violations as cannibalism and unnecessary 
killings. As we saw with Suarez, there was an argument in place for intervening to punish the 
Indians for crimes against the natural law. Grotius seems to place himself closer to Sepulveda
193 Grotius, Hugo: On the Law (Rights) o f  War and Peace, Three Books (1625), intro. James Brown Scott, 
trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), book II, chapter xx, §viii
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on this account; however he is not willing to go as far as the Jesuit in forcefully exposing them 
to the scriptures of Christianity. As will be apparent, although they both have a strong idea of 
punishment, there is an important difference between the two thinkers regarding their just war 
theories that sets them apart. Whereas Sepulveda’s principle of punishing the Indians for 
crimes committed against nature is a perfect moral obligation on the part of all Christians alike, 
Grotius nonetheless retains the notion that there is a strong moral obligation and a right to 
intervene on the part of states, but the obligation is ‘imperfect’, for the same reason that 
Sepulveda’s is ‘perfect’; Grotius cannot prescribe who should do the punishing. This, of 
course, resonates in the more contemporary times of today in the debate of the enforceability 
of such interventions. However, for Grotius it was ‘absolutely necessary to kill all those things 
which unjustly do us harm’194, and as we shall see this included a notion of what we might 
term humanitarian intervention grounded in a strong principle of punishment.
The law of war and humanitarian intervention - the right of punishment
War for Grotius did not lie outside the realm of morality or law. On the contrary; he contended 
that ‘where judicial settlements fail, war begins’ and that these wars were based in actions of 
wrongs not yet committed or for wrongs already done.195 Indeed, much of Grotius’s work may 
be interpreted as subjecting international relations, including war, to the rule of law. Thus, 
Grotius saw war as an instrument of right.196 Or more than that, just wars were as he noted
1 Q7‘customarily defined as those which avenge injuries.’ Unlike Michael Walzer, Grotius 
asserted that even if a war has been undertaken rightly, it must also be fought justly in order to 
be just. In this way he devotes the whole of book III of his work to the meticulous treatment of 
the topic of jus in bello, that is the right conduct of states in wars. From the outset, Grotius 
emphasises that his main reasons for writing about the subject of war is to argue against the 
notion that somehow being Christian forbade the use of all arms, and that a Christian’s primary 
conduct was, instead, grounded in the duty to love all men. For Grotius, such thinking had 
been brought about by an extreme reaction to being confronted with ruthless and barbaric wars, 
which were characterised by a clear lack of restraint. He notes that such inclinations have 
especially been voiced by his countryman Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466 - 1536),
194 Ibid., §ix
195 Ibid., book II, chapter I, §11
196 Dumbauld, Edward: The Life and Legal Writings o f Hugo Grotius (Oklahoma: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1969), p. 73
197 Ibid., book II, chap. xx, §viii
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whose devotion to peace has taken him and his followers in an unnecessary pacifist direction. 
To this Grotius asserts that it is therefore necessary to bring such ideas back to a ‘true middle 
ground’, in an attempt to avoid undermining any actual restraining in war.198 In this vein 
Grotius’s writings are also a response to the whole of the Spanish Thomist tradition, which 
included thinkers such as Francisco Vitoria, Francisco Suarez and Domingo de Soto. On 
several occasions Grotius’s discussions of the principles of just war theory sought particularly 
to refute Vitoria.199 Vitoria, as we saw in the previous chapter, was vehemently against 
punishing violations of the law of nature such as cannibalism and sodomy. In contrast, Grotius 
argued that war may be waged upon those who sin against nature. He asserted
‘The contrary view is held by Vitoria [...] and others, who in justification o f war seem to demand that he who 
undertakes it should have suffered injury either in person or his state, or that he should have jurisdiction over him 
who is attached. For they claim that the power o f punishing is the proper effect of civil jurisdiction [...]. ,20°
Instead, Grotius argued that the power of punishment can also be derived from natural law. As 
such, states have a natural right to punish violations committed against nature, and besides 
cannibalism, for instance, these did also include inhumanity committed to one’s own parents. 
Although Vitoria and Gentili had considered that a just cause of war could be waged to save 
innocents in relations to certain violations against the law of nature, it would appear that for 
Grotius such principles of just war applied regardless of whether the people you were saving 
were innocents or criminals. This, as we have seen, was of great importance to Vitoria and
198 Grotius, Rights o f War and Peace, Prolegomena, §28 - 30
199 It is uncertain why Grotius does not refer to Suarez to the same extent as he does Vitoria, given 
Suarez’s great authoritative status on issues o f natural law. As is apparent, there is no doubt that Grotius 
must have been influenced by the Spanish Thomist, some scholars even suggest to the extent that Grotius 
merely ‘echoes’ principles which had already had a long standing in Spanish jurisprudence. However, 
such views clearly do not give the Dutchman credit enough, although it is certainly true that in Protestant 
jurisprudence it has been customary to treat Grotius as the ‘single-handed founder’ of modem 
international law. Despite his enormous influence, it is then usually overlooked that his work owes a 
great deal to a long list of notable precursors -  and Suarez is certainly on that list. However, it would 
seem that Grotius would have had prudential reasons to not extensively refer to Suarez’s writings, given 
the prejudice o f both Protestants and Catholics, which after the reformation was such that any formed 
opinion could not be impartial. Grotius wrote the first edition o f his great work in 1625 and Suarez’s 
work had appeared some 13 years before, however, Suarez’s lesser known political writings had greatly 
displeased the reigning monarchs James I, Louis XIII and Maria de Medici. Grotius was in England when 
he wrote part of his work and depended on the protection of James I and when it was published he was 
exiled in France and here he depended, this time, on the hospitality of the French king, even relying on 
an, albeit irregular, income from the royal treasury. As such, Grotius might have felt it unwise to cite 
Suarez at length, making only four references to the Spanish scholar in total. For further discussion on 
this see Villa, Sergio Moratiel: ‘The Philosophy of International Law: Suarez, Grotius and Epigones’ in 
International Review o f  the Red Cross (no. 320, 1997), pp. 539 -  552
200 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, book II, chapter XX, §XL
85
Gentili, exactly because we do not have a natural right to avenge categories of crimes in breach 
of the natural law; however we do have a moral duty to protect the innocents. What matters for 
Grotius, then, is the right to punish and by this right the very interests of human society were 
being served. In this way, Grotius’s theory of punishment becomes important in exploring his 
just war theory. As such, I want to argue that any notion of humanitarian intervention rests on 
his view of punishment.
What Grotius wanted to refute was the view that the law of nature requires the right of 
jurisdiction for exacting punishment. This was exactly what he argued against Vitoria and the 
Spanish Thomists. Violations of rights were not the only grounds that provided jurisdiction to 
just cause for war. Following St. Augustine of Hippo (350 - 430), the issue of jurisdiction does 
not apply, because wars of punishments are sanctioned by nature which holds the jurisdiction 
for the whole of mankind. St. Augustine had observed that in thinking that people ‘should 
decree the commission of crimes of such sort that if any state upon earth should decree them, 
or had decreed them, it would deserve to be overthrown by a decree of the human race.’201 
Grotius noted that the natural right to punish originally rested with individuals but since the 
organization of states and courts of law has come to be it is in the hands of the highest 
authorities, namely, state rulers, who are subject to no earthly authority, to exercise this right. 
In this light, he remarked that ‘truly it is more honourable to avenge the wrong of others rather 
than one’s own, in the degree that in the case of one’s own wrongs it is more to be feared that 
through a sense of personal suffering one may exceed the proper limit or at least prejudice his 
mind.’202
For Grotius, then, all states have a right and a duty to punish other states of violations 
committed against the law of nature. For him, war ought not to be undertaken unless it is for 
the enforcements of rights. Justifiable causes for undertaking war include defence, recovery 
of property and inflicting punishment. Like previous jurists Grotius upholds the right to self- 
defence and that the origin is found directly in the law of nature. However, this principle of 
self-defence is not an absolute right. Self-preservation is not the primary law of nature; other 
concerns come before, such as natural sociableness and the obligation not to endanger the lives 
of others in order to save your own. Thus, considerations such as these act as constraints. 204
201 Cited in ibid., chapter XX, §xl
202 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, book II, chapter XX, §xl
203 Ibid., Prolegomena, §25
204 Boucher, David: Political Theories o f  International Relations -  from Thucydides to the Present, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 210
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From Grotius’s notion of natural sociability we find his claim then that nature dictates that we 
should help our fellow man.205 As we shall see in the following chapter, Grotius’s idea of 
natural sociability is not as strong as Pufendorf, but it is nevertheless a profound precursor for 
Grotius in terms of the universality of his principle of punishment. We are all sociable by 
nature and this entails a minimum of obligations upon us to come to the aid of each other. It is 
also by the law of nature that we find the origin o f Grotius’ second claim for causes of just 
war, namely that it is by this law that it is permissible to kill in defence of property.206
However, the right to inflict punishment acts as a somewhat different principle from the 
right to defend oneself and the right to recover property. Grotius, more explicitly than Vitoria 
and Gentili, transforms the notion of ius into something that we possess: it is instead a moral 
quality. This conception of rights then has reference to the person and differs from an objective 
right which in contrast is imposed on you by being derived from natural law. It, instead, 
establishes rules of right conduct. With regards to subjective rights, Grotius thus argues that ‘in 
this sense a right becomes a moral quality of a person, making it possible to have or to do 
something lawfully.’207 This is important, because unlike the right to self-defence and the 
rights attached to ones property, the right to punish wrongdoers is strictly speaking not a moral 
power. Haakonssen notes that the suggestion that people have a natural right to punish is 
problematic. This is so because it cannot be regarded as a moral power in the same way as we 
hold other rights, and must therefore be understood as a kind of a second-order right. And this,
9 0 SHaakonssen asserts, is never adequately explained by Grotius.
Grotius does, however, attempt to explain this problem in his discussion of attributive and 
expletive justice. Here, it is important to take a closer look at Grotius’s criticism of Aristotle. It 
is well- known that Grotius seeks to distinguish between questions of entitlement and questions 
of worthiness or rights and aptitudes. Grotius notes ‘when the moral quality is perfect we call it 
facultas [...]; when it is not perfect, aptitudo.’209 For Grotius, rights are a matter of expletive 
justice. They follow from the basic requirements of the social order, which is the source of 
law for Grotius. Aristotle is concerned with aptitudes for his distributive justice -  which is 
directed toward those virtues which have as their purpose the good of others. The central point 
underlying this distinction between rights and aptitudes is the denial, for Grotius anyway, that
205 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, book II, chapter XX, §viii
206 Ibid., book I, chapter II, § 1-2
207 Ibid., book I, chapter I, § iv
208 Haakonssen, Knud: ‘Hugo Grotius and the History o f Political Thought’ in Political Theory, vol. 13, 
no. 2 (May, 1985), pp. 239 -  265, p. 242
209 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, book I, chapter I, § iv
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juridical rights and duties is derived directly from the requirement of the common good. For 
Grotius rights were in the domain of liberty -  where one might pursue ones self-interests, but 
they could not be seen as being directly related to the requirement of the common good -  even 
if one understand Grotius to have a ‘thicker’ understanding of natural sociability.210 In relation 
to attributive justice, he argues that here it is untrue to say that all punishment comes from the 
whole to the part. The essence of such punishment is to take into account its notion of aptitude, 
which by way of definition ‘does not contain in itself right strictly so called, but furnishes an
911opportunity for it.’
With this distinction in mind, it could be argued that Martha Nussbaum attributes a much 
stronger view of Grotius’s notion of humanitarian intervention than what can in fact be the 
case. It is worth noting that Nussbaum in her book Frontiers o f  Justice relies heavily on a 
Grotian foundation of what she terms ‘human fellowship’, however, it is a foundation she 
never fully explores. This becomes problematic in trying to discover her moral 
foundationalism. Nussbaum seems to rely on the misguided notion that Grotius secularised the 
natural law tradition, from which we find the move from natural law to natural rights. Grotius 
famous ‘impious hypothesis’ will be explored in more detail below. Here it is sufficient to 
emphasise that Nussbaum’s conscious theoretical selection of Grotius gets her into an 
argumentative fix, and this can be illustrated by taking a closer look at her argument that 
Grotius provides her with a strong moral claim for humanitarian intervention. On the face of 
it, Nussbaum wants to present a more robust justification for humanitarian intervention than 
Rawls -  or at least she does not think that it is as morally problematic as he does. She criticises
Rawls’s international relations projects, and notes, Rawls ‘is eager to conclude that we may
• 212respect hierarchical nations as members in good standing of the Society of Peoples’. She 
voices her concern that it is problematic what to do when the standards of given nations are 
defective (going back to her concerns of Rawls’s human rights list, ‘back ground structures’ 
and the fact that he uses peoples and not individuals as the main recipients of international 
justice)? In this way she says that ‘Rawls can give us no insight into why we might care about
210 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, book I, chapter I, § iv -ix; See also Simmonds, N. E.: ‘Grotius and 
Pufendorf in Nadler, Steven (ed.) A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, (Blackwell Publishing, 
2002) pp. 216-224
2.1 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, book II, chapter XX, § ii
2.2 Nussbaum, Martha: Frontiers o f  Justice -  Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, (Cambridge 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 255
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state sovereignty’213. She thinks that Grotius can provide her with the stronger foundation that 
she needs. She appeals to the Dutch thinker’s idea of taking individuals as the main actors of 
international relations as well as to his strong notion of natural sociability (human 
fellowship).214 She emphasises this point by asserting ‘[recognition of the moral importance of 
the state as an expression of human autonomy is already a prominent feature of Grotius’s 
discussion of humanitarian intervention by forming sovereign states and giving themselves 
laws, human beings assert their moral autonomy.’ In this way Nussbaum sees Grotius as giving 
us ‘grounds that does not depend on our believing that we ought to express respect for the 
hierarchies which society has organized itself,’ which is her criticism laid against Rawls.215 
However, this understanding of Grotius’s notion of humanitarian intervention is problematic as 
might already be apparent. As we saw, any understanding of a notion of humanitarian 
intervention that Grotius might have is strongly linked to a theory of punishment. From 
Grotius’s idea of natural sociability it follows that it in fact does not provide states with an 
absolute obligation to intervene when gross violations of the natural law take place exactly 
because it is not ‘thick’ enough. This is why he talks of states’ or sovereign’s rights to punish 
not obligations as such. In this way, there is a much weaker foundation of obligations to punish 
crimes on breach of the natural law on humanitarian grounds than what Nussbaum assumes. 
This, I think, stems back from Grotius criticism of Aristotle and his notion of distributive 
justice as explained above. From the fact that state’s or the sovereign’s natural rights to punish 
is not absolutely derived from the requirements of the common good, but is rather found in the 
realm of the permissive. Thus, the point I want to make is that it seems that Nussbaum ascribes 
Grotius a much more robust obligation for humanitarian intervention than he actually does -  he 
talks of (‘imperfect’) rights and minimal obligations at best. This becomes more obvious in the 
following. From the notion of aptitude, what seems to be the crux of the matter for Grotius 
here is that nature does not determine to whom punishment is appropriate; however, the law of 
nature does dictate that those free of crimes may exact punishment.
213Nussbaum, Frontiers o f Justice, p. 258. Pogge of course voiced similar concerns; See Pogge, Thomas: 
World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, (Cambridge: Polity, 
2002)
214 How strong Grotius’s notion of natural sociability is, is contentious -  there is no doubt that he does not 
present as strong a notion as Pufendorf later did, as will be apparent in the following chapter. However, it 
could be argued that Nussbaum seems to want to present a thicker conception of sociability that what 
could be ascribed to Grotius.
215 Nussbaum, Frontiers o f  Justice, p. 256
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‘But the subject o f this right, that is the agent to whom the right is given, has not been definitely fixed by nature 
itself. For Reason declares that the criminal may be punished. It does not, however, declare who ought to inflict 
the punishment, excepting so far as this, that nature makes it clear enough that it is most suitable that punishment 
be inflicted by one who is superior [...].,216
Thus, the right to punish is not obligatory in the positive sense of the word. It is difficult 
to specifically determine to whom this obligation should correlate. This relates intimately to 
the idea of humanitarian intervention in the sense that it can never be a ‘perfect’ obligation for 
this exact reason; a fact Grotius recognised. He to some extent explored this issue with some 
caution citing both Cicero and Plato in relation to a man’s duty to help or prevent a wrong, but 
came to the conclusion that 4the obligation to undertake war may be disregarded without 
wrong, i f  one fears fo r  himself or even fo r  the life o f  an innocent per son.1,2X1 Thus, in close 
relation to this Grotius also argued, as did Vitoria and Suarez for instance, that such wars are 
only to be undertaken if there is an outcome without great losses for the subjects of the third 
party ruler who is intervening. For these exact reasons, Grotius relayed a word of warning in 
relation to such wars saying that ‘wars which are undertaken to inflict punishment are under 
suspicion of being unjust, unless the crimes are very atrocious and very evident, or there is
710 • •some other coincident reason.’ It is clear, then, that Grotius is not only emphasising the need 
of a proportionate outcome (something we today might term ‘humanitarian’), he is also 
asserting the problem of using such wars of punishments as mere pretexts. It seems that 
Grotius here is almost suggesting that if the crime is not palpably heinous, then one is in 
danger of being viewed as an opportunist, intervening under a pretext. He further asserted this
concern by citing Mithridates220 that such wars of pretext ‘assail not the faults of kings’ but
971 # # 
rather ‘the power and authority of kings.’ In relation to this, Grotius relays further
precautions, namely that the law of nature must be distinguished from widely current national
customs. He notes that ‘to wish to impose civilization upon uncivilized peoples is a pretext
227
which may serve to conceal greed for what is another’s.’ Thus, to use the example of the 
American Indians; unless their ‘uncivil’ life constituted serious enough crimes against the laws
216 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, book II, chapter xx, § iii
217 Ibid., chapter xxv, § vii (Grotius’s italics)
218 Ibid., § ii
219 Ibid., book II, chapter xx, § xliii
220 Probably Mithridates (VI) the Great (132-63 BC) king o f Pontus (what is today Turkey)
221 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, book II, chapter xx, § xliii
222 Ibid., §xli
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of nature, waging wars against them could only be considered as being motivated by greed and 
ambition, not justice.
In recognising a right to inflict punishment, Grotius, in this way, does not deny that there 
are obligations that go beyond what is dictated by the natural law. We have virtues apart from 
justice that encourage us to work towards perfecting ourselves and the common good. These 
are, nevertheless, ‘imperfect’ which can only compel us if they are established in human
9 9 Tlaw. As Grotius contends:
‘That which we call moral goodness [...] at times it has a wider range, so that an act may be praiseworthy if 
performed, yet if it be omitted altogether or performed in some other way no blame would attach [...] it is with [...] 
this class [...] o f actions that both divine and human laws are wont to concern themselves, in order that those acts 
which were in themselves merely praiseworthy might also become obligatory.’224
The aspect of moral goodness is part of the conception of permissions. As was explored in 
chapter 1, Grotius was not the first to assert the notion of permissions as part of the natural 
law. Suarez discussed this notion extensively. For Suarez there are instances in the law of 
nature of concessions, or permissions, which are conducive for the common good of men as a 
condition to living well in society. These are therefore not absolute otherwise they would 
pertain to the natural law. These, as was explored amply in chapter 1, belong to the law of 
nations.
Grotius takes the concept of permission and makes it central to his account of the law of 
nations and the law of war; this has to be understood in recognition that for Grotius war is the
9 9  Sgreatest human imperfection of all. Grotius recognises the morally problematic nature of 
permissions on several occasions and emphasises that giving way to permissions does not 
make it morally right; for instance in quoting Cicero Grotius stresses ‘it is one thing to have
9 9 A  •regard to rights, and another to have regard to justice.’ However, in Prolegomena he makes 
the necessary distinction between acts that are done with impunity and acts that are actually
9 9 7  •free from fault. As will be explored more explicitly later on, Grotius’s account of the law of 
nations, underlined by an idea of the authority of agreement between human beings, suspends
223 Forde, Steven: ‘Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War’ in The American Political Science Review, vol. 92, 
no. 3 (Sept., 1998), pp. 6 3 9-648 , p. 641
224 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, book I, chapter II, §i
225 Forde, Steven: ‘Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War’, p. 644. Also see Forde for a good discussion on the
differences between permissions and the law of war in Suarez and Grotius
226 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, book III, chapter IV, §ii
227 Grotius, Prolegomena, §35; Forde, Steven: ‘Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War’, p. 644
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the operation of the natural law. The law of nations, Grotius asserts ‘permits many things 
which are forbidden by the law of nature’; but, at the same time, Grotius is also adamant to
emphasise that it also ‘forbids certain things which are permissible by the law of nature’, such
228as polygamy. In the case of war, the reason such permissions are necessary is to bring about 
peace. Grotius recognises that if  strictly applied, the natural law just war doctrine could 
override any peace settlements with endless conflicts being reopened in service to justice. In 
this way having a right does not necessarily imply that it should be exercised on any given 
occasion.
The status of human permissions in the law of wars is something that greatly concerned 
Grotius and the last part of book III is a plea for states to follow the higher laws of nature or 
the morals found within Christian duties. Steven Forde notes whether this in fact means that 
Grotius, after all, denies to human law any permissions from the natural law. As he notes ‘in 
Grotius’s view, are permissions granted by human law through a true moral power it possesses, 
or do these permissions merely represent the impunity that results from the nations deciding in 
concert to ignore justice?’ However, as he subsequently clarifies this does not seem to be the 
case as Grotius placed great limits on the ability of humans to abolish the law of nature, and 
thus permissions which happen to obstruct the enforcements of the law of nature is not on this 
account manifestly Machiavellian in scope. Thus, human law ‘cannot enjoin anything which 
the law of nature forbids, or forbid what the law of nature enjoins’; it can nevertheless, as 
Grotius explains, ‘set limits on natural liberty, and forbid what by nature was permitted.’ In 
this way, human law may grant permissions which are unjust, but these permissions are not 
absolute.231 As alluded to at the beginning of this chapter Grotius believes that presenting an 
utopian ideal for the international order is not a solution, neither is a pure just war doctrine. 
Thus, as will become apparent, Grotius wanted to emphasise the necessity of granting the law 
of nations the legitimacy of law.
If, as I argued, Grotius allows a permissive right to punish violations of the natural law, 
what exactly is the purpose of the punishment? There are a number of possibilities, or course. 
It could be retribution for committing a moral wrong, or a deterrent to prevent future 
violations, or indeed, it could be to reform the character of nations, to force them to see the 
error of their ways and act more morally. Primarily, his underlying assertion is that punishment
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has to have a deterrent effect. Unlike what Pufendorf later argued, as will be explicit in the 
following chapter, Grotius emphasised that punishment must have some advantage among men 
and must somehow be inflicted differently from the way God does it (in relation to 
humanitarian intervention that is). Following Plato, Grotius asserts that punishment is not 
designed for evil neither is it exacted because a wrong has been done. In other words he is 
denying the retributivist justification of punishment. Instead, the purpose of punishment is to 
prevent a recurrence, and deter others from similarly transgressing the natural law. In quoting 
Seneca Grotius says ‘no wise man punishes because a sin has been committed. For what has 
passed cannot be recalled, but what is to come may be prevented [...] we are not to do harm to 
a man because he has sinned, but that he may not sin.’232 Here, in relation to the purpose of 
intervention for Grotius, it is necessary to take a closer look at its implications. If the only 
justification for intervention is deterrence, then it is not really a moral claim. What, then, 
would the reason for saving the innocent and preventing, for example, acts of bestiality and 
sodomy be? Punishments may deter, but there is something deeper going on there. To deter 
someone from consorting with animals would be to prevent him or her from committing a 
mortal sin, and to prevent an indelible stain on his or her soul. It is as Grotius says that ‘when 
man punishes a man who is his equal by nature he ought to have a definite purpose in view 
[....] for one man is so bound to another by ties of common blood that he ought not to do harm
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to another save for the sake of attaining some good.’ For Grotius, then, punishment is not 
exacted for retribution or vengeance, but rather as a measure of precaution. The purpose needs 
to be for ‘some good’ and as such for Grotius there is this deterrent aspect attached to the 
principle of punishment. Such punishments are to be viewed as exemplary and are employed 
‘so that the punishment of one may cause many to fear, and others may be frightened by the 
nature of the punishment.’234 Grotius stipulates that it is important to consider that punishment 
is not necessarily inflicted for the good of the wrongdoer, but for the good of the public. This is 
so, ‘partly by removing the wrong-doer or by restraining him from doing harm [and] partly by 
deterring others through the severity of punishment as an example.’235 In this way, Grotius’s 
general view of the principle of punishment can be viewed as humanitarian in the sense that it 
is good for the public.
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As I emphasised above, for Grotius we have moral obligations that goes beyond the 
dictates of the law of nature and these are grounded in acts of permissions, grounded in a 
natural right, of which some can have humanitarian justifications. This requires us to explore 
what sort of acts of punishment is permitted on humanitarian grounds and ultimately Grotius’s 
notion of third party intervention.
Third party intervention
From the notion that states have a natural right to punish crimes committed against the law of 
nature, such as cannibalism and inhumanity to one’s own parents, Grotius emphasised that this 
would be the case regardless of whether such violations were committed against one-self or 
against others with whom there was no direct involvement. And as such Grotius has a clear 
idea that undertaking war on behalf of others was lawful in the sense that it was permitted by 
the law of nature. As he contends:
‘Kings and those who possess the rights equal to those kings, have the right o f demanding punishment not only on 
accounts of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not 
directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever.’236
Following from this, he thus asserted that most just wars were fought against ‘wild rapacious 
beasts, the next against men who are like beasts’,237 in accordance with what nature had 
sanctioned. These would then be cannibals, sodomites, and others that participate in licentious 
wicked acts. An assertion in obvious opposition to what Vitoria had previously argued.
Much has been written on whether Grotius is in fact an apologist for absolutism in the 
sense that even in cases of extreme necessity he asserted that subjects may not rebel against 
their ruler. It is not my place here to confirm or deny such arguments. In relation to the topic at 
hand is the fact that not only did Grotius recognised a principle of non-intervention into the 
internal affairs of other states; he also expressed the imperative need of lawful intervention by 
one state on behalf of seriously persecuted people of another. This was derived from Grotius’s 
notion of punishment, as has already been shown, that by the law of nature an individual was 
justified in enforcing not merely his or her own rights, but also those of others. The causes, 
Grotius contends, ‘which are just in relation to the person whose interest is at stake are
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[therefore] just also in relation to those who give assistance to others.’238 This, for Grotius is 
intimately related to his claim that the ‘most wide-reaching cause for undertaking wars on 
behalf of others is the mutual tie of kinship among men,’ which of itself, Grotius contends, 
‘affords sufficient ground for rendering assistance’.239 In this way, Grotius was leaning on the 
same type of argument as Gentili, which had its origin in medieval thought of the common 
interests and duties of mankind. What Grotius in fact is arguing here, by evoking medieval 
Christian thought of a common humanity, is that we have a duty to assist one another 
irrespective of our right to punish. However, in circumstances such as these he, yet again, 
noted the potential danger of the ever- present abuse of this kind of intervention:
‘Seneca thinks that I may make war upon one who is not of my people but oppresses his own [...] a procedure 
which is often connected with the protection of innocent persons. We know, it is true, from both ancient and 
modem history, that the desire for what is another’s seeks such pretexts as this for its own ends; but a right does 
not at once cease to exist in case it is to some extent abused by evil men. Pirates, also, sail the seas; arms are 
carried also by brigands.’240
Theodor Meron notes that on this point Grotius owes much more to his predecessor Gentili 
than he gives credit; in fact, to such an extent that in today’s academic scholarship one might 
well term it plagiarism.241 Even though it is certainly true, as we have seen, that many of 
Grotius’s passages are indeed very similar to Gentili’s, Meron’s critique is hardly pertinent. 
What Gentili was arguing is that crimes violating natural or divine laws would somehow result 
in the perpetrators forfeiting their natural rights; what Grotius instead is arguing is for the 
natural rights of individuals or states to punish such crimes.
One of the extensively discussed issues by Christian jurists and theologians, namely the 
issue of whether war can be waged on account of crimes committed against God, was 
considered to some extent by Grotius. As was discussed in relation to some of the Spanish 
Thomists the notion that we have a duty to undertake war to avenge crimes committed against 
God generally denied such wars as just saying that God is able to punish offences committed 
against Himself. However, Grotius’s argues that if this is the case then the same thing is true 
about other crimes. He denies the notion that these other crimes are punished by men in so far 
as these cause injury and endanger other men for as he remarks ‘men do not only punish the
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sins which directly harm others but also those which harm by their consequences, such as 
suicide, intercourse with animals [...],,242 which, as was demonstrated above testifies to the 
moral purpose of such punishments. What Grotius wants to argue is that injury to God consists 
of injury to human beings. He notes that ‘religion, although it is in itself effective in winning 
the favour of God, nevertheless has also in addition important effects on human society.’243
Thus, there is a strong notion of humanitarian intervention for undertaking wars for 
crimes against God, and that these are consistent with a just cause. In fact, Grotius feels very 
strongly that wars undertaken for such reasons are not only important but also necessary for the 
welfare of the common good:
‘Religion is o f even greater use in that greater society than in that o f a single state. For in the latter the place of 
religion is taken by the laws and the easy execution of the laws; while on the contrary in that larger community 
the enforcement o f law is very difficult, seeing that it can only be carried out by an armed force, and the laws are 
very few. Besides, these laws themselves receive their validity chiefly from fear o f the divine power; and for this 
reason those who sin against the law of nations are everywhere said to transgress divine law. Therefore, [...] 
religious corruption affects all to their hurt.’244
In this way, those who violate these common ideas of religion may be punished, even people 
who ‘are too dull-witted to be able to discover or understand positive proofs thereof;245 for as 
Grotius argued, they have at some point been instructed and guided to the right path of reason. 
However, what does Grotius argue in relation to people who have not had such an instruction 
in the Christian faith? This argument weighed heavily on the minds of the Spanish jurists, and 
thinkers such as Vitoria came to the conclusion that punishing the Indians for crimes 
committed in ignorance against God would be unjust. Sepulveda, on the contrary, believed that 
such people should be instructed in the true faith by force and coercion if necessary and wars 
undertaken for such purposes would be just.
Grotius disagreed on this point with Sepulveda. Wars against those who are unwilling 
to accept the Christian religion cannot be waged justly because, as he argued, ‘Christ as the 
author of the new law desired that absolutely no one should be inducted to receive His law by 
punishments in this life, or by fear thereof.’246 However, Grotius was adamant that wars may 
be justly waged for crimes committed against Christians for the sake of their religion alone. In
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arguing that there is nothing in the Christian teachings which is injurious to human society, 
rather the opposite, Grotius therefore emphasises that people of other religions have an 
obligation to recognise Christians. As such, wars can be justly waged against people who 
persecute another group of people on account of their beliefs. Grotius had had important 
political reasons for expounding such a point, not only considering Dutch relations with the 
Catholic Hapsburgs, but also in light of the political and religious feuds within the Dutch state 
itself. A dispute over seemingly arcane theological matters had broken out in 1618 between 
orthodox Calvinists, ‘Contra-Remonstrants’, and the reformers, the ‘Remonstrants’, who 
voiced more religious tolerance and this had quickly turned into a deepened political feud. 
Grotius, along with the leading Dutch politician of the day, Johan van Oldenbamevelt (1547 - 
1619), supported the latter movement, and when Prince Maurice of Nassau (1567 - 1625), 
leader of the Calvinist establishment, staged a coup and usurped power, he immediately sought 
to eliminate the Remonstrants and their supporters in government. Oldenbamevelt was 
executed and Grotius was sentenced to life imprisonment; (although from which he later 
escaped).247
Another issue which Grotius discusses is the idea of mling others for the sake of their 
own good. As we saw with Sepulveda, this was one of his main arguments for just warfare 
against the Indians and also humanitarian in the sense that it was to civilise them and 
ultimately save them from themselves. And as was discussed, this was grounded in his idea of 
applying Aristotle’s category of natural slavery to the Indians. Grotius, however, denies such 
justifications as being mere pretexts. As emphasised previously, he proclaims:
‘Not less iniquitous is it to desire by arms to subdue other men, as if they deserved to be enslaved, and were such 
as the philosophers at times called slaves by nature. For even if something is advantageous for any one, the right 
is not forthwith conferred upon me to impose this upon him by force. For those who have the use of their reason 
ought to have a free choice of what is advantageous or not advantageous, unless another has acquired a certain 
right over them.’248
Thus, as was explained, only if the Indians committed crimes against the law of nature does a 
third party have a natural right to intervene and not, as Groitus asserted above, to civilise them,
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even if it would be to do them ‘good’. This is interesting in relation to today’s notion of 
humanitarian intervention. Only genocide or crimes, which ‘shock the moral conscience of 
mankind’ are serious enough to precipitate a potential humanitarian intervention (or not as is 
more often the case), whereas, for instance, systematic violations against women in countries 
like Yemen or Saudi Arabia are not deemed serious, or criminal, enough for intervention.
Another important aspect here in relation to intervention, which deserves mentioning, is 
the issue of what has later become known as the doctrine of Terra Nullius. Grotius, like John 
Locke (1632 - 1704) after him, believed that everyone had a natural right to possess and 
inhabit uncultivated land. The condition was that due recognition was given to the appropriate 
political authority. This is of course not the case with Locke, where ownership rights to 
property does not depend on a system of law, whereas for Grotius, then, it could only have 
validity within such a context. Grotius distinguished between property and jurisdiction, where 
the latter was something that is exercised over people rather than things, but also extending it 
to all people entering within a given territory. This was also how Grotius justified his argument 
against the claim of the Portuguese to have a right to possess the East Indies.249 As he asserted 
‘the sea is by nature open to all.’250 Against William Welwod (1578 - 1622), his contemporary 
and professor of mathematics and civil law at the University if St. Andrews, Grotius restates 
his important argument that neither sea nor land is by nature the property of anyone. However,
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‘land through nature can become property, while the sea cannot.’ As has already been 
discussed, the violation of rights for Grotius is just ground for war against the perpetrators. 
What this in effect meant was that if the Indian authorities refused settlers their right of 
settlement or husbandry then this would be to violate the natural law and just war could be 
waged against them.252 This also applied if the Indians somehow denied settlers and travellers 
the right of passage; access to harbours; the conduct of trade and commerce; or obtaining 
provisions. These are all rights granted to them by the law of nations. This view, as we saw, 
was also endorsed by Vitoria and Gentili. As will become apparent in the following chapter, 
this was something that Pufendorf was strongly opposed. Although, Grotius here recognises 
the political authority of the Indians, he nevertheless does not recognise the eminent domain, 
or sovereignty they hold over the land. Historically, this is of course because the notion of
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sovereignty is not conceptually available to him in the same way that it was for Pufendorf. By 
emphasising the collective ownership of the land by the Indians, as we shall see, Pufendorf s 
theory severely restricted any colonial or settlement aspirations for the Europeans.
From the above analysis, it is apparent that Grotius does have a notion of humanitarian 
intervention which is inextricably tied to his theory of punishment as a right based on certain 
permissions to promote and maintain the interests of human society. However, a necessary 
question follows from this: what are the sources of these obligations, according to which we 
act? What law are they grounded in: the natural law or the law of nations? This will be 
explored in the following section.
The source of moral obligation - the law of nations or the law of nature
As was discussed above, the obligation (and right) to punish presents us with a difficult task in 
determining where such obligation is grounded, or the source of the obligation. Arguably, for 
Grotius, because the right of punishment was not an objective right as such, it is not derived 
explicitly from nature. Rather, it is permitted by nature; however, its enforcement depends on 
conventional law. This is emphasised by Grotius in his assertion that law is the sustainer of 
morality rather than its creator. As such, the obligation of humanitarian intervention depends 
on the law of nations for its imposition. But what constituted the law of nations for Grotius?
Unlike with Vitoria and Gentili, Grotius was much more careful to distinguish the law of 
nations from the law of nature, and make it more pronounced. In fact, Grotius criticised Gentili 
for not distinguishing the two systems of laws properly. Although acknowledging the value of 
Gentili’s work, Grotius, nevertheless noted that he would leave it up to the Italian jurist’s 
readers ‘to pass judgement on the shortcomings of his work as regards method of exposition, 
arrangement of matters, delimitations of inquiries and distinctions between the various kinds of 
laws.’254 As was explored in the previous section of this chapter, Grotius’s notion of rights is 
extremely important for his natural law theory and the way he conceptualises the law of 
nations. As was briefly stated, for Grotius, there was a universal moral order in which an 
individual’s right was sustained by law. In this way the natural law becomes the declaration of 
respecting each other’s rights and thus implies that others have a certain duty to respect them 
as well. As we saw, from our definite natural sociability fundamental rights of nature relating 
to property, self-defence, promise keeping and punishment follows. In this way the natural law
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stands as a foundation of all law, because without these, human society could not exist or 
flourish.255
Knowing the content of the natural law is firstly laid out by the dictates of our right 
reason, a priori which is consistent with our rational and social nature. Secondly, through a 
posteriori method it can be known with great probability, which directs all civilised nations 
towards a common cause, for as Grotius says ‘an effects that is universal demands a universal 
cause; and the cause of such and opinion can hardly be anything else than the feeling which is 
called common sense of mankind.’ As has already been demonstrated, the law of nature for 
Grotius does not rest on the will o f individuals, instead as Boucher points out ‘it has an 
objective existence as a criterion of human actions.’257 This is important to emphasise, 
because for Grotius, the law of nations does not have an objective existence and is not logically 
self evident from definite law of nature principles. Instead, it is derived from human will and 
receives its obligatory force from the will of all nations, or most of them as Grotius contend. 
He further notes
‘The distinction between these kinds of law is not to be drawn from the testimonies themselves (for writes 
everywhere confuse the terms law of nature and law of nations), but from the character of the matter. For 
whatever cannot be deducted from certain principles by a sure process o f reasoning, and yet is clearly observed 
everywhere, must have its origin in the free will of man.’258
As such, the law of nations is a product of human agreement. In the same way as civil law is 
designed to benefit the state, so is the law of nations meant to benefit the society of humanity. 
It is observed and consented to by all civilised nations and in this way because it cannot be 
deduced from first principles it, instead, supplements the natural law. As Grotius himself 
expounds
‘But just as the laws of each state have in view the advantage o f that state, so by mutual consent it has become 
possible that certain laws should originate between all states, or a great many of states; and it is apparent that the 
laws thus originating had in view the advantage, not of particular states, but the great society o f states. And this is 
what is called the law of nations, whenever we distinguish that term from the law of nature.’259
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Unlike, what Pufendorf argued both laws regulate relationship between states. In fact 
Pufendorf criticised Grotius on this very issue. In arguing against Cameades (c. 214 -  129 BC) 
who had presented a similar view as Pufendorf, Grotius implied the illogic for such a view by 
saying that ‘just as the national, who violates the law of his country in order to obtain an 
immediate advantage breaks down that by which the advantage of himself and posterity are for 
all future time assured, so the state which transgress the laws of nature and of nations cuts 
away also the bulwarks which safeguards its own future peace.’260
Grotius then argues that the law of nations sometimes contains precepts which are created 
by nations themselves. These are then not derived from natural law and the obligation in such 
cases arises from tacit consent manifested through usage and custom. However, although they 
are not derived from natural law they cannot be in direct contradiction to it as has already been 
demonstrated. The law of nations can only set restriction or forbid what by the law of nature is 
permitted, not its absolute principles. Whether these precepts arise from divine instinct or 
mutual consent they have authority proven from their ancient usage of civilised nations and by 
the authority of the wisest men. As he said
‘The proof of the law of nations is similar to that for unwritten municipal law; it is found in unbroken custom and 
the testimony of those who are skilled in it. The law in fact [...] ‘is the creation of time and custom’.’261
For Grotius then, much of the law of nations arises out of usage and custom which is a kind of 
positive law.
A secular law of nature tradition? Grotius and the impious hypothesis
thKnud Haakonssen notes that it is clear that the natural law theories development in the 17 and 
18th Centuries lost more and more of their theological manifestation and instead became more 
technically juristic. Subsequent attempts that try to pinpoint this development face the 
difficulty and danger of ‘premature secularization’ in the interpretation of the natural law 
tradition.262 It seems clear, that for one reason or the other, no other thinker apart from Grotius 
has sparked such controversy in academic scholarship regarding this issue. If, indeed, Grotius 
did secularise the natural law tradition, this would have a profound effect on his notion of 
humanitarian intervention in the sense that if God was not the source of such obligations, then
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who was? As will be apparent in the following such contentions cannot hold, and Grotius’s 
notion of humanitarian intervention provides a good example of this very issue. The answer 
seems simple: if God is not the source of the obligations to wage war on humanitarian grounds 
for Grotius, which I have discussed in this chapter, then his notion here would simply not have 
been strong enough; especially in light of the audience he was addressing at the time.
As did his successor Pufendorf, Grotius sought to separate the natural law from the 
Christian religion. He had already laid the path for his natural law theory in his unpublished 
work De Indies, which he began as early as 1604. And in his Prolegomena Grotius clearly 
contended that the natural law could not be identified with either the Old or the New 
Testament.263
‘The New Testament I use in order to explain [...] what is permissible to Christians. This, however, contrary to the 
practice of most men, I have distinguished from the law of nature, considering it as certain that in most holy law a 
greater degree o f moral perfection is enjoined upon us than the law of nature, alone and by itself, would require. 
And nevertheless I have not omitted to note the things that are recommended to us rather than enjoined, that we 
may know that, while the turning aside from what has been enjoined is wrong and involves the risk of 
punishment, a striving for the highest excellence implies a noble purpose and will not fail in its reward.’264
This was of course contrary to what Suarez had argued and he, unlike Grotius, saw the
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Decalogue as containing the natural law, and he, in this way, retained a religious based 
natural law content. It is this move from a religious based conception of the natural law that 
has also been seen as epitomizing a secular conception of natural law. Haakonssen notes that it 
is not until we come to Hume that all modem natural law thinkers ceased to believe that it was 
God who created the world and in so doing created the law by which people should live. 
However, Haakonssen goes on to state that such notion can only fully be comprehended by 
taking into account the religious basis, i.e. Catholicism, Orthodox or Protestantism, in which 
such claims can be grounded. With this argument then, Haakonssen is, to a certain extent, in 
danger of oversimplifying the issue by stating that the secularization of the natural law 
tradition amounts to nothing more than the relative neglect of religion; an argument he himself
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rejects for being a ‘poor substitute for an explanation’.266 He notes that the main shift in the 
foundation of natural law must arise in other areas and not simply in its ground of existence.
David Boucher has noted that the secularization of the natural law tradition emphasised 
the need for a natural law in a theory of morality based upon natural rights. The purpose of the 
law of nations and civil law, then, was to protect and facilitate the free use of these rights.267As 
we saw, Grotius, to a certain extent, holds a subjective notion of the concept of natural rights. 
It is precisely this that Haakonssen sees as a main indicator of Grotius’s move to secularising 
the tradition. Or rather, as he terms it, Grotius’s natural law theory has a secularising effect. 
Haakonssen notes that honouring rights, perfect and imperfect, is for Grotius a good in itself 
and although it is prescribed by God it is obligatory in itself. Haakonssen continues to 
emphasise that logically this means the natural law is obligatory without God. He goes on to 
conclude that for Grotius the natural law is morally insufficient in the sense that it only 
prescribes negative justice and not positive virtues and obligations. From this he deduces that 
without the moral intervention of God into human life there is no moral community between 
the two. This is to be understood in the idea that although Grotius accepts the authorship of 
God his conception of human sociability is such that God says nothing about the form of this 
sociability. This, as will be demonstrated further below, is a misreading of Grotius. To present 
Grotius’s conception of human sociability without God is not taking into account the whole 
argument.
The notion that Grotius represents the move to a secularised conception of the law of 
nature is also presented by James Muldoon, who was criticised in chapter 1. His arguments are 
undeveloped, unsophisticated and vague, unlike Haakonssen’s. Muldoon, seems to overstate 
Grotius’s jurisprudence as a clear move away from natural law theory towards a more secular 
based international system composed of sovereign states. The purpose of his contention is to 
give force to his categorisation of a pre-Grotian international society into which he wanted to 
fit Vitoria. In this way, Muldoon more or less presents Grotius as a modem legal positivist; a 
claim which is hardly fitting. Although Grotius is usually seen as this early example of seeking 
to secularise natural law and natural right within the context of international relations, it is in 
fact an anachronistic contention.
For Grotius, as has been shown, the natural law is self evident, the proof of which is 
found in human sociability. In this sense natural law is so inextricable tied to human nature that
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even if it were the case that God did not have an interest in the welfare of humanity, the law 
prescribing this welfare would remain valid. As Grotius himself stated
‘What we have been saying would have a degree o f validity even if we should concede that which cannot be 
conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him. 
The very opposite o f this view has been implanted in us partly by reason, partly by unbroken tradition, and 
confirmed by many proofs as well as by miracles attested by all ages.’268
It is this particular argument which has been held to give evidence to Grotius’s secularisation 
of the natural law and in this way leading the way to modem international law. However, such 
reading of Grotius is impoverished in the sense that it does not take into account the complete 
logic of the argument. It is God that has implanted the principles which spring from human 
nature. The obligation we have to accept these principles is to God, proving that the source of 
natural law in Grotius is undoubtedly God.269 As he, himself, stated immediately following the 
famous quotation:
‘We must without exception render obedience to God as our Creator, to Whom we owe all that we are and have; 
[...] Herein, then, is another source of law besides the source in nature, that is, the free will of God, to which 
beyond all cavil our reason tells us we must render obedience. But the law of nature [...] comprises alike that 
which relates to the social life of man and that which is so called in a larger sense, proceeding as it does from the 
essential traits implanted in man, can nevertheless rightly be attributed to God, because of His having willed that 
such traits exist in us.’270
So the source of the natural law is indisputably God for Grotius, however, its contents are 
based upon and comes from human nature and those traits which are implanted in us by
9 7 1God. Grotius contends that there are compelling reasons for ascribing the principles of the
268 Grotius, Rights o f War and Peace, Prolegomena, §11
269 Boucher, David: The Limits o f Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights and 
Human Rights in Transition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2009), pp. 115 - 118
270 Grotius, Rights o f  War and Peace, Prolegomena, §11- 12
271 Boucher, Political Theories o f  International Relations, pp. 211 -  212. This view is also shared by the 
political philosopher John Finnis. In relation to Grotius’s famous passage, Finnis underlines the carefully 
wording of Grotius. Grotius ascribes only ‘a degree of validity’ to his posed hypothesis if God did not 
exist. Finnis’s conclusion is that Grotius was not adopting a firm intellectualist position as could be taken 
from his impious hypothesis. Rather, it places him in a less extreme and more orthodox position 
mediating between intellectualism and voluntarism. In this way, natural law’s obligatory force is derived 
from the divine will, but its content may be determined independently. As Finnis notes ‘What is right or 
wrong depends on the nature of things (and what is conveniens to such nature), and not on the decree of 
God; but the normative or motivating significance of moral Tightness or wrongness, in particular the 
obligatoriness of the norm of right and wrong, depends fundamentally upon there being a decree 
expressing God’s will that the right be done ( as a matter of obligation) and that the wrong be avoided
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Natural Law to God. He has made them so evident and clear even to those ‘less capable of 
strict Reasoning’ that He forbids us to give in to impetuous passions that are contrary to our 
own and others’ interests and which divert us from conforming to the rules of reason. In the 
Mare Liberum (The Free Sea) Grotius goes further and suggests that God directly insinuates 
certain precepts into men’s minds, which are ‘sufficient to induce obligation even if no reason 
is apparent’.272 As such, to reiterate, for Grotius you cannot have a human condition without 
God. This could be termed to be secularizing in effect, but clearly not the effect for which 
Haakonssen is arguing. His argument seems to state a much more fundamental secularizing of 
Grotius’s natural law, in which, there is no moral community between God and humans, which 
is then deemed to be secularizing. This has been proved to be a misunderstanding. Grotius 
even analogically asserts that the word Taw’ holds per definition that God is its source. 
Immediately following the passage cited above Grotius notes ‘in this sense, too, Chrysippus 
and the Stoics used to say that the origin of law should be sought in no other source than 
Jupiter himself; and from the name Jupiter the Latin word for law (ius) was probably 
derived.’ In relation to humanitarian intervention, then, our human condition, presupposed 
by a natural sociableness is meaningless without God, so must any obligations arising out of 
this sociableness. The fact is that we have obligations to help our fellow man and punish others 
that transgress the natural law is then evidence that the source of such obligations is 
undoubtedly God.
In the same vein as Boucher, the political theorist Brian Tierney has also argued that to 
present Grotius as inaugurating a new era of ‘modem natural law’ is a misunderstanding. The 
idea that Grotius epitomizes the substitution of a new theory of natural rights for the old idea of 
natural law in the sense then, that natural law is merely derivative from natural rights is ‘not 
really true’ as he says. In explaining the origin of the contested passage in Grotius Tiemey 
argues
‘In the work o f Grotius, as in that of his scholastic predecessors, we find natural rights and natural law side by 
side, both associated with traits of human nature that were taken to be implanted by God. [...] [W]e now 
understand that the famous “impious hypothesis” (“Even if there was no God....”) was a rather common topos of
(likewise), See Finnis, John: Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1980), 
p. 44; See also, Simmonds, ‘Grotius and Pufendorf, pp. 219 - 220
272 Cited in Boisen, Camilla and Boucher, David: ‘Hobbes’s and the Subjection of International Relations 
to Law and Morality’ in International Political Theory After Hobbes eds., Prokhovnik, Raia, and Slomp,
Gabriella (London, Palgrave: 2010 forthcoming); (Grotius, Rights o f War and Peace: Preliminary 
Discourse, §13); (Grotius, The Free Sea, p. 105)
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late scholastic discourse and that Grotius could have picked it up from Su&rez or from any one of half a dozen 
sixteenth-century authors.’274
Thus, Tiemey sees Grotius’s proposed secularising effect for what it is: a particular method of 
arguing which, rather than placing Grotius in a new tradition of secularised natural law, serves 
instead to cement his place in the Thomist Medieval tradition of natural law, which he 
inherited alongside thinkers such as Suarez and Vitoria.
Richard Tuck gave credence to the secular interpretation of Grotius more forcefully than 
Haakonssen. The centrality of Tuck’s argument is his suggestion that Grotius reinterpreted the 
universal notion of self-preservation as a moral standard that could be the basis of a new 
natural rights and natural law doctrine. However, Tiemey argues that Tuck in this instance 
does not take into account the whole of Grotius’s doctrine of natural rights and natural law. 
Certainly, one of the main principles here is indeed self-preservation or self-love as Grotius 
sometimes terms it, and also sociability. In this sense, Grotius presented a similar argument as 
some of the medieval jurists and theologians in contending that God intended that individuals 
should have regard for their fellow-human beings in order for to live in reciprocal harmony 
with each other. And thus, Grotius states that ‘love is twofold, love of self and love of 
others.’275
As Tiemey argues, the legal jurist N. E. Simmonds also notes that Grotius’s impious 
hypothesis, rather than giving credence to a new foundation for the natural law, locates him 
instead in the long running debate within Christian theocentric natural law writing, which 
highlighted the two positions of voluntarism and intellectualism. We briefly touched upon this 
in chapter 1 in relation to Suarez. Like his Spanish contemporary, Grotius takes the middle 
position of the two. Simmonds notes, that those who seek to defend Grotius’s originality -  that 
the Grotian natural law has a new and somewhat secular character -  will not find the impious 
hypothesis a fruitful avenue to pursue. Rather, the impious hypothesis instead begs the 
question of whether Grotius was an intellectualist. Pufendorf certainly interpreted Grotius as 
one. However, as Simmonds argues, it might be too easy to assume an equation between the 
impious hypothesis and intellectualism; Grotius intention may simply have been to argue, as I
274 Tiemey, Brian: The Idea o f  Natural Rights -  Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 
1150- 1625, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 319 - 320
275 Cited in Tiemey, Brian: The Idea o f Natural Rights, p. 323
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have also attempted to argue here, that the dictates of the natural law were not arbitrary, but 
founded upon the nature of man and the circumstances of the world.276
This idea that Grotius somehow signalled a new era of secular international law, also 
brings out the tendency to exaggerate Grotius as presenting an international society 
underpinned by sovereign states. For instance having loosely alluded to Grotius’s secularised 
natural law theory, Muldoon emphasises his legal positivist views by confirming that instead 
of a medieval hierarchal structure encompassing a world order directed by the pope ‘Grotius 
constructed a system of a European order composed of sovereign states, all legally equal, 
without any overarching authority that could authorise intervention in their affairs’.277 This is a 
complete overstatement on Muldoon’s part as this chapter has shown. Also, it seems clear that 
Grotius sought to fashion a law of states without a single Christian denomination; but saying 
this, as has already been made obvious, did not imply that God was taken out of the equation. 
As Mark Janis has observed ‘it is doubtful, given his time and character, that Grotius meant to 
effect a strictly secular refashioning of the medieval Catholic natural law tradition.’278 Rather, 
Grotius presented a law that could appeal to and bind both Catholic and Protestant states alike. 
Such ideas emerged at a critical time in Europe. It was clear that to settle Catholic -  Protestant 
disputes underlying the Thirty Years War, the Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 had to recognize 
the sovereign authority of the princes and states of Europe. And for reasons already 
contemplated, Grotius sought to restrict the temporal justification of the Church in practice as 
in theory, by emphasising a non-sectarian law of nature and sovereign states as right holders. 
As Tiemey emphasised that although Grotius does not represents the secularisation of the 
natural law tradition, he, nevertheless, played a significant role in the transition from a 
medieval conception of natural rights to a modern. Grotius’s ‘vigorous creative’ imaginative 
handling of the medieval natural law tradition he inherited, was put to good effect in 
addressing the problems of a new century in a different way from his predecessors by writing 
in a new style in an attempt to deal with a whole new audience made up of mainly Protestants
9 7 Qand Humanists.
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What is notable is that these theorists that presents Grotius as being the pivotal point 
where the natural law traditions becomes secular, seems to do so wholly uncritical without 
regard for the consequences it will have for Grotius’s theory as a whole. As the above has 
shown, Grotius’s arguments, for instance, about obligations of humanitarian intervention, 
would collapse at crucial points.
Conclusion
What I have tried to show with this chapter, is that ultimately, for Grotius, the source of 
fulfilling our obligations has to be God, whether grounded in our objective rights or subjective 
rights. Grotius is presenting not a secular law of nature, but rather a non-sectarian version that 
may be applied not only to Catholics and Protestants, but to the whole of humanity. If Grotius 
had indeed presented a secular natural law tradition, as we have seen various scholars seem to 
argue, then the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention for him has its source either in 
rationalism, that is, reason determines for us what is right, and right dictates obedience, or in 
human agreement. It is certainly the case that Grotius believed that certain of the permissive or 
voluntary law of nations precepts may be obligatory because of agreement, but as I have 
argued Grotius did not rest his case for obligation on right reason. Indeed, he goes as far as to 
say that the precepts of natural law are impressed on men’s consciences irrespective of whether 
they are capable of discovering them through reason. They are right and obligatory because 
God has willed it so. Given that many of the issues relating to international law, the rights of 
the seas and of the appropriation of large tracts of the Americas, a natural law that was not 
firmly grounded in more than custom a convention would simply not have been robust enough. 
And furthermore, part of what those obligations, albeit imperfect at times, entail is for a third 
party to intervene to punish crimes against the law of nature. Grotius deems that crimes such as 
cannibalism and the sacrifice of people should be punished and what is more, states have a 
natural right to do so. In this sense, for Grotius, third party intervention to prevent such crimes 
are grounded in obligation, and expressed through right. I have therefore argued that any
280 If the obligation does not rest on agreement, then one may want to steer Grotius in the direction of 
Aristotelian ethical deontologism. This would be consistent with abstract metaphysical thought, and 
would give further credence to the view that Grotius is a ‘secular’ natural law thinker -  in so far as we 
can argue that from Aristotle we have a secular doctrine o f natural right or law. However, as I have been 
at pains to argue here, this is not consistent with how I or many other readers interpret Grotius. For 
Grotius, obligations are derived from what God wills for us, and not from reason itself. Although Grotius 
makes reference to Aristotle in several places, in his Prolegomena among other places, it is not necessary 
in the context of my argument to further explore Grotius’s Aristotelian foundations. Of course, this is not 
to say that a thoroughgoing examination o f Aristotle’s influence on early modem thought would not yield 
fruitful and surprising results.
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notions of humanitarian intervention that Grotius has are grounded in his theory of 
punishment. Unlike what Pufendorf was to argue some two generations later, states have the 
right to punish crimes committed against nature, and contrary to what Vitoria argued, for 
instance, rights of jurisdiction are not relevant. Wars of punishments for Grotius are sanctioned 
by nature, which holds the jurisdiction for the whole of mankind. Pufendorf developed 
Grotius’s notion of states being the main actors within international relations, by grounding 
their obligations and rights on the principle of sovereignty, which for this very reason had a 
very different effect on the obligations for intervention on humanitarian grounds. Although, 
Grotius is one of the first thinkers to address the issue of states as the main actors in law of 
nations, and also developing the notion of a specific moral person of the state with rights and 
obligations different from the individual, states are for Grotius not founded upon the principle 
of sovereignty, which is exactly why he is able to present a theory of universal punishment. 
Humanitarian intervention for Grotius, then, is only an imperfect obligation in so far as it is 
difficult to determine who should exact the punishment, but the act itself does not constitute an 
infringement of sovereignty, which, as we shall see in the next chapter, it certainly does for 
Pufendorf.
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Chapter 4
Samuel von Pufendorf
‘To ready oneself for others’ assistance one makes 
grandiloquent appeals to the claims of humanity [...] 
however [this] often elicits but a sterile sympathy or procure 
assistance that is too ineffectual to dispel one’s difficulties’
Samuel von Pufendorf (1678)
Introduction
In the highly contentious debate about the character and even the existence of international 
law, which is interesting because it constitutes the legal framework in which humanitarian 
intervention is realised, the German moral philosopher Samuel von Pufendorf (1632 -  1694)
can contribute significantly by his particular view of the law of nations. Among his writings on
the law of nature and nations he made the unusual contention that they are indistinguishable. 
Pufendorf promoted the law of nature as the moral constraints regulating the relationships 
between states. One of the main arguments to be stated here is that Pufendorf s denial of a 
(positive) law of nations has to be understood by accentuating his idea of ‘sovereignty’ as the 
key foundational and informing principle. It is this foundational principle of sovereignty, 
which serves as the theoretical framework for Pufendorf against any argument which can 
justify the violation of the rights of the Indians.
The aim of this chapter is firstly to identify the reasons why he denied the separate 
existence of a law of nations, and if in doing so he undermined the idea of humanitarian 
obligation in international relations. The issue is, then, whether Pufendorf s just war theory 
suggests intervention on humanitarian grounds to aid the Indians? To accentuate his view on 
international law it is useful comparing his views with his lesser-known contemporary, Samuel
281 Pufendorf, Samuel von: On the Natural State o f  Men, trans. and intro, by Michael Seidler (New York: 
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), p. 131
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Rachel (1628 -  1691), who made a very clear distinction between the two types of law, but 
whose scholastic endeavours went more or less unnoticed. Pufendorf, nonetheless, denied the 
existence of a positive ju s gentium distinct from the law of nature. He maintained that states 
were universally subject to the law of nature only. There were of course rights based upon 
treaties and also customs observed between civilised states; but they were only valid between 
the states that had concluded the treaties. States might at any time renounce these customs, 
which would for Pufendorf be an immoral act, but only insofar as they violated the law of 
nature that governed agreements between sovereigns. Pufendorf contended that it would not be 
possible for a custom gradually to assume the force of law. For him, it is absolutely 
presupposed that all law has an author, and, in order to qualify properly as law, it must also be 
enforceable. This is the Hobbessian element that many have attributed to him; at least as far as 
human positive law is concerned. Law requires a sovereign to enact and enforce it. For 
Pufendorf, going beyond Hobbes, both natural law and human positive law satisfied this 
criterion; the law of nations did not, and could not.
Rachel directly opposed him on these issues in his work Dissertations on the Law o f  
Nature and o f  Nations (1676). He emphasised the arbitrariness of basing the law of nations 
solely upon the principles of natural law established by a priori reasoning and against 
Pufendorf, among others, he set out to demonstrate that coexistent with natural law there also 
existed a positive law of nations. This aspect of Pufendorf, then, is of extreme importance as it 
helps accentuate his particular view on the relationship between morality and law: If law 
presupposes an author to enforce it, and for Pufendorf the law of nature meets these 
requirements, does that entail an obvious case regarding non-intervention on humanitarian 
grounds? Thus, the second aspect to be explored in this chapter is, given this particular view of 
international law, whether Pufendorf s exacting articulation of sovereignty allows for the 
notion of humanitarian intervention. It will be argued that clearly it does not. He, more than 
any other thinker, promoted the collective rights of a community in a highly systematic way 
and presented them differently from those of the individual. This highlights the particular 
singularity of Pufendorf contrary to other natural law thinkers, thus, giving greater priority to 
the rights of states. What Pufendorf ultimately emphasised was that states are the absolute 
titleholders to property in the realm. I will argue that Pufendorf conceptualises the Indian 
community as a sovereign entity and ultimately a sovereign state. This idea was imperative to 
his denial of any justifiable appropriation of the Indians’ lands in the New World precipitated
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by the claim that indigenous people in America did not fulfil the moral requirement of title to 
property.
By positing natural sociableness as a feature of man in the state of nature and through 
‘sovereignty’ Pufendorf argued that the Indians collectively owned the land as a whole, 
something that he called ‘eminent domain’, which constrained any use of private property not 
consistent with the bounds of the common good. He thus denied the principle of terra
98 9nullius. As we shall see, this provided the moral foundation for maintaining the illegitimacy 
of the European enterprise of violating the rights of the Indians by occupying their lands. Thus, 
one aspect to be explored here is to what degree this aspect of Pufendorf s theory is linked up 
with his theory of the moral quality of property. On what basis does Pufendorf ground his 
moral judgements in relation to the rights of the Indians? He clearly wants to say that we can 
make moral judgements on local practices such as cannibalism and Spanish treatment of the 
Indians. One aspect, which is necessary to highlight is the innate difficulty in a theory that 
surprisingly holds the same contemporary concerns for the inherent moral and legal difficulties 
of humanitarian intervention. Pufendorf asserts a clear moral view for the rights of the Indians, 
including their practices of cannibalism, and the subsequently moral condemnation of the 
Spaniards’ violation of these rights, but, however, there seems to be no room to suggest in his 
law of war theory intervention on behalf of the Indians. This I argue has to be understood on 
two accounts. Firstly, it has to be understood on the basis of emphasising what ‘rights’ 
Pufendorf is conceptualising. He defends sovereign territory of the Indians, and thus promotes 
the communal sovereign rights of the Indians. And this is of course very different from 
Grotius, as we saw in the previous chapter, who had a theory of punishment which related to 
the crimes they committed against nature. Pufendorf seems eager to emphasise in his work the 
importance of the Westphalian moment and its enshrinement of sovereignty in the European 
system of states; and he transferred this Westphalian system of states’ religious rights 
(sovereignty) to the New World. In his later historical works, however, Pufendorf does seem to 
have an argument in place for humanitarian intervention. He insists, for example, that it is
• 9 8 Tlawful to militarily aid suppressed Protestants of a neighbouring state.
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The fact that Pufendorf emphasise the sovereignty of the Indians as a mean to protect 
their rights is important. However, it might be to read too much into Pufendorf by using 
Walzerian language to stress the importance of the sovereign community as a prime vehicle for 
the Indians’ self-determination. This is of course one of the main bases for Michael Walzer’s
984 .commumtarianism. Thus, labelling Pufendorf a humanitarian would be a precarious task. 
Secondly, although it seems that Pufendorf does not have a just war argument in place for 
intervention, this has to be understood in terms of his conception of obligation in international 
law. States have moral obligations to adhere to the law of nature; however, these are 
necessarily imperfect because there is no sovereign at an international level. For this reason 
humanitarian intervention or punitive actions against such perpetrators cannot be prescribed 
nor actualised. However, what is important for Pufendorf and what, to a certain extent set him 
apart from thinkers such as Suarez and Grotius is that imperfect and perfect rights are equally 
morally obligatory. What this mean then is that if the American Indians violate the rights of 
each other (e.g. practice cannibalism) Pufendorf clearly wants to say that we can make moral 
judgements about it, regardless of whether we can (or agree to) act on that judgement.
The nature of obligation and law - law as necessitating a moral order?
Arguably, what captures the whole of Pufendorf s moral philosophy is his constant reflection 
on the foundations and sanctions of law, from which he bases his moral judgements. First of 
all, for Pufendorf, natural law qualified as law because it has a sovereign who enforces it. And 
secondly, no moral action or moral judgement was independent of that law. He argued that ‘the 
obligation of Natural Law is of God, the creator and final governor of mankind, who by His
7 0 c
authority has bound men, His creatures, to observe it.’ As to the reason why law needed a 
sovereign to enforce it, Pufendorf maintained that a divine legislator is needed to explain law’s 
obligatoriness, which means its character as law. Thus, all law needs a sovereign to enforce it, 
and God is the sovereign in regard to Natural Law. This is also the case with human positive 
law, which may codify or enact many of the precepts of Natural Law. What is important in 
relation to this is Pufendorf s outright denial of ‘the existence of any law of nations arising
284 See Walzer, Michael: Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994); Spheres o f  Justice: a Defence o f  Pluralism and Equality,
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983)
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from a superior.’286 What formed the background of such contentions, unlike Thomas 
Hobbes’s (1588 - 1679), was his idea that the fundamental laws of nature were ‘sociableness’, 
and thereby the sociality of human beings; from this key idea all others followed. In this also 
lies the asserted secularity of Pufendorf philosophy, by grounding natural law on the social life 
of man to avoid the disputation of rival religious doctrines. Thus, Pufendorf s natural law 
theory had dual foundations, the Hobbesian idea of man’s self-preservation and the Grotian 
idea of man’s social nature.287 In the Groitian element of Pufendorf s theory we also find the 
universality of his moral order; in the fact that human sociality is universal. Although by 
ridding the law of nature of any of its metaphysical foundations, he, nevertheless, sought to 
retain its function as a moral basis for civil law and the state. Pufendorf did not merely 
characterise sociality as a negative duty of respecting other people’s property rights. It was, in 
this sense, different from what Grotius termed appetites societatis, a natural disposition to live 
together, Pufendorf s law of sociality was a prime principle of social behaviour.288 Hence, 
sociableness prescribed an inclination towards peace as our natural condition and makes us 
disinclined towards the sort of war of all against all that Hobbes was describing. The dual 
foundations of Pufendorf s natural law theory have sparked off a debate of the moral necessity 
- obligatoriness - of the law of nature. It is contentious as the political theorist Knud 
Haakonssen suggests whether the idea of man’s social nature is fully independent from man’s 
need of self-preservation or is man’s sociability a way of self-preservation and in this way 
preconditioned? The core claim is, then, that human beings are instrumentally sociable rather 
than inherently sociable. Haakonssen emphasises that Pufendorf s constant attempts to distance 
himself from Hobbes, as well, and more importantly, his idea that the moral necessity of 
obligation is based on the person’s rational awareness of the justifiability of the imposition of 
threat if an obligation is breached. As such, this points to the argument that the principle of 
sociality has an independent status. However, in further exploring these inconsistencies in 
Pufendorf s theory Haakkonssen argues that if sociality is taken to be an independent principle, 
and it is clear that Pufendorf wants to hold such a position, then being the ultimate feature of 
human nature it would allot any argument of God excepts as a creator according to 
Haakkonssen. This would consequentially mean a total segregation of theology from natural
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jurisprudence, given the fact that morals would be an independent and inherent part of human 
endeavour.289
Although, this is an important concern for Pufendorf, given that he sought to address and also 
mediate the religious disputes of the day, he could then settle for conceptualising sociality as a 
natural inclination. However, as Haakonssen asserts, this would render the idea of 
socialibleness as law nonsensical in the sense that the very idea of obligation would lose its 
effect because it would be meaningless to invoke God. Thus, what seems to be Pufendorf s 
core idea of moral obligatoritess is that sociability is God’s will for humanity, which clearly 
emphasises our obligation to God.290
For Pufendorf, then, the provisions of sociableness (due to the needs of human 
nature) necessarily relates to the law of nature. From the fact that human beings were peaceful, 
followed that the fundamental laws, or the obligations, were necessarily congenital, and 
therefore not of men’s making. We owe duties to each other by the mere fact that we are 
human and because we a subject to God’s sovereignty. As Pufendorf stated
‘Now by our assertion that the maintenance o f peace towards all men as such is a natural state of man, we mean 
that it has been instituted and sanctioned by nature herself without any human intervention, and that it rests 
therefore, upon that obligation of Natural Law, by which all men are bound, in so far as they are endowed with 
reason, and which does not owe its original introduction to any convention o f man.’ 291
As a consequence of human agreement other fundamental laws may arise these can be 
described as natural insofar as they are consistent with our human nature but are for that very 
reason adventitious obligations, not congenital. We acquire these as a result of agreement and 
these obligations are necessarily adventitious. This distinction is important to emphasise as it 
relates to Pufendorf s theory of property and rights, which will be explored in more depth
292below. On a general note, this distinction refers to the origin of the obligation, and thus for 
Pufendorf, the notion that we should come to the aid of our fellow men is congenital because it 
is an obligation we owe to each other by the mere fact that we are human.
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So, following from the above, Pufendorf emphasised that the ‘good’ can never exist 
independently of law, because all action according to law is necessarily a moral action. Since 
moral necessity is the affections of human beings, he claims, and arises from their conformity 
or non-conformity to law, it cannot be conceived to exist prior to that law.293 The point that 
Pufendorf makes is that natural law may be described as a ‘dictate of reason’, and so it is a law 
that is absolutely compatible with human nature. As Pufendorf argued:
‘Whatever is deducible from the requirements o f human nature we refer to the natural law as, since we are 
unwilling to deduce if from a conformity with rational nature, inasmuch as by such a procedure reason is set up as 
its own rule, and any demonstration of natural laws undertaken in this way is merely arguing in a circle.’294
So the fact that natural law is a dictate of reason does not in itself entail obedience. 
Nevertheless, the underlying point, which Pufendorf is making, is that if natural law, or the 
dictate of reason, is not already morally obligatory, the enforcement of obligations in civil law 
cannot take place. As Pufendorf asserts
‘The mere authority o f men does not seem able to endow these dictates [dictates of reason] with the power of 
obligation. [...] It does not appear how any human authority could arise endowed with power to assert the force of 
obligation, unless the dictates of reason had beforehand the strength of law. [...] It must, therefore under all 
circumstances be maintained that the obligation of natural law is o f God, the creator and final governor of 
mankind, who by his authority has bound men, His creatures, to observe it.’295
However, law is the essential reference point and not reason itself when judging the morality 
of an act. There can be no morality without reference to law and without this law also being 
enforced by a supreme sovereign; law, Pufendorf quite clearly asserted, entails the ‘binding of 
a superior’.296 This requires sanction, which means a power necessarily needs to impose itself. 
Thus, the force of law, which demands obligation, unambiguously presupposes its imposition 
by a superior. God has created us and destined for us a nature in accordance with which we 
have certain obligations consistent with rules or laws; it is ultimately God’s will that we 
cultivate ourselves. The moral order that Pufendorf conjectures here is one where we are all
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subjects to God’s sovereignty and we all have duties to each other by the mere fact that we 
retain a sociableness human nature that wills peace.
Pufendorf s theory conceptualises morally good actions as proceeding purely from 
the motive of duty; thus, the contention that one does the right thing for the sole reason that it 
is the right thing, because it is in the law.297 In essence it was in agreement with Hobbes that 
the dictates of reason could not have the force of law without the command of a superior. From 
this, Pufendorf is quite clear that states being in a ‘mutual state of nature’ can have no common 
superior. As with Hobbes, Pufendorf suggests that individuals cannot enjoy their natural liberty 
and so they form societies, forming a common sovereign for states is on the other hand 
impossible.
‘And so Commonwealths and their officials may properly claim for themselves the distinction of being in a state 
of natural liberty, when they are girded with the powers which allow them its secure enjoyment, while it is a thing 
of little joy or use for those who enjoy individuality a pure state o f nature to have no superior, since the weakness 
o f their own resources makes their safety hang by a thread.’298
Pufendorf and the law of nations
Because there is no sovereign, then, to enforce law, Pufendorf irrevocably denies that any 
voluntary or positive law of nations could ever have the force of law. In his De Jure Naturae et 
Gentium he sides with Hobbes in quoting from De Cive. The natural law, Hobbes contended, 
can be divided ‘into the natural law of men and the natural law of states. The injunctions of 
both [....] are the same; but because states, upon being constituted, take on the personal 
properties of men, the law, which we call natural when speaking of the duties of individual 
men, on being applied to whole states and nations or peoples, is called the law of nations.’299 
Hobbes’s natural law, however, is descriptive. Neither in the state of nature, nor in the sphere 
of international relations does a moral condition prevail. Thus, when they are instituted states 
assume the personal properties of men. They both saw the law of nations and laws of nature 
necessarily being made up of the same precepts but they would have been different precepts. 
Hobbes talks about artificial men and Pufendorf about ‘moral’ men. In fact, neither Pufendorf
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nor Grotius subscribed to Hobbes’s extreme individualism, nor is Pufendorf s state of nature 
characterised by a war of all against all. And as we saw with Grotius, man is naturally sociable 
and originally ignorant of vices.300 In attempts to place Pufendorf in the history of the 
foundations of modem international law it is especially this distinction which is sometimes 
confused in the literature. Recently, S. James Anaya, for instance, contended that from what he 
calls ‘Hobbes’s vision of humanity as a dichotomy of individuals and states’ Pufendorf 
(among others) ‘began developing a body of law focused exclusively on states under the rubric 
“the law of nations”.’ As is already evident this is a misconception on a number of counts. 
The international sphere for Hobbes is equivalent to the state of nature, and the only natural 
laws there are of the descriptive kind. Without a sovereign there could be no 'law of nations', 
only prudential agreements or accommodations which do not have the force of law. In relation 
to Pufendorf it is slightly more complicated. Strictly speaking, for Pufendorf, and this will 
become more clear later on, the natural law does the work of the law of nations. What we see 
in practice is that he does develop rights that relate only to communities (moral persons). So 
you have (natural) laws that relate to individuals and to the moral persons of states. What can 
be said about Pufendorf is that he stands in that transitionary stage where the individual ceases 
to be the subject of the law of nations and is instead replaced by the state. This is the genius he 
saw in Hobbes. However, he transcended Hobbes, by making states morally subject to the law 
of nature. Hence, for Pufendorf, the law of nations, in so far as it deviates from natural law, has 
no sovereign and therefore it does not have the character of law. The law of nature governs 
agreements among sovereigns, and the obligations that arise are those regulated by natural law. 
Therefore, there are moral constraints on breaking these agreements. Morally there is just as 
strong an obligation to adhere to them, as there is to obey civil law. Because there is no earthly 
sovereign over them to enforce the agreements, those agreements are not strictly speaking 
international law. For instance, Pufendorf talks about all sorts of considerations why 
sovereigns should adhere to their agreements, and why they often do not. Thus, natural law is 
the creation of God, and should we transgress, He punishes our actions. This contention 
becomes important in the arguments founding the hypothesis that Pufendorf would not have 
endorsed intervention on behalf of the American Indians against violations of their rights.
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For Pufendorf, then, customary law is not enough to demand obligation. Such customs 
entail observances due to the mere consent of people and not of the law of nations. They only 
appear to be observed by a certain tacit agreement, especially in warfare; which Pufendorf 
holds to be the origins of that sort of ‘customary law’. The interest and security of nations lie 
not in customs but in ‘the observance of the law of nature, which is much more sacred.’302 If 
the law of nature is intact, mankind, Pufendorf asserts, has no need, whatsoever, of the law of 
nations. An important aspect here, then, is to emphasise that a custom’s origin is important for 
Pufendorf, irrespective of its presumed authority. If any custom, Pufendorf states, ‘is based 
upon the natural law, without a doubt far more is done to give it dignity than if  its origin is 
based upon the simple agreement of nations.’303 This illustrates Pufendorf s greater project, 
that there is a universal moral order that demands obligation from states, and thus he, in his 
own peculiar way, denies the arbitrariness of morality by contending that it is simply not a 
matter of convention between states.
It is uncertain whether Pufendorf s 1688 edition of The Law o f  Nature and Nations is 
specifically referring to Rachel’s doctrine of the positive law of nations. Rachel explicitly 
distinguishes the law of nations from the jus naturale. His work is not merely directed against 
Pufendorf, but also, more particularly, against Hobbes and Grotius. He recognises that states 
do not necessarily accept definitive obligations from the natural law, but rely instead on their 
free consent and agreement. In this way, according to Rachel the law of nations is based either 
upon agreements or customs and is part of the jus arbitrarium. Obligations between states can 
only come into being by agreement in the sense that they are independent from each other. 
Thus, in customs, Rachel found an implied agreement. However, the implied agreement (i.e. 
the custom) does not need to be concluded between all nations; all the requirements are met 
when, especially, the civilized nations recognize a definite rule. This is contrary to Pufendorf s 
view of the improbability that the consent of all nations ever established any arbitrary law 
among them. This deduction in Pufendorf goes after his contention that no general custom or 
usage of all nations is apparent for law to be deduced and presumed, because it lacks 
enforcement. In this, Rachel discerns between two sides of the law of nations, for alongside of 
the general law of nations, the jus gentium commune; there also exists a ju s gentium proprium 
operating only between separate individual nations. In fact, it is likely that Rachel contended
j02 Pufendorf, O f the Law o f  Nature and Nations, Book II, chapter iii, §23
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that the ju s  gentium commune had its origin in the jus gentium proprium, through the 
development of fitting customs.
What Rachel is emphasising is that it is imperative that the arbitrary law of nations be 
taken into consideration; for the law of nature demands that only legitimate means be resorted 
to in war but this needs to be considered with the tacit consent of nations. In essence the sort of 
inveighing arguments that Rachel makes in defence of an existence of the law of nations is in 
order to stress the dangers of denying and ignoring the common bond that exists between 
nations. Rachel explicitly objects to Pufendorf s contention that not all nations are expected to 
be bound by the law of nations. Here the two theorists’ conceptions of law come to the fore, 
for Rachel contends that this objection is met by stressing that the rules of the law of nations 
cannot be traced back to specific treaties. The mere proposition that a tacit consensus exists is 
sufficient that something is accepted and observed as law, regardless of the uncertainty of its 
origin. Rachel, thus, relies upon the force of customs as law on the basis o f their authority and 
not their enforcement.304 The voluntary law of nations had independent integrity because 
Rachel promoted a law without a sanctioning authority. The idea that authority somehow 
prescribes perfect obligations among states without enforcement is a key part in Pufendorf s 
criticism. His consideration of this point emphasises that perfect obligations are enforceable 
among themselves. Thus, the sovereign, set up by the people, and enacts laws, is able to 
enforce them. States, having no sovereign among them, cannot enforce the law that regulates 
them.
Rachel makes the point that some precepts that are not derivable from the law of 
nature are nevertheless accepted as precepts of the law of nature. As he states
‘Pufendorf admits that by tacit consent certain usages concerning war prevail among many Nations; also that 
these usages seemingly contain an obligation based on agreement, at any rate of the tacit kind; and yet that they 
can be neglected by one who is engaged in lawful war, so long as he observes the Law of Nature.’305
The explanation for this in Pufendorf is clear. Such tacit agreements are contrary to the Law of 
Nature. The end of war is peace, and once just cause has been given for war, the moral laws of 
nature are in abeyance. States are permitted to do anything they can to restore peace. The
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reason why they do not is for prudential reasons. Should circumstances change the enemy may 
be similarly harsh in its treatment of you. This will become clearer in the following sections. 
Rachel, in response to Pufendorf s contention, accuses him of being a slave to his hypothesis 
that there is no law of nations, or that the law of nations is based in part on the law of nature 
and so there is no need to feign an arbitrary law of nations. To this, Rachel claims that states 
are always careful not to violate the law of nations, even when they carry out unjust schemes, 
whereas the law of nature is more often not observed. In Rachel’s view, if certain conduct by 
states under the law of nations is abrogated by destitution, it is most likely because it has not 
been ‘firmly settled in the usage of free nations’.306 Rachel does grant Pufendorf s contention 
that the law of nations does not take the form of laws of the sort that are decreed by a superior, 
but as he says ‘the Law of Nations does not for that reason fall to the ground.’307 As Rachel 
explains ‘Granted that, [....] Law means a rule o f human conduct imposed by a law-giver upon 
his subjects, still pacts are not on that account to be barren from all Law, and not even from 
Law properly so called.’ Nature has conferred law-givers with liberties to settle by reference 
to the law of nature matters that are not covered by legislation; that same liberty is to be found 
by the free consent of nations, on whose considerations the law of nations is established.309 
Rachel contends that even if one nation is not the superior of another all nations are 
nevertheless, by the choice of binding themselves in pacts, reciprocally bound just as if by true 
law. Breaking a pact, by a nation committing fraud against the agreement may be restrained by 
juridical authority integral to that particular pact.
In the case of the law of embassy, Rachel asserts that the law of nations is too clear
Tinfor doubt. But as he says ‘yet even here a dissonant note is heard from Pufendorf.’ Pufendorf 
contends that ‘by the very Law of Nature Ambassadors are inviolable even among their 
enemies. [....] For functionaries of this type are necessary for the making and preservation of 
peace [...] the peace which the Law of Nature [....] bids us strive after [....] and so beyond all 
question, that same Law of Nature contain provisions for the security of those persons 
[ambassadors] [...].,3n As such Pufendorf emphasises the primary injunction of the law of 
nature, which is to hurt no one, and to include the Taw of ambassadors’. However, Rachel
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adamantly states that the provisions of security and safety for ambassadors even if they are sent 
as enemies to declare war ‘must unquestionably be attributed not to the Law of Nature, but to 
the deliberate choice of Nations.’312 To this Rachel further asks whether it can always be 
presumed that ambassadors are sent for the purpose of making peace. No he says; right of 
embassy is referred to by all as belonging to the law of nations, which originates from their 
own assent. The security, dignity and immunity o f ambassadors are, thus, not found in the law 
of nature, but in the arbitrary rules of nations.313 However, Pufendorf s denial of the law of 
nations can be characterised as a strained argument. The inconceivability, for Pufendorf, of the 
idea that implied agreements between states somehow entailed perfect obligations, which 
Rachel had promoted, seem to leave us to wonder what sort of ‘enforcement’ he is envisaging? 
As emphasised, states for Pufendorf are in the state o f nature because they have no earthly 
sovereign and just as important they have not agreed to a social contract. Obligations in the 
state of nature are imperfect because there is no temporal supreme sovereign to enforce them 
but, nevertheless, they are just as morally obligatory as perfect obligations enforceable in civil 
law.
Rachel’s criticism of Pufendorf is important. Not only is Rachel a contemporary of 
Pufendorf, who criticises his theory directly, but also, and more importantly, his criticism 
serves to highlight the contentious debate about the force of international law. And this 
conceptual debate, as we have seen, was just as much to the fore in 17th Century jurisprudence 
as it is today, and was equally contentious. And of course, as already asserted, issues of 
humanitarian intervention holds a central place in this debate. It is interesting that Rachael’s 
Dissertations on the Law o f Nature and o f  Nations went almost unnoticed, whereas Pufendorf 
became one of the most widely read moral philosophers of the 18th Century. Rachel, of course, 
thought he had severely damaged the logic of Pufendorf s arguments, but it took almost 
another century for thinkers such as Wolff and Vattel, who will be explored in the following 
chapter, to follow the theoretical path laid down by Rachel and emphasise that there was a law 
distinct from the law of nature, which states were subject to. Pufendorf, however, clearly 
asserts that the law of nature regulates the relationships between states, resting on the idea that 
God is the supreme sovereign. This is, however, an underlying problem in that Pufendorf seem 
to characterise the natural law as any other law, even though it has no prescribed punishment. 
Impossibility in itself, for Pufendorf it is always difficult to know what God wills. This is an
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important point to make as it relates to Pufendorf s affirmation of non-intervention, which, as 
will be explored below, becomes conceptually problematic.
Another highly important point to consider in this context is Pufendorf s idea of 
sovereignty. Part of what underlines his legal positivist view is his strong notion of 
sovereignty. As has already been noted the idea of sovereignty in Pufendorf s theory is of 
extreme importance because it laid the premise for his idea of law, and also, as will become 
clear, was central to the contention that the American Indians exercised certain rights even 
though taking them to be living in the state o f nature, as Grotius and Locke did, and in this way 
intervention, for instance, to save their souls or to cultivate their lands could not be justified.314 
In this way, Pufendorf appears to be protective of the rights of the Indians and leaves very little 
scope the justification of colonisation, or indeed, for intervention on the grounds of 
humanitarianism.
For Pufendorf sovereignty animates ‘the soul o f the state’.315 Sovereignty, Pufendorf 
implies, has its immediate origin in human agreement by which it is founded. As he contends 
‘If sovereignty is established in fact, some human agency must precede, and a natural aptitude 
for ruling does not of itself give a man the rule over him who is constituted’.316 However, as 
previously discussed, this human action is necessarily authorised by or based on divine right. 
Pufendorf argues that sovereignty ‘came from God as the author of natural law [...] for what 
men have contrived under the guidance of sound reason’ so ‘that they might fulfil the
o I 7
obligation enjoined upon them by God.’ What is important is the idea that because
OJO
sovereignty is grounded in the free consent of citizens it ‘comes about as a moral quality.’ 
Thus, sovereignty proceeds from God but not without the intervention or the imposition of the 
will of men. It is part of human sociality and right reason and facilitates the intelligibility of the 
natural law. Sovereignty, then, is both human and divine and fulfils the purpose to assist in our 
association and institutionalisation of political society. Our interests are best served by 
instituting a civil sovereign, who as a moral person is subject to no human authority and
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conducts his authority in accordance with what reason dictates, and is in this way exercising 
natural liberty.319 Peace and safety, Pufendorf contends, would be impossible without the 
establishment of states, which subsequently are ‘unintelligible without supreme
• 7^0sovereignty.’ Pufendorf conceptualises the idea of sovereignty very differently from, for 
instance, Hobbes. Unlike the English philosopher, Pufendorf sees it as being the attributor of 
moral entities, or moral persons as he terms them. Hobbes presented the ‘artificial’ created 
sovereign as being the unity of the people, and thus fully exercising his will on behalf of the 
people. Moral entities Pufendorf defines as individual persons or a collection of persons all 
united by a moral bond. The former he characterises as simple, the latter composite.321 
Pufendorf is in effect taking the idea of the sovereign representing the people much further 
than Hobbes. As Boucher, contends, Pufendorf s three stage social contract, comprising two 
contracts and one decree, institutes a new moral entity by endowing the state with individuality 
and a personality that is different from the individuals who set up the state and the ruler who is 
exercising his authority. The state, being the most powerful of moral societies, thus has a 
personality of its own and holds rights and duties in its own right. This is important because in 
here lies the very idea that the Indians encompass sovereignty; a composite moral person with
• • •  T9Tcertain rights and privileges which the individual cannot claim for himself. As Pufendorf 
states
‘In compound moral bodies something can be attributed to the body which cannot be attributed to all the 
members, that is, to them taken individually, or to any one of the individuals; and, therefore, the whole is an 
actual moral person distinct from individual members, which a special will, as well as actions and rights, can be 
attributed, which do not fall to the individuals.’ 324
What Pufendorf is arguing is that states having an actual will different and independently from 
the individuals that comprise it, and as such it is also an actual legal entity, which retains a
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juristic moral person that is subject to the moral laws of nature.325 Thus, Pufendorf designated 
states to be constrained by natural law. There is, then, a qualified moral order at the 
international level comprising states which is consistent with the endeavour to live in peace. In 
this respect, Boucher observes that ‘conceiving the state as a moral person inevitable generated 
its own logic of explanation and justification of international conduct.’326 In emphasising this, 
it will become evident that these prescriptions of an ‘international law of nature’ to regulate the 
relationship between states provides us with an interesting set of discursive foundations as to 
Pufendorf s putative idea of humanitarian intervention.
Pufendorf s particular legalistic view of international law and its appendix of a strong 
notion of sovereignty leave me to discuss the implication this has for international relations. 
The issues are essentially: What obligation has a third party to intervene if the rights of the 
Americans are being violated by another state, say by the Spanish or indeed in aiding an 
oppressed people in defence of their religious rights? Although, as we shall see, if the 
American Indians violate the rights of each other Pufendorf clearly wants to say that we can 
make moral judgements about it, however, he does not think it permissible to intervene to 
convert them to Christianity or to prevent them from eating each other. However, he seems to 
be more inclined to justifying intervention to secure an oppressed people their religious 
freedom. This, as we shall see, is derived from the constraints the natural law puts on the 
sovereign in relation to human freedom.
The rights of the Indians -  sovereignty as a moral quality
By presenting sovereignty as a moral quality preceding from the consent of free individuals, 
Pufendorf could argue that irrespective of terra nullius and ownership arguments, the Indians 
retains sovereignty rights.327 From this followed a reciprocal moral obligation, which 
emphasises Pufendorf s idea of sovereignty as the intrinsic moral (and legal) effect of 
obligation to property. His theory on property is, for this reason, very different to for instance 
Locke and Grotius. God gave the earth in common to men; however, this was not equivalent to 
collective ownership, rather granting a right to use it. In this no one has property rights and it is 
what Pufendorf called a negative community. A positive community in term is one where 
property is communally owned. Scarce resources and increasing population results in the
325 Boucher, David: ‘Resurrecting Pufendorf and Capturing the Westphalian Moment’ in Review o f  
International Studies (2001), 27, p. 557 -  577, p. 567
326 Ibid., p. 573
327 Boucher, ‘Property and Propriety in International Relations’, p. 169
125
emergence of private property, which thus arises to avoid disputes over-use rights. In 
specifying the origin of dominion Pufendorf explains that ‘proprietorship and community are 
moral qualities which have no intrinsic effect upon things themselves, but only produce a 
moral effect in relation to other men; and that these qualities, like the rest of the same kind,
• • • • « '3,) 0
owe their birth to imposition.’ In this way, rights to property are not congenital but 
adventitious. Although property is a social construct, arising with the needs according to 
sociality, it can nevertheless be called a natural right because it is consistent with the nature 
God has set forth to us.329
This is unlike Grotius who holds that a use right entails an exclusive right to that which 
is used; as such, occupancy is all that is required and not agreement. In disputing this 
Pufendorf says that ‘no credit should be given to any such idea as that God at the beginning 
instituted a positive community, from which men later withdrew on their own initiative.’330 It 
is the complexities of communities which necessitate the development of private property and 
a deviation from the original use right.331 Thus it is clear that Pufendorf takes the opposite 
view, by emphasising that although God has granted use rights to the products of the earth, this 
is not equivalent to dominion. Dominion ‘presupposes absolutely an act of man and an
'X T9agreement, whether tacit or express.’ This contention significantly constrains colonial 
expansionism exercising arguments founded on the idea that use right and labour expending
'X'X'Xsomehow creates title to property. Pufendorf is adamant that only an external act or 
imposition can ‘produce a moral effect’, which is ‘an obligation on the part of others to refrain 
from a thing already seized by someone else [....]’.334
Private property, then, is conducive to peace in so far as sociality entails a moral duty 
to respect others’ property rights as part of our self-preservation. An express act is required to 
divide the land among communities or nations; however Pufendorf at the same time suggests 
that agreements were made to assign first occupancy to land not already assigned to a definite 
individual ‘by the first dividers of things.’335 Property is not a precept of natural law where 
things are commanded in such a way that each man ‘be allotted his own separate and distinct 
portion’ rather natural law approves conventions were such agreements are made according to
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the advantage of human society.336 This is important as no right can be conferred upon first 
occupancy in itself before the existence of conventions. Pufendorf acclaimed the absurdity in 
the idea that the occupancy of one person should in an extreme necessity exclude the use right 
of a second acquired by way of first occupancy. The same argument would be equally true of 
the idea of occupancy effecting occupancy. We have seen in the previous chapters the 
central role property theory has for the justification of just war and the colonisation of the 
Indians lands. As will be apparent in the following, exploring Pufendorf s property theory 
brings his ‘humanitarianism’ to the fore, in the sense that it serves to underline his arguments 
that the Indians had sovereign rights to their territory, which could not be violated for any 
reason. As such, this discussion is important in relation to the American Indians and any 
arguments about the appropriation of their lands as it was presented by Grotius and, especially, 
Locke. From here on, Pufendorf restricts any notion of Terra Nullius. From the idea of positive 
community Pufendorf develops his property theory further yet. People as a whole can 
nonetheless collectively own lands not hitherto assigned any property ownership . This he 
called ‘eminent domain’, ‘occupancy as a whole’, or ‘universal dominion’. Eminent domain is 
very different from an individual’s title to property in than the whole group, or community, is 
entitled to dominion in a particular territory. Interestingly, this means that the ‘universal 
domain is preserved only in the state’ whereas individual private property can pass to someone 
outside the state. The idea then, of eminent domain considerably constrains the idea of the 
use of private property not consistent within the bounds of the common good of the 
community.340 Eminent domain is therefore conceived as being a precondition of the common 
entitlement to property before private property rights are acquired and is consistent with the 
idea that the community, or state, has a right over property that no one outside it has. Thus, 
occupancy is not attained through mere cultivation or signs of seizure, neither is it, as Grotius 
contended, in need to being divided into recognisable parcels or plots among individuals.341
Pufendorf here directly denies the idea of terra nullius. In expressing this effect of 
eminent domain Pufendorf asserts that ‘it is not necessary that all things which are occupied in 
this universal manner should be divided among individuals and pass into private hands.
j36 Ibid., Book IV, chapter iv, §4
337 Ibid., Book IV, chapter iv, §5
338 This would then be lands, which normally would have been considered to be wastelands by the 
Europeans colonists.
339 Pufendorf, O f the Law o f  Nature and Nations, Book IV, chapter vi, §4
340 Boucher, ‘Property and Propriety in International Relations’, p. 168
341 Ibid., p. 169
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Therefore, if  anything be discovered in such an area that is still without a private owner, it 
should not at once be regarded as unoccupied, and free to be taken by any man as his own, but 
is to be understood to belong to the whole people.’342 The idea of ‘eminent domain’ then is 
profoundly related to Pufendorf s idea of sovereignty and circumscribes the contention that 
even if the Indians were recognised to have certain ownership rights, the colonising country 
would still deny sovereignty to the natives by the claim that it retained rights to eminent 
domain. Pufendorf s theory, on the other hand, propounds that shared sovereignty is 
inconceivable. Whether the effect of communal sovereignty was absolute or limited each 
constituted an instance of supreme sovereignty.343 This idea conceptually constrained any 
grounds that an intervening force has for subduing the Indians.
The widely held position that the law of nature required a duty of hospitality and 
evidence of the contrary for almost every write seems always to have been, Pufendorf notes, 
‘one of the earmarks of the inhumanity of uncultivated peoples’.344 Nevertheless, Pufendorf 
questions this, and contends that a stranger need an honourable reason to stay away from 
home; and also that no obligation could be derived from the law of nature to entertain people 
who visit merely out of curiosity; and if granted such visits need to be necessary and with a 
good reason. So, in essence, the duty of hospitality is conditional on the moral integrity of the 
foreigner. In this, he directly opposed Francisco Vitoria’s position, which, as we saw, 
grounded the Spanish’s entitlement to subdue the Indians. Vitoria’s presumption that the 
Spaniards had a right to live in the lands of the Indians, on the condition that no harm was to 
come to them, weakened the very idea of property rights for Pufendorf, as it is the property 
holder’s decision whether he wants to share it with anyone. Again, sovereignty is the 
underlying conception that underpins this contention. Pufendorf invokes the same kind of 
argument in discussing the obligation of free trade and admission of foreigners, however he 
upholds that to expel without good reason guest and strangers, once they have been admitted 
‘savours of inhumanity and disdain.’345 Thus to restrict the access of foreigners would not 
constitute in itself a just cause for war. This leaves us to explore in more detail, how his strong 
notion of sovereignty relates to any notion of humanitarianism he might have.
342 Pufendorf, O f the Law o f Nature and Nations, Book IV, chapter vi, §4
343 Boucher, David: The Limits o f Ethics in International Relations -  Natural Law, Natural Rights and 
Human Rights in Transition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2009), p. 207 - 208
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Pufendorf s notion of humanitarian intervention
The idea of communal sovereignty, conceptualised by Pufendorf as ‘eminent domain’, whether 
presented as a simple moral person or a complex moral person, i.e. the state, is significant 
because it follows that the right of the Indians can only be theoretical sound collectively and 
not individually, which is what Pufendorf is basing his moral judgement on in regard to the 
denial of encroachment into the Indians’ lands. The fact that Pufendorf is asserting a method of 
formulating a set of norms for the juridical community of ‘moral beings’ makes it clear that he 
is not differentiating between actual physical subjects and juridical subject, nor is he 
differentiating between private subjects and subjects under public law. This also conditions 
international law as being a set of general natural law principles valid in the same way as for 
individuals. Thus, what I want to emphasise is that the humanitarian basis for Pufendorf s 
moral arguments in condemning colonial expansion apply not to the individual natural rights of 
the American Indians, but rather to the right a community (or state) attains by the mere fact of 
being a sovereign moral person and capable of bearing such rights.
What seems to be the argument, then, is that Pufendorf s humanitarianism is grounded 
in the moral autonomy of the community (or the state) conceptualised through his idea of 
sovereignty, and not the individual. In this sense, the moral person of the state necessarily 
brings to light questions of the character of moral agency as well as the development of natural 
right, or in Pufendorf s instance natural communal rights, to human rights. Inevitably, this is 
interesting for exploring any notion of humanitarian intervention that Pufendorf might have, 
and leaves us exploring this very issue: if, according to Pufendorf, it is the right of the 
community as a moral person that is being violated, how does this relate to any notion of 
humanitarian intervention? Another point to consider in relation to this is also Pufendorf s 
moral objection to various abominable practices of the American Indians. This is an important 
because it relates to the widely held assertion that a sufficient cause for waging war against the 
Americans can be found in their human sacrificial and cannibalistic customs. This will be 
explored more in depth in the next section, which deals with Pufendorf s law of war. If the 
practices of the American Indians were grounds enough to wage just wars then consideration 
of property rights would be redundant. Pufendorf, unlike Grotius and Vitoria, did not 
necessarily find the practices of the American Indians abhorrent to the extent that it gave just 
cause for war. As we have seen, these arguments were based on the contention that the law of 
nature condemned their actions. Pufendorf is not explicitly condemning as immoral the 
customary practices of the Americans, such as sacrificing men and eating human flesh. The
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consenting Christian morality would render such expressions superfluous. Also, Pufendorf s 
‘scientific’ moral theory of prescribing sociality as a prime natural law principle so as to 
separate it from any moral theology would render such arguments that the Indians were living 
in a state of sin invalid. The Danish writer and philosopher Ludvig Holberg (1684 -  1754) was 
an ardent admirer of Pufendorf. He asserted, curiously in his critique of Berbeyrac, who held 
that the Indians, on the basis of their practices by their very nature affronted the enemies of a 
common humanity, that if  the Indians were aware that their practices was contrary to the laws 
of nature and as such sinful, they would without a doubt refrain from such actions. All that 
foreigners are obliged to do, although not without the approbation, or consent, of the Indians, is 
thus to educate them on the error of their ways and to dispel their delusions; for to wage war on 
a people and kill many thousands of human beings on account o f their delusions is, Holberg 
argues, ‘to violate the nine Commandments to enforce the 10th.’346
From this, let us consider in more detail Pufendorf s law o f war in relation to 
intervention, just war and general humanitarian considerations in terms of states’ obligations to 
each other. As a general rule, Pufendorf did not question the legitimacy of war, the same as 
most of his contemporaries, if a serious enough violation of the fundamental laws of nature 
necessitated it. However, as previously argued, despite Pufendorf s denial of international law 
there were obligatory moral restrictions on the conduct of states, this meant that Pufendorf was 
not, as such, concerned with the legality of war, but rather with the moral claims to it.347 
Stephen Neff is concerned precisely for those reasons and argues that Pufendorf recognises the 
force of humanitarian considerations but is persistent in placing them on a moral rather than a 
legal plane. He contends that Pufendorf s ‘humanitarian consideration operated outside the 
legal framework of the war contract and hence exerted only a moral constraint, not a legal 
one’348; however, Neff never concerns himself with what those ‘humanitarian considerations’ 
might be, or more importantly, how Pufendorf structures and arrives at those moral 
considerations. As we shall see, such apprehensions illustrate a misinterpretation about
346 Holberg, Ludvig: Introduktion til Naturen og Folkerettens Kundskab (O f the Law o f Nature and 
Nations), 1716, Bk II, Chapt. XIV. ‘Alt derfore, hvad Fremmed med Billighed kand giore, er at soge 
Leylighed at oplyse dem, og bringe dem af deres Vildfarelse; thi, at Paafore et Folk Krig, og myrde 
mange tusinde Mennesker formedelst deres Vildfarelser, er at overtrade 9 bud for at Haandhaeve det 
Tiende.’ Holberg’s work is far from an independent jurisprudential work, but rather a systematic 
rewriting of Pufendorf s Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem Libri Duo (Of the Duty of Man 
and Citizen) (1673) supplemented with Nordic law decrees and materials, especially Christian V’s 
Danske Lov (The Danish Law, 1683). Holberg explicitly asserted that the intention of the publication of 
the work was never scientific but instead practical as applied law. (Present author’s translation)
347 Boucher, Political Theories o f  International Relations, p. 240
348 Neff, Stephen: War and the Law o f Nations -  A General History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), p. 150
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Pufendorf s moral philosophy based on a more modernist legalist position and thus Neff risks 
opening himself up to charges of anachronism. Although initially wary of placing Pufendorf in 
his ‘contractual school of thought’ (where war is perceived as a contract between two parties to 
settle a dispute by armed force, i.e. similar to a duel) due to Pufendorfs otherwise 
conventional just war theory, he nevertheless proceeds to uphold him as a representative of this 
school.349 The explanation for this is to be found in the following: ‘[T]he belligerents at the 
outset made an agreement to rest their case with the fortunes of battle. And this is thought to be 
the case, when peaceful means are rejected [...] and both sides enter the conflict with the 
thought: ‘Either I will revenge my right or injury in a war, or else I will lose still more.’350 
Following this, Pufendorf concludes that ‘practically all forms of wars, certainly those where a 
peaceful agreement have been rejected by both sides, [...] appear to suppose an agreement that 
he upon whose side the fortune of war has rested can impose his entire will upon the
i f ,
conquered.’ Neff argues that given that the contractual school prescribed the contents of the 
law of wars, which was then wholly man-made, Pufendorf as a representative of the school 
could be able to compile some code of rules; as such Neff builds into Pufendorfs theory the 
normative contention that such rules should have been prescribed. He, accordingly, concludes 
that ‘Pufendorf [...] offered heartbreakingly little hope [...] to moderate the sufferings of war. 
He offered nothing significant in the way of specific rules of war, while also rejecting any 
notion of limitations based on the general concepts of necessity and proportionality.’352
In this way, what Pufendorf is in fact theorising is an open license to war, which 
arguably cannot be refuted. This needs to be looked at more carefully. Pufendorf is very clear 
on the fact that ‘a state of hostility of itself grants one the license to do another injury without 
limit.’ The very violation of the duty of peace against another provokes the licence of any 
force necessary to bring the war to an end and achieve peace; without this licence, Pufendorf 
argues, the end of war could never be feasible. Thus, Pufendorf does not subscribe to the same 
moral criteria for jus in bello as jus ad bellum. Peace is defined as ‘a state especially reserved 
to human nature as such, since it springs from a principle which belongs to man, as distinct
'49 Neff asserts that the contractual school of thought by accepting the medieval just war idea that peace
was the normal condition of human beings even in the state o f nature, it was a less radical departure from
mainstream natural law theory than the Hobbesian one. War and the Law o f  Nations, p. 138
,5° Ibid., p. 138; Pufendorf, O f the Law o f  Nature and Nations, Book VIII, chapter viii, §1
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from animals, while war arises from a principle common to them both.’354 Peace conditions the 
duties of humanity to be ‘that none unjustly do another hurt or damage.’355 In the analogy that 
states are conceptualised the same way as individuals in the state of nature their natural 
liberties are effecting to ‘defend themselves against an unjust threat of violence.’356 To, then, 
protect one’s own security, property and right, Pufendorf prescribes any means necessary that 
‘will best prevail against such a person, who, by the injury done to me, has made it impossible 
for me to do him an injury, however I may treat him, until we have come to a new agreement 
to refrain from injuries in the future.’ Thus, the sovereign who is conducting the just war can 
invalidate any agreement among nations that restrains the intemperance of war.358 The main 
reason for this is to be found in Pufendorfs rejection of international law, an important 
observation in his theory, which Neff fails to elucidate. This has the unfortunate consequence 
that Neff appears to assume that Pufendorf holds the law of nations as law, which Pufendorf, 
then, somehow fails to apply. As such, N effs  theoretical foundation is anachronistically 
assuming that there already is such a consensus in place, or rather a consensus what such legal 
commitment ought to be. By focusing on the consequences of Pufendorfs natural law theory 
Neff is forced to expound a more modernistic conception on international law, which is, 
chronologically irreconcilable with Pufendorfs general exposition. However, Pufendorf, as we 
saw, holds that there are moral obligations by which states should abide, and they are just as 
obligatory as legal ones. In this way, as will be explored further in his just war theory and 
which have already been suggested, Pufendorf expresses the moral as the legal.
To reiterate, Pufendorf did not conceive of war as natural, and it was thus permissible 
but only as a last resort to secure ones rights. He expressly conditions a war as just because 
‘nature permits war, on the condition that he who wages it shall have as his end the 
establishment of peace.’359 As such there is an emphasis on the right intention as underlying 
the justice of the cause of war. Pufendorf is adamant that offensive wars are always difficult to 
justify, but is suggestive that for instance pre-emptive wars could be justified. Fear, he writes 
‘alone does not suffice as a just cause for war, unless it is established with moral and evident 
certitude that there is an intent to injure us.’360 Nevertheless, Pufendorf maintains that it is
354 Ibid., Book VIII, chapter vi, §2
355 Ibid., Book VIII, chapter vi, §2
356 Ibid., Book VIII, chapter vi, §1
357 Ibid., Book VIII, chapter vi, §7
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against nature to plunge into war at the slightest sight of provocation, even when an injustice 
has been done. Every other recourse for a peaceful solution should be exhausted first.361 
Pufendorf is sensitive to the sort of pretexts adduced to promote colonial expansion and 
stressed that such justification as Grotius asserted provided too readily a pretext for war. In line 
with his conceptualisation of sovereignty rights and the entailment thereof, he argued against 
Grotius by declaring that it would be an unjust cause to wage war against the Indians for the 
mere reason that it is their custom to sacrifice and eat human flesh.
‘On this matter we should carefully consider whether a Christian prince can attack the Indians, as condemned by 
nature, merely because they eat the flesh of men of their own religion, or because they eat that of strangers. And 
in connexion with their treatment of strangers we must again inquire, whether those foreigners come to their 
shores as enemies and robbers, or come as innocent guests, or driven by storms. For only in the last case does a 
right o f war lie with those whose citizens are treated with such cruelty, not in others.’362
Thus, only if they do unnecessary and conspicuous harm to a stranger, who has either come 
with good intention or by accident is an intervention justified. Although, Pufendorf here talks 
of a right of intervention to punish innocent strangers from unnecessary cruelty, it applies, as 
the above illustrates, only to the prince whose subjects have been inhumanely treated to do the 
punishing. This, as we have seen, is quite different from what Grotius was stating, that to 
punish those who commit crimes against the law of nature was a universal natural right of 
states. Thus, Pufendorf imputes colonial motives to foreigners whose actions can rarely be 
justified. He questions the lawfulness of intervention on behalf of people caught up in the 
ceremonial practices of their own people, the Indians. This again illustrates the forcefulness of 
Pufendorfs conception of sovereignty. Pufendorf leaves no room to suggest that foreigners 
have a moral obligation to prevent the Indians from hurting themselves by intervention. In the 
same way Holberg contends that Protestants cannot wage war against Catholics who bum all 
the unfaithful in the name of God, so too is it true that the Spaniards cannot wage war against 
the Americans for mere reason that they ate and sacrificed people in their own lands out of
TATblind superstition.
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However, it must be said that Pufendorf is somewhat ambiguous. In discussing 
obligations he envisages circumstances when war can justly be waged on behalf of other 
people. He notes
‘But can a man also take up arms to protect another’s subject, that is, from the injuries of their own sovereign? On 
this point one may consult Grotius [....] In our opinion the safest principle to go on is, that we cannot lawfully 
undertake the defence o f another’s subjects, for any other reason than they themselves can rightfully advance, for 
taking up arms to protect themselves against the barbarous savagery of their superiors.’364
This indirectly relates to Pufendorfs idea of punishment, and his theory of sovereignty also 
becomes important. By denying voluntary international law as regulating the relationships 
between states, this is necessarily also a denial that the atrocities and crimes of states require 
punishment, or rather that wars waged with such a purpose are legitimate. This is the 
contention of Grotius, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter. However, for Pufendorf, 
the principle of sovereignty prescribed, necessarily means that punishment requires a supreme 
sovereign and therefore is only applicable in civil law. This contention is important because it 
is along the same lines that Pufendorf asserts that the purpose of waging war is not, unlike 
what Grotius had argued, to punish for the purpose of retribution and to reform the offender. 
This is because the force inflicting such punishment does not emanate from an authoritative 
superior in the international context. As such, neither could there be grounds for reforming 
the practices of the Indians.
‘By having said that punishment is imposed ‘by the authority of the state’, we separate it from those evils to 
which men are exposed involuntary in war, or a fight, and from the stubbornness or open injury of another. [....] 
The power to exact penalties is a part of sovereignty, and so no one can impose upon another a penalty, properly 
speaking, unless he have sovereignty over him.’366
However, when it comes to aiding an oppressed people to protect their religious freedoms, 
Pufendorf seems to be much more favourable. First of all, for Pufendorf the state is not 
founded for the sake of religion, rather religion is part of natural human freedom, which, unlike 
Hobbes contention, cannot be entrusted to the sovereign. This is why one of the main duties of 
a sovereign is respect for the religious freedom of his or her subjects. This is, in fact, a very
364 Pufendorf, O f the Law o f  Nature and Nations, Book VIII, chapter vi, §14
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interesting assertion; because Pufendorf rejects the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes of 1598, 
also known as the Edict of Fontainebleau 1685 that had granted the French Huguenots the right 
to practice their religion in the state without persecution. As he said ‘Civil Society was not 
instituted for Religion’s sake; neither does the Church of Christ participate of the nature of a 
Temporal state; and therefore a Prince that embraces the Christian Faith, does not thereby 
acquire and absolute Sovereignty over the Church or Men’s Conscience.’367 This led Pufendorf 
to conclude that if the sovereign rulers contravene the bounds of their power, the subjects have 
a right to defend their religion, by force if necessary.368 The question is, however, is there an 
obligation of foreign sovereigns to come to aid of oppressed religious peoples against their 
sovereign? Pufendorf notes
‘And, as for such Princes and States, as have shaken off the yoke o f Popish Slavery, if they seriously reflect, how 
their fellow-Protestants are persecuted, and in what barbarous manner they are treated, will, questionless without 
my Advice, take such measures, as may be most convenient for to secure themselves from so imminent a 
Danger.’369
Pufendorf is ambiguous here. Although, recognising that some measures must be taken to help 
your fellow Protestant against Popish oppression, he remains unclear about how far such aid 
should extend. But, there is, nevertheless, room to suggest that there is a duty upon a third 
party to come to the aid of a people suffering from religious persecution.
We have already explored the basis on which Pufendorf contends that the Spaniards 
are violating the natural rights of the Indians. Moreover, what has also been emphasised is the 
importance of Pufendorfs conception of sovereignty as underpinning his denial of 
international law and how this related to his view on punishment and intervention. It is evident 
that Pufendorf does not have an argument in place for intervention not only because this sort of 
intervention is not enshrined in the law of war, but also, and even more relevant, is the fact that 
the legal context for such an enterprise does not exist. However, Pufendorfs moral contentions 
do not entail a moral obligation for intervention. Bear in mind, as what noted earlier, our moral 
obligations, whether they can be said to be imperfect or perfect are equally obligatory, which 
means that Pufendorf think that we can make universal moral judgements about what is right 
and wrong. What Pufendorf is in fact emphasising, is the authority of the moral, which
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explains his assertion that the moral presupposes the legal; what seems to be a clear view in 
Pufendorfs thought, is that moral authority cannot prescribe perfect obligations. The possible 
judgements Pufendorf evokes regarding a principle for humanitarian intervention can only be 
in relation to the law of nature. One main contention here is that intervention from a third party 
on behalf of the Indians against any European encroachment into their lands is rendered 
invalid. The reason for this is that Pufendorf is arguably justifying humanitarian intervention 
under natural law, which has the necessary authority; it comes about as a moral obligation, 
where it is God that intervenes and punishes the wrongdoers. Also, war in itself is not an 
inherently moral action; it is rather, as we saw, a necessary mean to bring about peace. But this 
inevitably raises the question of whether humanitarian intervention, for Pufendorf, can even 
constitute a moral action? For without law there is no room for the possibility of moral 
judgements in the sense that moral action for Pufendorf is entirely correlated to legal 
prescription. Hinted at earlier, these contentions seem to emphasise the fundamental ambiguity 
in Pufendorf of positing the law of nature as any other law, although with no prescribed 
punishment. Inherently, a moral action comes about as an action prescribed by the lawgiver, 
either in form of punishment or reward. However, it is an inconsistent argument that God, as 
the eternal lawgiver punish wrongdoers, when such moral transgressions require prescribed 
legal punishment. This inconsistency is mainly the result of Pufenforfs foundational 
conception of sovereignty. Pufendorfs main reason of not considering rights as being primary 
to law is based on his initial criticism of what he found to be a strained scholastic essentialism, 
in that they placed moral values as inherent to human nature. Pufendorf wants to argue that this 
cannot be done before the moral legislation of God.370 This would be entirely incompatible 
with Pufendorfs specific views on sovereignty. This is important to consider because it serves 
to highlight Rachel’s criticism of Pufendorf fundamentally relating to the potential 
predicament of denying any international law independent of the law of nature. However, as 
the contemporary development of humanitarian intervention has contentiously demonstrated, it 
does not necessarily require a legal premise to promote the moral force of such considerations. 
Nevertheless, for Pufendorf, the moral considerations for humanitarian intervention were there, 
but such consideration might not be acted on within the international sphere, regulated by 
natural law, but may be enforced by God.
370 Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, p. 41
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Conclusion
What I have tried to show in this chapter is that Pufendorf did not have a notion of 
humanitarian intervention as such because its viability was in question because it could not be 
enforced by international law. He nevertheless presents us with a view that, in spite of this, that 
we can make strong moral judgements when we identify instances of ‘humanitarian’ crimes in 
international society. His differentiation of congenital and adventitious obligations is important 
in this sense, because although they are not equally enforceable, they are nonetheless equally 
morally obligatory and from this, then, moral obligations for Pufendorf are what we today 
might term aspirational in the international realm.
Because of his strong notion of sovereignty and its implied legal positivism, 
Pufendorf is often held as the historical proponent for what today is termed statism, whereas, 
for instance Kant is often invoked to represent the other side of the argument in defence of 
cosmopolitanism. A recent article does exactly this by proposing that ‘the rivalry between 
these two positions is reprised in current debates between cosmopolitanism and statism over 
humanitarian intervention.’371 However, although neo-Kantians today might view the statism 
Pufendorf is positing as inherently overly conservative to deal with the humanitarian crises of 
the world, the fact is that it is incredibly anachronistic and fallacious to refer to Pufendorfs 
theory in this way. Such authors seem to have fallen into the trap of not reading and 
understanding the text in the context of its time and place. However, as I have argued, the 
positing of a strong principle of sovereignty for Pufendorf implied a very strong notion of 
humanitarianism, which conceptually served to limit any atrocity committed by colonialists 
against the American Indians or indeed in relation to the overall religious intolerance of the 
time. It was exactly to address such humanitarian issues that a strong principle of sovereignty 
had to be proposed in the first place. Although Pufendorfs notion of international ethics 
cannot be more than aspirational from today’s point of view, there is no doubt that his theory 
of sovereignty at the time seemed conceptually to offer more protection to groups like the 
American Indians, unlike theorists such as Grotius, who had a very strong notion of 
humanitarian intervention tied up with his theory of punishment.
As we shall see in the next chapter, Pufendorf inspired thinkers such as Christian 
Wolff and Emmerich de Vattel, who build on his idea of the moral person of the state. 
However, unlike Pufendorf, they did not deny the existence of the law of nations nor the belief
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in its enforceability, although this was done while still retaining an equally strong notion of 
sovereignty. What was different was their theoretical positioning of the moral person of the 
state as subject to the law of nations. However, in terms of international ethics they both 
sought each in their own way, to bridge the potential gap between the principle of sovereignty 
and international justice, by placing certain duties on states in their interaction with each other; 
however, such duties and obligations were mainly confined to the sphere of ‘imperfect’ duties.
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Chapter 5
Christian Wolff and Emerich de Vattel
‘The object of the great society established 
by nature between all nations is 
the interchange of mutual assistance’372 
- Emerich de Vattel (1758)
Introduction
In this chapter I explore the notion of humanitarian intervention in the writings of two highly 
influential thinkers, Christian Wolff (1679 - 1754) and his disciple Emerich de Vattel (1714 - 
1767). The focus will be the way they sought to present a natural law tradition that was 
secularised and to a certain extent succeeded compared with their predecessor Grotius, about 
who, as we saw in chapter 3, there is much doubt as to whether or not he lay the foundation for 
such a conceptual move. Wolff and Vattel are important because in the almost immediate post- 
Westphalian period it is apparent, as it is with Pufendorf, that there is much more emphasis on 
the sovereign state, which considerably framed both thinkers’ notions of the duties nations 
have towards each other, especially in relation to the topic of this investigation -  grounds of 
humanitarian intervention. Unlike what I have discussed in relation to Grotius, who forcefully 
retained the old natural law principle of the common rights of mankind, from which derived a 
strong notion of universal jurisdiction to avenge crimes against the law of nature, Wolff and 
Vattel instead maintained a strong emphasis on the duty to assist, which in more recent 
theories of international relations John Rawls has developed in his Law o f Peoples. The duty to 
assist becomes central for Wolff and Vattel because they put emphasis on the sovereign state 
as the main actor of international relations. There is of course an important distinction here: 
whereas for Vattel it is the state that has moral capabilities, being a deliberative agent with 
separate rights and duties from the individual; for Rawls it is peoples who have this moral
j72 Vattel, Emmerich de: The Law o f  Nations, or Principles o f  the Law o f Nature, Applied to the Conduct 
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capability and the state acts as their representative on whose behalf it is exercised.373 The way 
that the state moves to the centre of the theories of Wolff and Vattel helps accentuate to what 
extent the individual become less important and how this effect their general notions of 
individuals’ duties in relation to humanitarian considerations.
Peter Remec contends that the concept of the personified sovereign state happened as 
part of the development of international legal theory starting with the legal and political 
philosophies of among others Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza (1632 - 1677) who saw the 
state as the ultimate summit of human organisation.374 As we have seen, thinkers such as 
Hobbes and Pufendorf, although in very different ways, believed that law was only true law if 
it could be enforced by a superior power. Since such power and enforcement, they claimed, 
were clearly lacking in international society, international law could therefore not be conceived 
as true law at all. And as was argued in the previous chapter, this meant for Pufendorf that to 
conceive of a separate law of nations from the law of nature was a misleading notion; it was 
only the latter that regulated the relationship between states. In this way Pufendorf was the first 
to perceive of states as moral subjects to the natural law, whereas, as we shall see in this 
chapter, Wolff and Vattel took a step further, and made them moral subjects of the law of 
nations. Although Vattel hardly mentions Hobbes, he does acknowledge that in his work we
' i n c
discover the ‘hand of a master, notwithstanding his paradoxes and detestable maxims’ and 
recognises his importance to be one of the first philosophers who, although flawed, had a 
distinct idea of the law of nations. What Vattel sought to emphasise was that both Hobbes and 
Pufendorf were wrong in thinking that the law of nature did not undergo any transformation 
when it is applied to states.376 The move to personifying the state came from this positivistic 
view of international law that law being the body of normative rules presupposes ‘reason’ 
because its application is impossible unless rational beings are capable of understanding it and 
obeying it. Of course, individuals possess such reason and are in this way conceived as clear 
subjects of the law, and in order that states may be envisaged as such they must, of course, be
373 Boucher, David: ‘Uniting What Right Permits with What Interest Prescribes: Rawls’s Law of Peoples 
in Context’ in Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (eds.) Rawls’s Law o f  Peoples -  A Realistic Utopia,
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 19 -  37, p. 25
374 Remec, Peter Pavel: The Position o f the Individual in International Law According to Grotius and 
Vattel, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960)
375 Vattel, Emmerich de [1758]: The Law o f  Nations or the Principles o f  Natural Law applied to the 
conduct and to the Affairs o f  Nations and o f Sovereigns, transl. by Charles G. Fenwick (Washington:
Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1916), Preface, §9
376 See Boisen, Camilla and Boucher, David: ‘Hobbes and the Subjection of International Relations to 
Law and Morality’, in Raia Prokhovnik and Gabriella Slomp (eds.), International Political Theory after 
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endowed with reason and a will, which therefore means that they must be personified. As 
Oppenheim emphasised, once this fiction is in place there is no hindrance to why international 
law should not be represented as body of rules for the conducts of states.377 As was apparent 
with the Spanish Theologians as well as Grotius, they still contended that the jus gentium 
personally bound sovereign princes and others in their participation in international 
associations. However, as Remec noted, this idea became gradually eroded by the concept of 
the person of the state. The conceptual move was clear: the actors of international relations 
were not individuals represented by the sovereign, but the sovereign state itself. And it was 
Vattel who more than anyone else expressly established the law of nations solely as the law 
between sovereign states. There was a strong emphasis upon the sovereign integrity of the state 
and in this way it is the state that is central and not the individual. In this sense the state 
became the subject of rights and duties in displacing the individual completely from the system 
of international law -  something which of course in recent time is being reassessed in 
discussions about human rights, crimes against humanity, and international justice. However, 
the various implications especially for the development of modem international law, practical 
as well as theoretical, of this conceptual move are beyond the scope of this thesis. It is 
sufficient for this present study to emphasise that such a shift came to be and explore the effect 
it had on the emergence of ideas pertaining to humanitarian intervention compared to its pre- 
Westphalia political thought and jurisprudence. This is, thus, what I seek to do in this chapter. 
From the writing of Wolff and Vattel I will elucidate how the development of the idea of 
humanitarian intervention change against the backdrop of a changing international society, 
when the emphasis was put on the state as the main actor of international relations instead of 
the individual. It seems clear that for Vattel, in particular, that there is a strong humanitarian 
aid aspect in his general notion of the duty to assist but only in so far as it is not detrimental to 
the whole of the sovereign state. (This was also a similar condition for Grotius, although, as we 
saw he based his idea on very different premises). The question is how far does Vattel take the 
notion of the duty to assist, when ultimately underpinning such a principle, is the sovereignty 
of the state?
For both Wolff and Vattel nations have clear duties to each other, but first of all towards 
themselves and it is from these duties that the duty to assist arises. Thus, firstly in discussing 
the concept of the duty to assist I explore under what conditions, especially in relation to just 
war theory, such duties arise; and secondly, the source of the obligations that underpin a
377 Remec, Peter Pavel: The Position o f the Individual in International Law, p. 22 - 23
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nation’s duty to assist. What is important here is W olffs positing of the legal fiction of a 
civitas maxima, a republic of states, where the natural society of states has as its source the law 
of nature, the so-called necessary law of nations, but what regulates it is the positive voluntary 
law of nations. Vattel, on the other hand, as will be apparent, vehemently opposed such an idea 
and thereby looks for a much firmer distinction between the necessary and the voluntary law of 
nations. This is important to note because this means that the two thinkers present two different 
foundations to their very similar conceptions of nations’ obligations towards each other -  their 
duty to assist.
The duties of nations towards each other
Derived from natural law principles, for both Wolff and Vattel, nations have clear primary 
duties toward themselves but these duties also, secondarily, extend to other states. A nation 
has a duty of preservation toward itself and owes to itself the perfection of government, but 
also owes as much to other nations in this regard. As Wolff contends
‘Since every nation owes to every other nation that which it owes to itself, in so far as the other does not have this 
in its own power. While the first nation can perform this for the other nation without neglect of its own duty to 
itself; one nation is bound to contribute whatever it can to the preservation and perfection of another in that which 
the other is not self-sufficient.’378
In this instance, Wolff is at pains to note that it is a misconception to think that the destruction 
of another nation somehow helps a nation in its own self preservation. Although, Wolff is 
adamant that the preservation of equilibrium, the balance of power, among nations is not a just 
cause for war, both him, and more in particular Vattel, were some of the first to take into 
consideration the importance of the existence of a balance of power to regulate states in the 
international state system.379 As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, this notion was 
something Burke, almost a generation later, was much more eager to expound as his main 
justification for intervention in Revolutionary France. Thus, by assisting in other states’ self- 
preservation and the perfection of their governments, a commonwealth or federation of equal 
states could be achieved and peace could be maintained. According to Wolff, this would
378 Wolff, Christian [1764]: The Law o f Nations Treated According to Scientific Method in which the 
Natural Law o f Nations is Carefully Distinguished from  that which is Voluntary, Stipulative and 
Customary, trans. Joseph H. Drake (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), chap. II, §166, p. 88
379 Ibid., see chap. VI, § 646 -  651, pp. 330 - 336
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naturally lead to something he termed a civitas maxima; nations, like individuals, are to make 
themselves greater and better through united effort and because of this, nature has founded a 
society of nations to which they must necessarily belong.
For Wolff then, there is a strong duty to assist where a country lacks the resources to 
perform such duties towards their own self-preservation; he also insists that it is a duty of the 
failing nation to accept assistance. The reason for this is that changing the government of other 
nations necessarily presupposes the perfection of the assisting nation itself and its government. 
Without this, it cannot perform its duties towards other nations. This is an important point to 
make because Wolff is adamant that failure to perform the duties a nation has to itself means 
failing in its duties towards humankind as whole. As will be apparent below, the implication of 
refusing to accept assistance is that it constitutes grounds for waging just war.380 Thus, every 
nation is bound to preserve and perfect another. From this, we see that Wolff retains the 
familiar natural law notion of sociability in his thought, which extends to nations as well as 
individuals. In fact, for Wolff it was apparent, whether regarding individuals or nations, that 
the state of nature was sociable in character, and as we saw with Pufendorf the quintessence of
T O I
such a notion was the need for mutual aid. Thus, in Wolff we see that the concept of the 
moral person of the state is expressed much more emphatically than what was the case from 
his predecessor Grotius.
This has to be understood in the context of post-Westphalia Europe where such strong 
notions of the ‘state’, the sovereign state that is, become conceptually available. As with 
Pufendorf, Wolff extends his analysis of the state of nature to the relationship between nations 
and views nations as moral persons. It is from the social contract only that their rights and 
duties arise. Here Wolff asserts ‘it is enough to recognise that nature herself has combined 
nations into a state, therefore whatever flows from the concept of a state, must be assumed as 
established by nature herself.’382 However, Wolff is aware of the differences between nations 
and individual physical persons in the state of nature and necessarily acknowledges that the 
law of nature must be adapted to accommodate the relationship between the moral persons of 
nations. From his initial understanding of the premises of the law of nature the obligations of 
self-preservation and perfection are obligations that individuals and nations primarily owe to
380 Boucher, David: The Limits o f Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights and 
Human Rights in Transition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 180
381 Tuck, Richard: The Rights o f  War and Peace - Political Thought and the International Order from  
Grotius to Kant, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 187
382Wolff, Prolegomena, §9, p. 13
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themselves, and, thus, the obligations we have towards others are secondary. Wolff repeatedly 
notes that ‘every nation owes to every other nation that which it owes itself, in so far as the 
other does not have that in its own power, while the first nation without neglect of duty toward 
itself can perform this for the other.’383 This is logically deduced from the notion that nature 
has established a society among all nations in so far as it has also been established between all 
human beings. This society of nations has a specific purpose of giving mutual assistance to 
each other, and by its combined powers to promote the common good.
‘Since nature herself unites men and compels them to preserve society, because the common good o f all cannot be 
promoted except by their combined powers, so that nothing is more beneficial for a man than a man; the same 
nature likewise unites nations together and compels them to preserve society, because the common good of all 
cannot be promoted except by their combined powers, so that nothing can be said to be more beneficial for a 
nation than a nation. [...] Just as man ought to aid man, so too ought nation to aid nation.’384
However, the obligation of nations to promote the common good is imperfect. The main reason 
for this is one of judgement. Wolff asserts that by the virtue of the natural liberty of any nation 
it must be allowed its own judgement in determining an action of assistance, because it has to 
take into account its duty toward itself. As such, the right of nations to things owed to them 
must necessarily be imperfect. Wolff uses the example of scarcity of crops and illustrates the 
problem of what would happen if the nation that has an abundance of grain was impelled to 
sell or give its grain away so as to leave itself in a condition where it would suffer the same 
disaster?385 Because a nation’s natural duties to others are imperfect, such obligations cannot 
for that very reason be compelled. A nation capable, but unwilling, to assist another nation 
would be disregarding its natural duties; this is unfair, but not a wrong. As he explains, ‘it is 
plain of itself that what is contrary to an imperfect right of another is not contrary to his perfect 
right.’386 But Wolff clearly alludes to the immorality of such indifference by saying that when 
a nation fails to assist another, to which it is naturally bound to perform duties, its failings are 
those of charity rather than of justice, which does not make it a wrong, nevertheless, it is a sin. 
‘It is quite plain’, Wolff says, ‘that here we speak only of the moral impediment, since there is
383 Wolff, The Law o f Nations Treated According to Scientific Method, chap. II, §156, p. 84
384 Wolff, Prolegomena, §8, p. 11 - 12
385 Wolff, The Law o f Nations Treated According to Scientific Method, chap. II, §157, p. 85
386 Ibid., chap. II, §159, p. 85
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no obligation to do the impossible.’387 It is important, of course, to assess the limits of a 
nation’s duty when discussing morality. As demonstrated above, declining to fulfil your duty if 
you can is a sin. In this way, what Wolff is doing, is making the morally impossible equivalent
• • •  • • T O Oto that, which is physically impossible. Thus, a nation merely has an imperfect right to aid - 
in this sense, the right to request it, but as I will explore later in relation to the source of the 
moral obligation for assistance, a nation may acquire a perfect right to such aid by means of a 
treaty.What is significant here, of course, is W olffs highly controversial notion of civitas 
maxima: because what happens to these obligations of mutual assistance when Wolff assigns 
the necessary law of nations to positive international law? Surely, if  the natural law that 
regulates the relationship between nations is perceived as positive law, this necessarily means 
that it can be enforced by common law and as such the distinction between imperfect 
obligations and perfect obligations would become much less obvious? It is exactly on the point 
that states need a particular commonality, the civitas maxima, to pursue and promote the 
common good that he differed from Pufendorf, who instead maintained that the law of nature 
is the only moral and legal regulator of the relationships between states.
We turn now to W olffs disciple Emmerich de Vattel, who was highly influenced by 
W olffs international jurisprudence. Like his mentor, he too strongly emphasised the moral 
person of the state and asserted that ‘a moral being can have obligations towards itself only in 
view of its perfection and its happiness.’389 The preservation and perfection of oneself is the 
sum of all duties to the self or the nation. Vattel recognised that although nations have rights to 
self-preservation and independence, nevertheless, he also asserted that they have international 
duties
‘Since the universal society of the human race is an institution of nature itself, that is to say, a necessary result of 
man’s nature, all men of whatever condition are bound to advance its interests and to fulfil its duties. [...] When 
therefore, men unite in civil society and from a separate State and Nation [....] their duties towards the rest of the 
human race remain unchanged. [...] [I]t devolves thenceforth upon [...] the State, and upon its rulers, to fulfil the 
duties of humanity towards outsiders in all matters [....] and it peculiarly rests with the State to fulfil these duties 
towards other States.’390
387 Ibid., chap. II, §160, p. 86
J88 Ibid., chap. II, §160, p. 86
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As with human beings, the end of the great natural society among states, as Vattel terms it, is 
advancement in itself, which requires mutual assistance of all states towards each other to 
perfect themselves and thereby each other.
Vattel put the same emphasis on the hierarchy of duties as Wolff, in the belief that a 
nation’s duties toward itself clearly take precedence over its duties towards others. Because 
states are free and independent of each other they themselves have to be the judges of what 
their conscience demands of them in relation to what they can or cannot do and therefore ‘it is 
for each Nation to consider and determine what duties it can fulfil towards others without 
failing in its duties toward itself.’391 Any enforcement on this point would be an encroachment 
on the natural liberty of nations; ‘we may not use force against a free person, expect in cases 
where this person [or nation] is under obligation to us in a definite matter and for a definite 
reason not depending upon his judgement; briefly, in cases in which we have a perfect right 
against him.’392
The important aspect, in relation to the topic at hand, is o f course what those particular 
cases would be for Vattel (and Wolff), which will be explored further below. Vattel notes that 
the obligations nations have and the correlating rights that they produced can be divided into 
internal and external obligations. Internal obligations are what could be termed the conscience 
of each nation and are deduced from the rules of their duty towards themselves and other 
nations. When such obligations are considered relative to other nations they become external 
by producing some right on the part of particular nations. It is from external obligations that 
the duties nations have toward each others are deduced. These external obligations are divided 
into perfect and imperfect obligations. In this way, Vattel argues ‘\p\erfect obligations are 
those which give rise to the right of enforcing them; imperfect obligations give but the right to 
request.’393 However, there is a clear difference in the way Wolff and Vattel use the term 
‘imperfect’ obligations compared to Pufendorf. As we saw in the previous chapter, Pufendorf 
thinks imperfect obligations no less obligatory than perfect one; the only difference is that 
perfect obligations are part of the positive law and backed by sanctions. Applying Pufendorf s 
particular conception of moral obligation to Wolff and Vattel would mean that a nation’s duty 
of assistance would have an equal force as to its own preservation, which is clearly not what 
we find in their writings. For Wolff and Vattel a nation is free to act as it wills as long as it 
does not violate the perfect right of other nations and it acts under internal obligations without
391 Ibid., intro. §16, p. 6
392 Ibid., intro. §16, p. 7
393 Ibid., intro. §17, p. 7
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any perfect external obligation. As Wolff also says: if  it abuses its liberty, in this sense its 
internal obligations, then such acts are wrong, however, other nations cannot complain, 
because that would be to infringe upon the internal rights i.e. sovereignty of the particular 
nation.
As I have attempted to show, for Wolff and Vattel the mutual duty of nations to assist 
is crucial for the continuing relationship between states in promoting the common good within 
the society of states. However, it is only morally obligatory to the extent that it is so far as it is 
not detrimental to a nation’s own preservation and survival. Both thinkers employ the strong 
analogy between individuals and states in the state of nature, thus emphasising that individuals 
have first and foremost a duty to preserve themselves before their natural sociableness dictates 
that they should assist other. However, for Wolff and Vattel, the need for mutual assistance is 
even less needed for states because they are more self-sufficient entities than individuals. 
Having then explored the conceptual possibility for a duty to assist, I will now seek to more 
specifically determine from what source such duties are grounded in.
The source of moral obligation: the voluntary or necessary law of nations?
As was demonstrated in chapter 3, there is much disagreement as to whether Grotius effected 
the move to a more secular natural law and natural rights tradition. The principal support for 
such a claim was to emphasise his use of subjective natural rights. With Vattel, and to a certain 
extent also Wolff, there is no doubt that such a secular move was being made. Unlike Grotius, 
Vattel makes only few references, generally only in passing, to religion. In his statement that 
every nation has a duty to preserve its corporate existence he asserts that the obligation was 
‘natural to the individual whom God has created’; however, nations are formed by civil 
compacts and believed that the obligation of self-preservation was brought upon them by 
‘human acts’ and not nature.394 Mark Janis astutely notes that ‘in considerable contrast to 
Grotius, Vattel in his treatment of promises, good faith and treaties, never rested their 
effectiveness on any sort of religious foundation. Instead, his cement of obligations was a 
rational mixture leavened by natural law.’395 Rather, Vattel saw religion as having a specific 
social purpose, noting that the state would ‘profit greatly’ by its people’s religious
394 Janis, Mark W.: ‘Religion and the Literature of International Law: Some Standard Texts’, in Mark W. 
Janis and Carolyn Evans (eds.) Religion and International Law, (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
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sentiment.396As we will see in the following chapter, this notion of religion was very ‘Burkean’ 
in its prescription, where religion was noted for its social usefulness, rather than its appeal to
' l Q n
any abstract truth.
This secular move is important to emphasise in order to accentuate the conceptual 
conditions under which to understand the source of the obligations that nations have toward 
each other. What Wolff intended to do with his system of international law was, as Otfried 
Nippold notes in his introduction to W olffs The Law o f  Nations, to liberate international law
O Q O
‘from the shackles of natural law.’ As we have already seen, this had of course occupied 
many theorists’ minds grounded, as was the case with Grotius, in a wish to address the 
religious disputes of the day and also purport its universal applicability.399 Given the 
philosophical tradition he inherited, Wolff was no exception. What Wolff did, was to present 
international law as a discipline existing separately from the law of nature,400 and with this 
move, he thus followed in the conceptual footstep of Samuel Rachel. As was explored above, 
Wolff agreed with Pufendorf that states were moral persons and from that, they were in this 
way bound by the natural law. However, he was unwilling to support Pufendorf s assertion that 
the principles of the law of nature affecting individuals were the same for states.401 Thus, 
Wolff did not subscribe to Pufendorf s contention that the law of nature was the only law 
regulating the relationships between states and as we have seen, by doing this the latter thereby 
denied the separate existence of a law of nations. In opposition to Pufendorf, then, Wolff 
asserted that there was a positive international law, which he named, as did Grotius, the 
voluntary law of nations.
What Wolff sought was to succeed where Grotius had failed, and give the voluntary 
law of nations firm foundations.402 Wolff argued that there existed within the international
396 Vattel, The Law o f Nations or the Principles o f  Natural Law, book I, chapt. XII, §126, p. 53; Janis, 
‘Religion and the Literature of International Law’, p. 127
397 Emphasising the social utility of religion was not, of course, uncommon. Machiavelli, Hobbes and 
Rousseau, to name but a few, were convinced of the social efficacy o f religion. Marx was also well aware 
of this efficacy, but saw it as an instrument, or opiate, of the ruling class in placating the people.
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society, a civitas maxima -  the supreme-state -  which had its basis in the voluntary law of 
nations. And unlike Grotius and the Thomists, for instance, W olffs voluntary law of nations is 
set part from the law of nature. Although thinkers like Rachel and Richard Zouche (1590 - 
1661) had already taken this positivistic stance, W olffs importance cannot be underestimated 
in applying to his system of philosophy an acknowledgement of the positive character of 
international law. However, as we have seen, Wolff did not discard the existence of the natural 
law; rather he discusses the natural law applied to states as the necessary law of nations, basing 
it on the general elucidations of doctrines about the laws of nature and man (or nation). As 
already explained, from the natural obligations we have as individuals, nations are bound by 
the same obligations and duties to themselves and to other nations, and it is from these duties 
that certain rights arise, which we then all originally possess from nature. It is these rights that 
form the necessary law of nations as applied to nations. However, the rights that nations have 
as corporate moral persons are somewhat different from those of individual persons. On behalf 
of their citizens, the nation exercises the duties that individuals have to the common good of 
mankind as whole.403 It is also from this that Wolff then deduces the fundamental rights of 
states, in that, like individuals, all states are equal by nature and as such no nations have 
privilege or precedence over others. No nation has the right to decide the actions of another 
state and the natural liberty of states may not be used to impede other nations. This in turn 
means that every nation has a right to defend itself against a looming injury or to avenge a 
committed injury. Importantly, nations also have rights to bind others to fulfil their obligations. 
Doing this they may thereby acquire rights which may not be taken from them. Lastly, nations 
have the right to resort to war if its rights are being violated. 404 This was the general content of 
his natural or necessary law of nations. We turn now to his voluntary law of nations, which as 
has already been implied, met with considerable criticisms not least from his own pupil Vattel.
First of all, for Wolff, the voluntary law of nations did not remove the original 
obligations pertaining to the law of nature. As he explains
‘[T]he only law given to nations by nature is natural law, or the law of nature itself applied to nations. This then 
can be changed by the acts of nations voluntarily, so far as concerns those things which belong to permissive law, 
and so far as concerns the performance of those things which belong to mankind. [...] But far be it from you to 
think that therefore there is no need of our discussing in detail the law of nations. For the principles of the law of
403 Wolff, Prolegomena, §3, p. 9; Boucher, The Limits o f  Ethics in International Relations, p. 133
404 Nippold, introduction, p. xxxix
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nature are one thing, but the application of them to nations another [....] in so far as the nature of nations is not the 
same as human nature. For example, man is bound to preserve himself by nature, every nation by the agreement 
through which it is made a definite moral person.’405
From this it is clear, as has been noted, that he was firmly opposed to any notion that the law of 
nations should be conflated with the law of nature. Furthermore, from this last passage, Wolff 
also hints at an important postulate, which relates closely to his further explorations of nations’ 
duties towards each other. Fie emphasises that nations are different from individuals, and it is 
on this basis that Wolff has a particularly restricted view of intervention. His apparent 
assumptions about the sufficiency of nations means that the duties of nations can only be 
morally obligatory, that is imperfect, not only because he sees the nation as having absolute 
sovereignty, but also, in part, because he contends that the nation is more self-sufficient than 
the individual. This led Vattel to give even greater emphasis to his departure from W olffs idea 
of the civitas maxima: exactly because nations are not as vulnerable as individuals, they do not 
need to enter into an international civil society.406 For Wolff, then, the voluntary law of nations 
did not go against any original obligation of the natural law, rather it dealt with permissions 
derived from the natural law which could be enforced. The issue of permissive duties will be 
explored further below in relation to intervention. Thus, as we saw with other thinkers, the law 
of nations could not go against the law of nature and it could not demolish the moral 
obligations derived from it. The voluntary law of nations affected only externals and in this 
way the original obligations of the natural law were left unimpaired.
It remains to explore in more detail W olffs notion of civitas maxima from which the 
voluntary law of nations is derived. Wolff explains that:
‘All nations are understood to have come together into a state, whose separate members are separate nations, or 
individual states. For nature herself has established a society among all nations and compels them to preserve it, 
for the purpose of promoting the common good by their combined powers. Therefore since a society of men 
united for the purpose of promoting the common good by their combined powers, is a state, nature herself has 
combined nations into a state. Therefore since nations, which knows the advantages arising therefrom, by a 
natural impulse are carried into this association, which binds the human race or all nations one to the other [....] 
what can be said except that nations also have combined into society as if by agreement? So all nations are 
understood to have come together into a state, whose separate nations are separate members or individual 
states.’407
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The state, that Wolff understands nations to have combined into, he calls the supreme state. Its 
meaning is to be understood as a universal society or civil association, and he criticises Grotius 
for not having derived his own law of nations from such and idea. Wolff was aware that this 
would be a contentious idea and is careful not to promote it as a ‘super state’ as such; rather, he 
notes that it is a ‘certain sort of state’, meaning a society. Wolff is adamant that within this 
society of nations there exist rights to facilitate and promulgate laws that concern the society in 
general. As is the case with the particular states, civil laws are prescribed as a mean of 
maintaining the good of the state, so too, Wolff contends, ought there be laws that prescribes 
the means by which the good of the civitas maxima can be maintained. What Wolff is 
proposing here, is in fact to include the necessary law of nations that is the natural law applied 
to states, into positive international law. ‘No difficulty will appear’, Wolff asserts, ‘in 
establishing a law of nations which does not depart altogether from the necessary law of 
nations, nor in all respects observe it.’408 What he seems to be saying here, is that the 
obligations that nations have towards each other are all within the bounds of the good of the 
civitas maxima, and in this way, such obligations can never go against the purpose of the 
nation itself or the civitas maxima. Wolff explains this in the following way:
‘Since in any state the right of the whole over the individual must not be extended beyond the purpose of the state, 
so also the right of nations as a whole over individual nations cannot be extended beyond the purpose of the 
supreme state into which nature herself has combined them, so that forthwith individual nations may be known to 
have assigned a right of this sort to the whole.’409
Just as when a state is established the individual assigns him or herself to the whole in order to 
promote the common good, so it is with nations, because it is nature that has brought nations 
together in this society. It is nature that has imposed certain obligations to promote the 
common good of the society of nations. This necessarily entails that nations ought to agree to 
be bound to the whole and as such it may thus be presumed that they have agreed. Thus, the 
voluntary law of nations rests on the implied agreement of nations. As mentioned, the law at 
the basis of this society of states is the voluntary law of nations; just as in a state the civil law it 
ultimately is reducible to the natural law, so must the civil law of the society of nations be 
reducible to the natural law. And as explored above, Wolff believes in the existence and force 
of such a law even by a state that denies its existence. As such, the voluntary law of nations for 
Wolff is conceived on a similar basis as that of civil law in municipal society.
408 Ibid., §11, p. 13
409 Ibid., §14, p. 15
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The voluntary law of nations comprises two laws, the stipulative, or particular, which is 
treaty law and thus rests on the explicit consent of nations. The other law included in the law of 
nations is customary law, which he defines as the law so-called ‘because it has been brought in 
by long usage and observed as law.’410 This, as implied, rests upon the tacit consent of nations. 
All three laws, the voluntary, the stipulative, and customary law comprise the positive law of 
nations. The reason for such a detailed analysis here, is that, it is important for the topic at hand 
to note that W olffs civitas maxima forms the basis for the supreme right of nations, which he 
terms imperium universal sive gentium. From this ‘empire’ the society of nations can for the 
good of the welfare of the society determine the actions of individual nations and importantly 
force them to fulfil their obligations. This will be further explored below in relation to W olffs 
law of war. It would seem that to determine the source of the moral obligations and 
corresponding duties that nations have towards each other is the necessary natural law of 
nations for Wolff, which would mean that falling under the permissive natural law such duties 
are not absolutes, but instead imperfect moral obligations. However, because of W olffs 
peculiar and highly original conception of the civitas maxima grounding the voluntary law of 
nations, it would seem that any moral obligations nations have toward each other could have 
more of a force within the society of states, if such obligations were deemed necessary for the 
common welfare of the society. Before, we explore in more detail from which obligation 
nations are inclined to resort to war, and whether there can be any humanitarian grounds 
underpinning such obligations, we turn to Vattel’s conception of the law of nations.
Vattel begins his seminal work by noting that although the law of nations is a great and 
important subject, through time international thinkers have underestimated its importance, or 
rather, the ideas regarding it have been undervalued. He notes that by limiting the law of 
nations to those rules and customs resulting from mutual consent, their true origin has been 
degraded.411 Vattel notes how Grotius correctly had distinguished the law of nature and the law 
of nations, by asserting the law of nations as an established law based on the common consent 
of nations, but failed in distinguishing properly the law of nature as applied to individuals and 
the law of nature as applied to nations. He proceeds to assert that Grotius, if he had been more 
careful, would have noted that merely basing the law of nations on the consent of nations does 
not provide the full picture of what regulates the mutual relationship between states. Rather, 
the consent of nations forms the foundations and the source of the arbitrary law of nations,
410 Ibid., §24, p. 18
411 Vattel, Preface, p.3a
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which is a particular division of the law of nations.412 To elucidate his notion of the law of 
nations and the true foundation upon which he bases the voluntary law of nations, he seeks first 
of all to emphasise his departure from W olffs international law system.
Like Wolff, the states that Vattel considers are like independent persons, naturally free 
and have the same rights. On the basis of this equality Vattel constructs a law of nations which 
is derived from the nation’s right to self-preservation in which the first principle is the 
principle of the mutual independence of sovereign states. In the political climate after the 
Thirty Years War Vattel’s fears about the possible hegemony of an emperor or pope are 
understandable. And this is also one of the main reasons why he opposes W olffs civitas 
maxima because he suspects that such a civic federation of states would obstruct the 
independence and freedom of sovereign states, because it necessarily would entail the rule of a 
common superior. He immediately credits such notion as pure fiction, but nonetheless notes, 
that one day it might come to be a reality if it was exploited by clever politicians. Wolffs 
system of international law, then, left Vattel unimpressed due to the former’s insistence on the 
civitas maxima.413 That the voluntary law of nations would act as the civil law of one great 
republic was therefore an absurd notion for Vattel. As he said
‘This does not satisfy me, and I find the fiction of such a republic neither reasonable nor well enough founded to 
deduce therefrom the rules of a Law of Nations at once universal in character, and necessarily accepted by 
sovereign States. I recognise no other society among Nations than that which nature has set up among men in 
general.’414
Although, Vattel notes, nature has constituted for man a general society, where, given their 
natural sociableness they require assistance from their fellow men, nature cannot be said to 
have imposed or prescribed the perfect obligations of uniting them together into civil society. 
This is obvious for Vattel because it is no where as near a necessity for civil society among 
nations as it is among individuals.415 What Vattel is saying, is that the reciprocal relationship 
between nations in terms of assistance, mutual intercourse and communication can be 
sufficiently regulated by the natural law.
412 Ibid., p.5a
413 Ruddy, Francis Stephen: International Law in the Enlightenment, p. 36
414 Vattel, Preface, p.9a
415 Ibid., p.9a
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Thus, even though Vattel departed from Wolff on some key issues, he was very much 
inspired by him in the contention that the law of nations is in fact a modification of the natural 
law applied to states. What he did first was to distinguish the law of nations into the necessary 
and the voluntary. Vattel believed the necessary law of nature was that which bounded the 
conscience of sovereigns and the positive law of nations relied on the will of the sovereign and 
included all the practical and prudential consideration in dealing with and alleviating the 
effects of war.416 From this, as his criticism against Grotius shows, he wants to emphasise that 
nations’ rights and duties are more fundamental and morally obligatory than merely resting 
upon the consent of individual nations in dictating the conscience of sovereign states towards 
such obligations. Vattel explains this in the following
‘I shall reason much as Mr. Wolff has reasoned with respect to individuals in his treatise on the Law of Nature. 
That treatise shows us that the rules which by reason of man’s free nature may govern external right do not 
destroy the obligation which the internal right imposes upon the conscience o f each individual. It is easy to apply 
this doctrine to Nations, and to teach them by careful distinctions between internal and external right, that is to say 
between the necessary Law of Nations and the voluntary Law of Nations, not to feel free to do whatever can be 
done without impunity, when it is contrary to the immutable laws of justice and the voice of conscience.’417
From this, then, Vattel deduces the necessary law of nations as the inner law of conscience of 
nations, whereas the voluntary law of nations recognises the need for certain modifications and 
exceptions, as for instance regarding war, in the exacting application of the necessary law of 
nations. However, Vattel is eager to demonstrate that they both have their origin in the natural 
law although their applications are quite different. His differentiations become clear from his 
definition below
‘The necessary Law of Nations and the voluntary law have therefore both been established by nature, but each in 
its own way: the former as a sacred law to be respected and obeyed by Nations and sovereigns in all their actions; 
the latter as a rule of conduct which the common good and welfare oblige them to accept in their mutual 
intercourse. The necessary law is derived immediately from nature; while this common mother of men merely 
recommends the observance of the voluntary Law of Nations in view of the circumstances in which Nations 
happen to find themselves, and for their common good.418
416 Ibid., p. 10a -  1 la; See also Boucher, The Limits o f  Ethics in International Relations, p. 140
417 Vattel, Preface, p.l la
418 Ibid., p.l la
154
But what is important, and what lies at the core of Vattel’s separation of the law of nations 
from the law of nature is his contention that the natural law does not derive its obligatoriness 
from God, but rather from reason itself. This is, as we recall, the secular move that some 
scholar misleadingly ascribed to Grotius. Vattel instead criticises Grotius and notes that ‘men 
would be obliged to follow natural laws even by setting aside the will of God, because they are 
praiseworthy and useful.’419 Unlike Pufendorf, for instance, for Vattel this did not undermine 
the enforceability of the obligations because he presents the law of nations as law, which states 
are subject to.
Thus, the voluntary law of nations is effectively positive international law because it 
results from the will of the sovereign. Furthermore, Vattel asserts, as did Wolff, that nations 
may, by will or consent give rise to the arbitrary law of nations, whereas treaties, agreements, 
and promises institute the conventional law of nations. The conventional law of nations binds 
the contracting parties, whereas implied in tacit consent lies the subscription to common 
practices, which establishes custom, in which common practises are accepted on the basis of 
‘long usage’. However, what grounds the obligatory nature of the arbitrary law of nations is 
the necessary law of nations which prescribes the honouring of tacit promises and as such it 
acts as a standard by which to judge the lawfulness and justice of treaties and customs 420
Vattel asserts the imperative need that justice is observed among nations, exactly 
because of the terrible nature of war. Thus, the justice of the universal human society among 
all mankind which underpins the necessary law of nations depends upon the mutual assistance 
and respect that nations afford each other. 421 However, it is improbable that having the right to 
judge their own moral obligations on the basis of their own conscience that this is sufficient to 
prevent conflicts as each nation would claim justice on their side. However, enforcing the 
necessary law of nations is another matter, one which Vattel sees as only exacerbating a 
conflict. And this is where Vattel sees the voluntary law of nations as far more certain in its 
application to fulfil this function 422 Vattel, therefore, sees the voluntary law of nations as a 
much more practical expedient, and given the fact that it cannot judge the justness of a war, it 
is rather invoked to deal with issues relating to the conduct of war. Unlike the more traditional
419 Vattel, Emmerich de: ‘Essay on the Foundation of Natural Law and on the First Principle of 
Obligation Men Find Themselves Under to Observe Laws’ in The Law o f  Nations, or Principles o f  the 
Law o f  Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs o f  Nations and Sovereigns, edited and with an 
introduction by Bela Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), pp.747 -  772, 
p. 760
420 Boucher, The Limits o f  Ethics in International Relations, p. 142
421 Vattel, The Law o f Nations or the Principles o f  Natural Law, book II, chap. V, §63, p. 135
422 Boucher, The Limits o f Ethics in International Relations, p. 143
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natural law thinkers explored in the previous chapters, Vattel holds that it must be presumed 
that each side has equal justification in war exactly because states are perfectly equal. 
However, to reiterate, the voluntary law of nations cannot make right what is naturally wrong:
i t  must never be forgotten that this voluntary Law o f  Nations, established from the necessity and for the 
avoidance of greater evils, does not confer upon him whose cause is unjust any true rights capable o f justifying his 
conduct and appeasing his conscience, but merely makes his conduct legal in the sight o f men, and exempts him 
from punishment.,423
From this, it is clear then, that in terms of the source of the moral obligations, although 
imperfect, the duty to assist other nations comes from the necessary law of nations, however, 
what regulates the discharge of such obligations is the voluntary law of nations. From the 
above exploration there are clear parallels to be made between the issue facing international 
humanitarian justice today and the problems which Wolff and Vattel sought to address for 
international relations of the 18th Century. Although they present a secular natural law 
tradition, the perfect obligations of humanitarian intervention have their source solely in 
human agreement and conventional international law, whereas the imperfect moral obligation 
of nations is derived from the law of nature.
As we have seen from the above discussion, for Wolff and Vattel the duty to assist is an 
important issue relating to international law. By positioning the principle of sovereignty as 
taking priority over any duty to assist such duty can only be imperfect at best. However, as we 
shall see, Vattel presents a conceptual solution to W olffs absolute principle of non­
intervention in the internal affairs of another state, however despotic its ruler may be. Thus, 
having explored the conceptual possibility for a duty to assist and the source of such duties, I 
will now turn more specifically to the conditions under which such duties arise.
Notions of humanitarian intervention and the case against intervention
As was explored above, for both Wolff and Vattel there was a clear duty to assist, however 
such moral obligations were imperfect. Although the principle exists for both thinkers the 
conditions under which such duties arose varies, especially in relation to intervention as
423 Vattel, The Law o f Nations or the Principles o f  Natural Law, book III, chap. XII, §190, p. 305
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grounds for just war. Christian Wolff makes a very clear distinction between barbarous and 
civilized nations. Civilised nations have a duty under the natural law to assist these less 
civilised nations in deficiencies that impede their progress to a more civilised way of life. In 
this then, as already demonstrated, there is a strong duty to assist, but equally there is also a 
strong duty on the part of the potential recipient to accept assistance where a country lacks the 
resources to perfect itself. This is because to refuse assistance impedes the nation’s fulfilment 
of its duty toward itself and towards humanity. About such states Wolff notes that ‘these will 
be the ones whose hearts are still void of the universal love of all toward all, and who have not 
yet realised in their hearts that there is a society which nature herself has established among 
men, and much less do they recognise that society which this same nature is understood to 
have established among all nations.’424 Thus, W olffs principle of a duty to assist less 
resourceful nations, for instance ‘barbarous’ states, is a potential strong principle of 
humanitarian intervention however imperfect the obligation might be. What seems to be the 
case of W olffs theory is that for the nations that met and conformed to the standard of civility 
and civilised conduct and culture the principle of sovereignty is sacrosanct 425 What of the 
nations that do not meet such standards? Wolff is adamant that barbarism and an uncultivated 
way of life do not constitute grounds for just war against a nation and notes that this would be 
a mere pretext for war. From this argument then, he takes a clear stand against Vitoria and in 
particular Grotius
‘Approval is not to be given to the opinion of Grotius, that kings and those who have a right equal to that of kings 
have the right to exact penalties from any who savagely violate the law of nature or of nations, nor is there need 
for correcting this, to employ the warnings which he puts forward in §§41 and following [‘Wars of Punishments’]. 
The source of the error is found in the fact that the evil seems to him of such a nature that it can be punished and 
that it is quite in harmony with reason that it may be punished by him who is not guilty of it.’426
Wolff emphasises this criticism that any nation has a perfect right to seek the services of 
humanity, but no man has the right to compel another to accept such service. Thus, although 
there is a strong notion of humanitarian aid there is an even stronger notion of the case against 
intervention. This also means that Wolff is resolute that neither should there be interfering in 
the government of another, because government exists unconditionally for the exercise of its
424 Wolff, The Law o f Nations Treated According to Scientific Method, chap. II, §160, p. 94
425 Boucher, The Limits o f Ethics in International Relations, p. 180 - 181
426 Wolff, The Law o f Nations Treated According to Scientific Method, chap. II, §169, p. 89
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own sovereignty and as such no ruler has the right to interfere in the government of another 
to.427 Wolff rehearses his argument where a ruler of a state burdens his subjects too harshly and 
treats them in this way. Wolff reaffirms his argument that a ruler of another state may not resist 
such a tyrant by force; however, he may intercede on behalf of the subjects in question. But 
such intercession should not be grounded in force but rather belongs to the realm of politics 
and diplomacy. But, as he notes, sometimes even intercession is not an option because it can be 
rightly refused if offered and all that is left then is for the pleading nation to ‘endeavour by its 
prayer to persuade him to change his mind.’ For Vattel such a stand was hardly good enough 
in dealing with tyrants and he puts forward certain conceptual possibilities for grounds of just 
war against tyrants and third party intervention regarding civil wars, as will be apparent later 
on.
Furthermore, Wolff also has a strong argument against any nation forcing another 
nation to embrace its religion. Force, Wolff notes, ‘is a means not suited to inculcate truth.’429 
Wolff argues that the issue here is not whether or not religion can be propagated by force, this 
seems beside the point for him, but the important issue relates instead to the right of nations 
towards nations. But part of a nations’ duty toward itself and toward others is to promote the 
true worship of God, as Wolff calls it, but this cannot be done by force, only by persuasion. 
Such persuasion is done through teaching and missionaries, but it is in a nation’s right to deny 
any admittance of missionaries in its territory. This was in clear opposition to Vitoria and 
Sepulveda who believed that treating missionaries badly gave rise to just cause of war. 
Although Vitoria did not believe that the Indians could be forced to submit to a Christian God, 
he nevertheless put forward the strong belief in a common origin of mankind. This was 
grounded in the so-called Christian notion of oikumene: God’s will for the perfection of man 
and the natural would had to be extended over the whole world. It was for exactly this reason, 
as we have seen, that Vitoria argued that the Indians possessed reason, because if this notion of 
oikumene was to be so, all peoples had to have sufficient enough reason to grasp Christian 
teachings; otherwise the obligations God had given Christians would have been contradictory. 
Vitoria had said that ‘God and nature never fail in the things necessary.’430 This was also one 
of the reasons that Sepulveda’s doctrine of natural slavery inevitably was viewed as heresy. 
Sepulveda, as we have seen, firmly believed in justifying war against the Americans Indians on
427 Ibid., chap. II, §257, p. 132
428 Ibid., chap. II, §258, p. 132
429 Ibid., chap. II, §259, p. 132
430 Cited in Jahn, The Cultural Construction o f  International Relations, p. 66
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account of them being heretics and sinners and to save their souls by forcing them to conform 
to the true religion. As such, he presents one of the strongest notions of humanitarian 
intervention on the basis of religion. Arguments like these were something both Wolff and 
Vattel viewed with great suspicion; it was partly for such reasons that missionaries did not 
have special status. For Wolff no nation has a right to punish missionaries or treat them badly 
unless they have disturbed the public peace or are unwilling to leave if asked. Indeed, neither is 
atheism a just cause for punitive wars. Here it is apparent that Wolff takes a much more non­
sectarian stand away from religious matters than his 16th and 17th Century predecessors. 
Nations are bound to perform the duties towards each other regardless of religious preferences
‘For the love of mankind, or charity, which embraces all duties o f one man towards others, extends to all men 
generally, without any regard to religion. And there is no one o f us who does not recognise this, and who does not 
condemn the perverse belief of the ancients, which bids us hold in scorn those who devoted to another religion.’431
Wolff then seems to have a strong notion of non-intervention, even in cases where a people is 
oppressed by its sovereign ruler. However, he notes that in cases where there are persuasive 
reasons for undertaking war, which are for the good of the state or common good of citizens, 
and also, in this case, accompanied by just causes, then such wars are just. However, this is 
articulated very vaguely. As mentioned, the purpose of the state is to preserve and perfect itself 
and others, and in this way contribute to the common good. However, Wolff is wary that such 
motives could be misused as mere pretexts. As he notes ‘it is by no means sufficient that wars 
should be waged justly, but it must also be waged with righteous motives. Therefore one must 
also be on his guard lest in the consideration of persuasive reasons something vicious may be 
admitted.’432 Importantly, then, Wolff alludes to right intent as an important part in the 
justifications of war.
For Wolff a just cause of a war only arises between nations when a wrong has been 
done, or is likely to be done -  in this sense war in relation to pre-emptive strikes. This is 
prescribed by the natural law as it exists between nations. In relation to humanitarian 
intervention then, grounds for just war here would mainly arise if there existed some 
convention between nations that had instituted a perfect obligation of assistance. Although 
posited as a kind of legal fiction in W olffs idea of the civitas maxima, the necessary law of 
nations is conceived as positive international law for the good of the welfare of the society of
4,1 Wolff, The Law o f Nations Treated According to Scientific Method, chap. II, §263, p. 135
432 Ibid., chap. VI, §628, p. 320
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nations. This society can determine the actions of individual nations and force them to fulfil 
their obligations. By this, if a duty of assistance in a particular situation is perceived to be 
necessary for the common good, then, theoretically, this could be enforced.
I will now turn to Vattel and how he devises, what he clearly saw, as deficiencies of 
W olffs arguments against intervention. Vattel also presented the principle of the duty to assist, 
however, as with Wolff, this duty to assist relies on the nations own judgement of self- 
preservation and capability to assist. In practice this would mean, that when a neighbouring 
state is attacked unjustly by a powerful enemy, which threatens to destroy it, Vattel notes that 
if the state without causing great harm to itself can come to the aid of the attacked state, there 
is no question as to why it should not do so. We find the same duty of assistance in relation to 
famines
i f  a Nation is suffering from famine, all those who have provisions to spare should assist in its need, without, 
however, exposing themselves to scarcity. To give assistance in such dire straits is so instinctive an act of 
humanity that hardly any civilized Nation is to be found which would refuse absolutely to do so.’433
Because, as we explored above, Vattel’s notion of human society imposed obligations on 
nations to contribute not only to their own advancement and happiness but also to others, it is 
important that such contributions to the general good of humanity are brought about peacefully 
and not through violence. Thus, if an uncivilized state asks for assistance to improve its 
condition, a state should not refuse it the necessary assistance of teachers etc to assists it in its 
own self-perfection. But as Wolff also argued forcing such assistance upon the state is a 
violation of its natural liberty. Here, Vattel makes a clear argument against the Spanish 
theologians as well as Grotius himself.
‘Those ambitious European States which attacked the American Nations and subjected them to their avaricious 
rule, in order, as they said, to civilize them and have them instructed in the true religion -  those usurpers, I say 
justified themselves by a pretext equally unjust and ridiculous. It is surprising to hear the learned and judicious 
Grotius tell us that a sovereign can justly take up arms to punish Nations, which are guilty of grievous crimes 
against the natural law.’434
4j3 Vattel, The Law o f Nations or the Principles o f  Natural Law, book II, chap. I §5, p. 115
434 Ibid., chap I §7, p. 116
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Grotius’s mistake, Vattel argues, is that he confused the freedom attributed to the individual 
and the sovereign state somehow gives rise to a right to punish crimes against violations of the 
law of nature, when in fact those crimes do not affect its own rights or safety. For Vattel, a 
nation’s right to punish only exists against those who have injured it; otherwise it violates the 
autonomy of the moral person of the sovereign state. The right to punish crimes against nature 
as Grotius conceives it, gives for Vattel, states ruled by ambitious men too easy a pretext for 
waging war and ‘opens the door to all the passions of zealots and fanatics.’435 
Vattel notes that it is truly impossible for nations to fully realise their duties of mutual 
assistance if  they do not love each other. Thus, here, Vattel alludes to, as did Wolff, that 
offices of humanity should advance from a ‘pure source’, meaning that the intentions must be 
grounded in just motivation of charity and morality. From this point, it must be questioned 
whether Vattel, in fact, is a proponent of the principle of terra nullius, which Grotius and in 
particular Locke advocated as grounds for just acquisition. In contrast to Pufendorf, Vattel was 
much more permissive in allowing for appropriation of ‘uninhabited’ lands, believing that 
when the nations of Europe came upon the lands ‘which the savages have no special need of 
and are making no present continuous use of, they may lawfully take possession of them and 
establish colonies in them.’436 However, he firmly notes that this is to be done only as a means 
of sustaining life in accordance with the natural law and, unlike Locke, mere occupancy for 
Vattel is not enough. As he notes
‘But it is questioned whether a Nation can thus appropriate, by the mere act o f taking possession, lands which it 
does not really occupy, and which are more extensive than it can inhabit or cultivate. It is not difficult to decide 
that such a claim would be absolutely contrary to the natural law, and would conflict with the designs of nature, 
which destines the earth for the needs of all mankind, and only confers upon individual Nations the right to 
appropriate territory so far as they can make use of it, and not merely to hold it against others who may wish to 
profit by it. Hence the Law of Nation will only recognise the ownership and sovereignty of a Nation over 
unoccupied lands when the Nation is in actual occupation o f them, when it forms a settlement upon them, or make 
some actual use of them.’437
Thus, from this then, Vattel was in fact much more nuanced on the point of terra nullius than 
what is usually recognised, mainly because he believed that history had shown that such 
occupations were mere pretexts employed by Spain and Portugal, in particular, to colonise the
435 Ibid., book II, chap I §7, p. 116
436 Ibid., book I, chap XVIII §209, p. 85
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Americas for individual gain and exploitation. Against the 16th Century conquest of South 
America, he contrasts ‘the moderation of the English Puritans’ who were the first to settle New 
England, and holds William Penn (1644 - 1718) and his Quaker colony as praiseworthy 
examples of how land, they wished to occupy, was bought from Indians.
As has been emphasised, Vattel has a strong notion of state autonomy and sovereignty, 
however, although he is very clear that if a rule violates his state’s fundamental laws and the 
law of nature this would give his subjects just cause to resists him. If the ruler’s insufferable 
tyranny should bring about a national revolt against him, pace Wolff, Vattel asserted that any 
foreign power ‘may rightfully give assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its 
aid.’438Vattel gives the example of the William III of Orange (1650 - 1702) coming to aid of 
the English against James II (1633 - 1701) in 1688 bringing about the Glorious Revolution. 
Thus, when such circumstances reach the state of civil war, nations may assist whatever two 
parties seem to have justice on their side. However, ‘to assist a detestable tyrant, or to come 
out in favour of an unjust and rebellious people, would certainly’ as Vattel notes, ‘be a 
violation of duty.’439 The grounds for such intervention has to be found in Vattel’s argument 
that when such a situation occurs the principle of sovereignty of the state is temporarily 
suspended in the sense that the political bonds between a sovereign and his people are broken 
and as such constitute two distinct parties. They are both to be conceived as independent of 
foreign authority and judgement, and until the issue is resolved they must be allowed to act as 
if they possessed the same equal rights as any other nation. This is an important point to make 
because as has been demonstrated here, for both Wolff and Vattel it is the principle of states’ 
equal natural liberty and as such sovereignty which provide the conditions for the principle of 
the duty to assist. However, by presenting a different application of the principle of 
sovereignty Vattel furnishes the opportunity for humanitarian intervention in cases of grievous 
oppression of a people. Vattel readily seems much more concerned with the problems of
tyrants and the historical evidence for the need to deal with such instances than Wolff. ‘As for
the monsters’ Vattel notes ‘who, under the name of sovereigns, acts as a scourge and plague of 
the human race, they are nothing more than wild beasts, of whom every man of courage may 
justly purge the earth.’440
As with tyrants, Vattel is also particularly concerned with hegemonic powers, such as 
the Holy Roman Emperor shaping the power relations of the European state system in the 16th
438 Ibid., book II, chap IV §56, p. 131
439 Ibid., book II, chap IV §56, p. 131
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Century, and was one of the first international jurists more carefully to address the notion of 
the concept of the balance of power. The notion o f an all powerful or too powerful sovereign in 
the European state system was also the reason why he took such a strong stand against W olffs 
idea of the supreme state. In relation to this, Nicholas Greenwood Onuf has argued that Vattel 
creates a problem for himself because, while the natural society of states can remain as a 
foundation for the necessary law of nations, the voluntary law has nothing to compare, and 
thus Vattel’s solution is to found it on the balance of power.441 Although misconceived, this is 
an important observation, because this would change the condition under which obligations to 
assist might arise, especially in viewing the balance of power as way to promote and maintain 
the common good of the society of states. However, unlike Burke, who will be explored in the 
next and final chapter, Vattel did not allude to the balance of power ever having such a moral 
purpose. Vattel’s view of the balance of power is mainly descriptive. He saw inter-state 
relations as being more analogous to human beings governed by a natural law and thus 
obliging them to respect each other’s rights.442 It was in this framework, which he believed the 
principle of the balance of power operated. The descriptive balance of power was referred to, 
more as a system or mechanism than a policy, created by the treaties, which had ended the War 
of The Spanish Succession (1701 - 1714); sometimes it was even referred to as the ‘System of 
Utrecht’. It was the idea that despite the complexity of interactions, there was a direct 
relationship between the set of structures, which described the international system of states 
and the behaviour of individual states within the system.443
Vattel based the principle of the balance of power on the absolute right, especially of 
smaller states, to combine for the purpose of safeguarding their independence against the threat 
posed by their greater neighbours.444 Thus, he comes very close to argue that a war taken up 
for the sake of the balance of power would be a just war. This of course has to be understood in 
connection with his idea that the states of Europe constituted some sort of Republic, where the 
forming of confederations and alliances would be a just method to make a stand against very 
powerful sovereigns and prevent them from dominating. He claimed that the states of Europe 
‘each independent, but all bound by a common interest -  unite for the maintenance of order
441 Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood: ‘Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Republicanism’, in 
American Journal o f  International Law, vol. 88, no. 2, 1994, pp. 280 -  303, p. 301
442 Knutsen, Torbjom L.: A History o f International Relations Theory (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997), p. 120
443 Sheehan, Michael: The Balance o f Power -  History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 76
444 Anderson, M. S.: ‘Eighteenth-Century Theories of the Balance of Power’ in Ragnild Hatton and M. S.
Anderson (eds.) Studies in Diplomatic History -  Essays in the memory o f  David Bayne Horn (London:
Longman Group, 1970) 183 -  198, p. 190
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and the preservation of liberty. This is what has given rise to the well-known principle of the 
balance of power, by which is meant an arrangement of affairs so that no State shall be in a 
position to have absolute mastery and dominate over the others.’445 Thus, the idea of a balance 
came to be centred on the idea of natural rights and any war, which was said to defend this 
principle, could be morally justified. As such, it followed that lesser goods, such as alliances 
and successive principles, had to be sacrificed for its preservation. The logic behind it was that 
just as an individual had to sacrifice some of his personal wealth and rights for the good of the 
community, so too had states (or sovereigns). This idea is especially promoted by Burke. 
However, unlike Burke, as will be apparent in the next chapter, Vattel does not present the 
‘Republic of Europe’ as a Commonwealth of Europe as Burke does, which was viewed as a 
wholly moral essence founded on the ethical and cultural unity of states, and it is for this 
reason that his conception of the balance of power is mainly descriptive. Invoking the balance 
of power as a just cause in itself is not what Vattel is directly advocating, whereas for Burke, 
this was to be his main justification for intervening in Revolutionary France. As Vattel notes
‘Considerations would be a sure means of preserving the balance of power and thus maintaining the liberty of 
Nations, if all sovereigns were constantly aware of their true interests, and if they regulated their policy according 
to the welfare of the State. But powerful sovereigns succeed only too often in winning for themselves partisans 
and allies who are blindly devoted to their designs. Dazzled by the glitter o f a present advantage, seduced by their 
greed, deceived by unfaithful ministers, how many princes become instruments of a power which will one day 
swallow up either themselves or their successors. The safest plan, therefore, is either to weaken one who upset the 
balance of power, as soon as a favourable opportunity can be found when we can do so with justice [my italics], or 
by the use of all upright means, to prevent him from attainting so formidable a degree of power.’446
The justice of war that Vattel refers to, is, as already explained, nations’ right to assist the 
weaker state against any formidable sovereign and prevent him from too easily oppressing the 
state. Although, the last sentence in the quote above is ambivalent, in that it potentially reads 
that safeguarding of the balance of power itself is ground for just war, Vattel seems to argue 
that by acquiring such a degree of power is an act of more or less aggression. To prevent this 
from happening, Vattel notes that ‘all Nations should be on their guard above all not allow him 
to increase his power by force of arms, and this they are always justified in doing. For if a 
prince wages an unjust war every Nations has the right to assist the oppressed State; and if he 
wages a just war, neutral Nations may interpose to bring about a settlement [....] and [...]
445 Vattel, The Law o f Nations or the Principles o f Natural Law, book III, chap. II, §47, p. 251
446 Ibid., book III, chap. II, §49, p. 251
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prevent it from being subjugated’.447 Thus, the balance of power is never promoted directly as 
a just cause for war but is rather viewed as an important consideration with which to promote a 
stable system of states as the basis for international peace.
Conclusion
What has first and foremost been elucidated in this chapter is the place for humanitarian 
considerations within new conceptual frameworks for international relations which were 
emerging with the theoretical emphasis on the idea of the sovereign state as the main actor in 
international society. Both Wolff, and especially Vattel, who sought to popularise and 
systemise W olffs jurisprudence, brings about the modem era when the state becomes the 
subject of international law. This has clear ramifications on views pertaining to notions of 
humanitarian intervention. Unlike Grotius who still retained the individual as the main subject 
of international law, which then ultimately carries his theory of punishment for crimes against 
the natural law, for Wolff and Vattel the consequences o f conceiving the sovereign state as 
subject of international law and the main actor in international relations is that grounds for 
humanitarian intervention are considered in purely imperfect terms. There is no question in the 
two thinkers that sovereign states have a duty of assistance towards each others, but the 
sovereign integrity of the state comes before considerations of humanitarian assistance and 
duties. Although, Vattel saw to redeem what he viewed to be deficiencies of W olff s theory in 
relation to assisting the oppressed subjects of a tyrant, such intervention was still envisaged in 
terms of a strong principle of state sovereignty. And also, Vattel does not seem to have taken 
the argument beyond general notions of civil war. Burke on the other hand was acutely aware 
of the need to address what he viewed as the problems of the Revolution in France. Although 
he, as we shall see, saw at first to draw on Vattel’s justification of intervention in a civil war, 
he ultimately found this theory wanting and went beyond Vattel in his attempt to make war 
against the French system o f ‘alien’ values and justify a regime change. Such justification was 
grounded in his underlying idea of a Commonwealth of Europe, which had as its moral basis, 
exactly for this reason, a very different conception of customary law than what Vattel was 
expounding.
447 Ibid., book III, chap. II, §49, p. 252
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Chapter 6
Edmund Burke
‘When bad men combine, the good must associate; 
else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice 
in a contemptible struggle’448 
Edmund Burke (1770)
Introduction
One central claim within Burke’s anti-revolutionary political philosophy was that not only was 
it necessary to defeat France militarily, but that it also called for regime change and the 
restitution of the ancient regime. This required a right of intervention in the domestic 
arrangements of another country. Burke based his case not on traditional foundations such as 
the natural law, and its modem derivative natural rights but upon the premises of customary 
law. At the core of Burke’s political thought was a resounding dismissal of the idea of natural 
rights. He used the term Taw of nations’ as the principal component in the laws common to 
Europe -  the similitude of religion, laws and manners to which all European nations were 
bound, and which were not the result of abstract thinking, but emerged in the course of 
historical relations among the family of European nations.
This family, Burke called the Commonwealth of Europe. For him moral pmdence was 
the regulator of social change and the premises for intervention in France was the prescriptive 
framework of the ‘publick law of Europe’ in which all meaning for what he calls the law of 
nature must be sought. What I want to explore first is the notion that Burke thought that 
Europe was a family of nations sharing common sympathies; these nations were bound 
together not so much by natural law, and abstract principles, but instead by customary law. 
This was superior to what Vattel called ‘the voluntary law of nations’ that is, express 
agreements. On a general note, it is clear that through his works Burke is rehearsing arguments 
for intervention whether using Vattel as a main authority to persuade the government into 
action or emphasising a specific balance of power policy that needed to be sought. The 
historian Iain Hampher-Monk voices his concerns in a recent article against scholars who
448 Burke, Edmund: ‘Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents’ (1 7 7 0), in Canavan, Francis (ed.):
Selected Works o f Edmund Burke ( a new imprint of the Payne edition (1875)) vol. 1 (USA: Liberty Fund 
Press, 1999), p. 146
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present Burke’s justification for intervention as deriving from an unchanging theoretical 
position. Correctly, he argues that Burke ‘soft-pedalled any outright championship for 
intervention for strategic reasons’ and although he increasingly relies on Vattel for authority 
the restorationist context of intervention, which Burke sought, it could never be congruent with 
the grounds Vattel offered.449 Hampsher- Monk argues that international law provided Burke 
with no apparent grounds for the kind of ideological campaign he was pursuing and that he in 
the end develops an interventionist argument based on Roman law in conceiving nations not as 
part of international law, but rather domestic law.450
This chapter endeavours firstly to emphasise the important distinction between 
Burke’s justifications for intervention, which frequently, as Hampsher-Monk so aptly 
illustrates, resonates in Burke’s rhetoric and political necessities, and the premises for 
intervention, which he expounds within the tradition of customary law. What Burke was 
stressing was the recognition of the moral claims of the Commonwealth of Europe against 
revolutionary France, which was enforced through norms and customs. The idea that Burke 
positioned was that the spirit to which a law is implemented is important and thus this became 
the crucial element in the customary international law that Burke was articulating. One of the 
main questions I want to examine is what is the moral basis of this Commonwealth? The 
answer is that it has the same basis as any other society: prescription, presumption and 
prejudice as embodied in the common practices of a people, and manifest in its common law. 
Thus, I want to argue that customary law was the informing principle of Burke’s thinking. 
Customary law, then, provides the moral constraints regulating the commonwealth of Europe. 
In basing the ‘law of nations’ on customary law Burke stands, on an important point, in 
contrast to what the international jurist Vattel called ‘the voluntary law of nations’, which was 
effectively positive international law expressing agreements rather than underlying moral 
norms and values. In this sense Burke is shifting the ground of obligation, because his idea of 
obligation is very different from many the natural law thinkers in that it is grounded in 
prescription and as such Burke presents a theory that moves past the impregnability of the 
principle of sovereignty that was presented by Vattel. What I ultimately want to show with 
this is that it is customary law theory that provides Burke with the justification for intervention 
in France, and indeed in any country that upsets the balance of the commonwealth of Europe.
449 Hampsher-Monk, Iain: ‘Edmund Burke’s changing justification for intervention’ in The Historical 
Journal, 48, 1, (2005), pp. 65 -  100, p. 66
450 Ibid., p. 97
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This intervention was, above all, grounded in humanitarian considerations, which was so, 
exactly because of the customs underpinning the Commonwealth of Europe.
Edmund Burke is perhaps one of the most notable critics of revolutionary politics. The 
theoretical and ideological arguments presented in his celebrated work Reflections on the 
French Revolution continue to this day to inform modem conservatives.451 What is interesting 
is that given this legacy, he had, in fact, far from ‘conservative’ views on international 
relations; Burke is instead much more of a radical in relation to intervention. Ultimately, Burke 
adhered to a weak idea of sovereignty because his idea of intervention in France took 
precedence over its absolute liberty and independence in that it was part of a wider moral 
domain -  the Commonwealth of Europe.
The Commonwealth of Europe and International Order -  A Family of Nations
For Burke, international society was state-based452, and these states each had their own 
peculiar prescriptions, prejudices and customs, which subsequently meant that there was no 
fixed pattern of development through which the state had to go.453 The state was not just a 
geographical entity, but in it was incorporated a sense of continuity, which was based on 
prescription, historical social circumstances, and divinity. As Burke asserted, the “Nation is a 
moral essence, not a geographical arrangement, or a denomination of the nomenclator.”454 In 
this way, so too were commonwealths.455 According to Burke, there existed a fundamental 
social, political, and cultural sympathy extending across sovereign borders, which sustained 
order among the members of the European international society.
In his Letters on a Regicide Peace he maintained that Europe is “virtually one great 
state having the same basis of general law, with some diversity of provincial customs and local 
establishments. The nations of Europe have had the very same Christian religion, agreeing in 
the fundamental parts, varying a little in the ceremonies and in the subordinate doctrines.”456 In 
this way Europe was seen as constituting one large state or a society of nations.457 He termed
451 Haddock, Bruce: History o f  Political Thought - 1789 to the present, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005),
p.26
452 Burke also often talk of nations
453 Boucher, David: Political Theories o f  International Relations - from  Thucydides to the present 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 319
454 Burke, Edmund: ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace I, II, III, IV’ (1795 - 1797) in Canavan, Francis (ed.):
Selected Works o f  Edmund Burke, (a new imprint of the Payne edition (1875)) vol. 3 (USA: Liberty 
Fund Press, 1999), ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace V, p. 139
455 Ibid., p. 63
456 Ibid., p. 133
457 Boucher, Political Theories o f  International Relations, p. 320
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this vision of European international society, the Commonwealth of Europe, in which these 
thoughts on diversity and unity came together. Despite an acknowledgement that each state 
possessed its own national character, he believed that this autonomy and diversity was made 
possible precisely because these states also possessed a sense of community and thus, a 
collective commitment to maintaining order.458 At the foundation of this ethically and 
culturally united community was the Christian religion and the state’s attachment to the 
monarchical form of government -  ‘the spirit o f European Monarchy’, which generated a 
solidarist consensus among the states in nurturing and maintaining order.459 Moreover, Burke 
emphasised common customs and legal heritage and just as important, ‘manners’ shared by all 
the peoples in the European Commonwealth. Consequently, Burke, accentuated the cultural 
similitude throughout Europe, comprising these above-mentioned elements, as forming part of 
the long-standing tradition of Christian European civilisation, which the states would dedicate 
themselves in preserving. Here, a significant aspect is that Burke’s definition of 
Commonwealth relied on his differentiation of European civilisation from the outside world,460 
because it was these ancient manners, which distinguished Europe from the non-European 
societies in Asia, the New World, and the Ottoman Empire. This has to be understood in 
conjunction with Burke’s overriding need to reinforce the uniqueness of the European identity.
Burke held that manners where ultimately more important than any laws, because, in a 
great measure, laws depended on manners, not the other way around. As such, in addition to 
the spirit of religion his idea of the ‘spirit of a gentleman’, associated with the prescriptive and 
presumptive manners and sentiments, deriving ultimately from ancient chivalry, became 
imperative to the maintenance of order among European states.461 In this way, Burke conceded 
that, more than anything else, it was the deep bond of affection between the European states, 
which arose from their similitude
‘Men are not tied together to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by 
conformities, by sympathies. [...] Nothing is too strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as 
correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in 
themselves. They are obligations written in the heart. [...] The secret, but irrefragable bond of habitual
458 Fidler, David P. and Welsh, Jennifer M. (ed.): Empire and Community -  Edmund Burke’s writings and 
speeches on international relations (USA: Westview Press, 1999) p. 48 - 49
459 Welsh, Jennifer M.: Edmund Burke and International Relations -  the Commonwealth o f  Europe and 
the Crusade against the French Revolution (London: Macmillian Press, 1995), p. 70
460 Ibid., p. 70
461 Boucher, Political Theories o f  International Relations, p. 320
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intercourse, holds them [men] together, even when their perverse and litigious nature sets them to equivocate, 
scuffle, and fight about the terms o f their written obligations.’462
The ties and obligations were therefore stronger than any treaty, and although these common 
sympathies and shared sentiments were not sufficient enough to prevent war, they did produce 
certain equanimity, which helped to curtail the animosity between nations.463 As Burke 
asserted, it was due to this similitude that ‘peace is more of peace, and war is less of war.’464
Importantly, therefore, what held Europe together was, for Burke, not so much the 
more procedural aspects of international relations, such as diplomacy and international law, but 
rather the ‘substantive horizontal links of culture.’465 It was the political and social 
considerations, which accentuated the underlying homogeneity of Burke’s European 
Commonwealth, and in this way his international society presupposed a common culture. For 
him, European international order was premised on conformity with the standards of European 
civilisation,466 which fits in with Burke’s acknowledgement of diversity in religious, social and 
political matters within the European Commonwealth. However, there was always a limit to 
Burke’s homogeneity: In rejecting doctrinal uniformity Burke strived more for international 
order than international perfection. ‘We are not to look’ Burke contended, ‘for perfection in 
anything that we are capable of understanding. All human relations are intermixed with evil 
and error, and all that is in our power, is to adopt those which are the clearest from both.’467
There is a conservative limit to his idea of ‘similitude’. In Remarks on the Policy o f 
the Allies (1793) Burke shows a scepticism towards the more radical doctrines of ideological 
homogeneity or as he termed it here ‘the tiresome uniformity of fixed principle’469, by 
accepting certain diversity among the European states as part of maintaining international 
order. Thus, his ‘unity in diversity’ is much less ambitious, because he denied the fixed 
ideological principles of the Revolutionaries; retained a Realist aversion to progressive 
philosophy; and denied that European solidarity can do away with war; but at the same time he
462 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace, I’, p. 132
46j Boucher, Political Theories o f International Relations, p. 320
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466 Ibid., p. 80-81
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believed that the underlying homogeneity of his European Commonwealth would eventually 
prevent any irreversible schisms provoked by various commercial and dynastic disputes.
This relates intimately to what I would want to argue, as will become apparent below, 
Burke’s idea of the law of nations applies distinctively to the Commonwealth of Europe and 
that Burke envisaged his ‘publick law of Europe’ an intricate part of this commonwealth. It is 
the idea of ‘similitude’ that Burke is pronouncing as binding the nations of Europe together 
that becomes interesting and how it corresponds to Burke’s conception of the law of nations. I 
want to argue that Burke’s idea of the law of nations applies distinctively to the 
Commonwealth of Europe, where this underlying ‘similitude’ expresses Burke’s customary 
law tradition. And it is this customary law tradition that gives us the humanitarian urge in 
Burke and underlying justification for intervention in France. The next to explore then is 
Burke’s idea of customary law.
Burke and customary law
It is evident that for Burke the ‘publick law of Europe’ was derived from common practices of 
the European states as ‘ancient conventions’ and was constituted as customary law. As he 
stated, it had a ‘kind of connexion in virtue of ancient relations.’470 The constitutional law of 
individual states was related to the European law of nations as shown above. According to 
Burke ‘constitutions furnish the civil means of getting at the natural.’471 Burke followed in the 
tradition of William Blackstone (1723 - 1780) who held that the common law of England 
regarding life, liberty, and property was inevitably more binding than any statute of king or 
parliament. Burke was adamant in stating
‘We entertain a high opinion of the legislative authority; but we never dreamt that parliaments had any right 
whatever to violate property, to overrule prescription, or to force a currency of their own fiction in place of that 
which is real, and recognized by the law of nations.’472
Common law theory had arisen in response to law-making mostly guided by the exercise of 
centralised power in the arbitrary assessment of the demands of justice, expedience and the 
common good. It reasserted the medieval idea that law was not something made by the king,
470 Burke, ‘Letter of a Regicide Peace IIP, p. 248
471 Cited in Canavan, Francis J . : ‘Prescription of Government’ in Daniel Ritchie ed., Edmund Burke:
Appraisals and Applications (Transactions Publishers, 1990), pp. 251 -2 7 4 , p. 259
472 Cited in Stanlis, Peter J.: ‘Burke and the Law of Nations’, in The American Journal o f  International 
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parliaments or judges, but was rather the idiom of a deeper social reality. Thus, it was given a 
distinctive historical force not embedded in universal rational principles but rather in national 
custom. As such, customary law is common and immemorial and handed down through 
generations by use and experience. In the fact that it is used and relied upon therein lies its 
authority. This is an important point to make because in its practice, public participation and 
acceptance lies also its validity. Thus, in this sense, the ‘goodness’ of customary law refers to 
its validity, legality and authoritative status as well as the wisdom, justice and the 
reasonableness of the custom.473
The English common law writer Edward Coke (1552 - 1634) in the early 17th century 
contended that common law was nothing but reason; the common law values were not 
themselves validated by reason, but were a product of the process of reasoning. This, therefore, 
rested on a shared sense of reasonableness. Being shared also meant that it is mutually 
recognised, which is essential in giving it validity and authority.474 Also, the historical 
appropriateness and expression of common law makes it continuous and dynamic and it was 
therefore to be located within the ‘living body of law’ in the context of historical development. 
In this way, common law is already an existing prescriptive order, being a distinctive 
expression of common life. From this contention, the common law provides the framework, 
which makes liberty possible and in this comprehensive sense rests the consent of the 
people.475 It was generally regarded as having a foundational status, and consequently, in the 
case of Burke, it served a direct purpose in his attempt to provide justification for intervention 
in France, and also and more importantly provided him with the logical premises for such an 
act. The sort of argument I want to emphasise is that Burke regarded customary law holding a 
foundational status for the commonwealth of Europe. This corresponds well with Blackstone’s 
assertion that common law decisions confirmed, affirmed and maintained social unity but, 
however, it did not create it 476 Thus, what becomes an imperative idea here, especially in 
relation to Burke is, as the 17th century jurist Matthew Hale (1609 - 1676) stressed, that the 
question of the origins of customs is not the legitimating matter; what mattered was continuous 
and present usage, acceptance and practice of the rules.477 Common law, more than anything
473 Postema, Gerald J.: Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 3 - 
7
474 Ibid., p. 8-9
475 Ibid., p. 13-16
476 Ibid., p. 19
477 Ibid., p. 21 -22
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else, is grounded as an important form of social solidarity,478 and Burke particularly appealed 
to this spirit of social solidarity tradition in his reaction against the French Revolution.
In the traditions of common law theory, Burke regarded the constitution, and the 
relation of power defined by it, as ancient custom by arguing, ‘our constitution is a prescriptive 
constitution [...] it is a constitution whose sole authority is, that it has existed time out of mind 
[....] Prescription is the most solid of all titles, not only to property, but, which is to secure that 
property, to government.’479 Burke used prescription, first and foremost in a juridical sense, but 
also, importantly, in a moral sense. Therefore, in civil as in moral law, possession held over a 
long period of time was a sufficient reason for legitimate ownership; to the possessor of real 
property as well as to the possessor of political authority. And it was through presumption that 
people obeyed this authority.480 Again, in his campaign against the revolution Burke contended 
in the fortitude of common law
‘The right of denunciation does not hold, when things [the French Revolution] continue, however inconveniently 
to the neighbourhood, according to the ancient mode. There is a sort o f presumption against novelty, drawn out of 
a deep consideration of human nature and human affairs [....].,48‘
The idea of ‘human nature’ and ‘human affairs’ here was imperative for Burke’s premises to 
intervene in France because it pronounced the unnaturalness of the revolutionary dogma. 
Burke’s notion of ‘humanity’ clearly involved that people’s mutual exchanges were to be 
regulated by just precepts law; human beings for Burke were made for communities and as 
such the authoritative task of the common law is to ensure the corporate pursuit of common 
goods and goals. What resonates in Burke’s thought was the idea that custom was the primary 
source of law. The authority to order according to the common good rested with the whole 
people and expressed the common reason of the community.482 What is interesting here is that 
for Burke this common reason is the objective rational normative order embedded in the 
customs and rules of the society. This is for instance in direct opposition to Hobbes who 
argued that customs and precedents had no particular authority, unless they were so termed by 
the sovereign. As such, unwritten law (customs) can only have authoritative status in so far as
478 Ibid., p. 23
479 Burke, ‘Speech on Reform of Representation in the House of Commons’, June 1784
480 Boucher, Political Theories o f International Relations, p. 318
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it is validated by natural reason — the natural reason of the sovereign.483 This stands in sharp 
contrast with Coke’s distinction between the ordinary faculty of reason, ‘natural reason’ and 
the special reason of law or rather reason within law, which he termed ‘artificial reason’. It is 
not a result o f philosophical manifestation, but rather the accumulations and refinements of 
experience. This concept of law is essentially Burkean and it becomes clear that the 
foundations of his thoughts were laid in the common law theory of the late 16th century; in the 
definition of common law being in opposition to written law.484 Thus, Burke’s perennial appeal 
to ‘the wisdom of the ages’ was conceptually an articulation of the idea of ‘artificial reason’. 
When Burke contends that the law of nations have been established by consent, it is exactly 
this ancient consent embodied within the law as ‘artificial reason’ that he is expounding. It was 
in ‘our hearts’ that the words and spirit of immemorial law laid 485 This is important to 
emphasise because it is exactly this institutionalised presumptive law that Burke is appealing to 
against the revolutionaries. Thus, he reasoned that the constitution and therefore the law of 
nations had no original principles; it was immemorial and prescriptive, and it was the ancient 
usage that necessarily legitimated the present state of affairs. Burke was using the title of the 
authority of antiquity, in exploiting the concept of the immemorial; however, it was the
j O /
modem that he was presenting as immemorial, not the antique.
‘To ask whether a thing which has always been the same stands to its usual principle seems to me to be perfectly 
absurd; for how do you know the principles but from the construction? And if it remains the same, the principle 
remains the same.’487
Burke then, appealed to the ancient customs and rules of the Commonwealth of Europe, which 
was itself legitimised by these customs upholding it. Burke’s whole philosophy is a recovery of 
the concept of the customary law tradition, which fits well in with his general doctrine of
483 Ibid., p. 47 - 48
484 Pocock, J. G. A.: The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law -  A study o f  English Historical 
thought in the seventeenth century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 35 - 36
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Works o f Edmund Burke -  a new imprint o f  the Payne edition (1875) vol. 2 (USA: Liberty Fund Press, 
1999) p. 107
486 Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, p. 80
487 Cites in ibid., p. 380
174
4S8tradition. Although the European states in the commonwealth had certain diversity in 
customs and establishments their polity and economy was derived from the same source:
‘It was drawn from the old Germanic or Gothic customary; from the feudal institutions which must be considered 
as an emanation from that customary; and the whole has been improved and digested into a system and discipline 
by the Roman law.’489
To summarise: What was important to emphasise for Burke is that the moral basis of 
the Commonwealth of Europe has the same basis as any other society; prescription, 
presumption and prejudice as embodied in the common practices of a people, and manifest in 
its common law. In this sense, for Burke, any traditional conception of a law of nations would 
be inadequate to effectively regulate the relationships of the nations of such a commonwealth, 
and Burke clearly recognises this. Thus, what Burke is proposing is a very specific conception 
of the law of nations based on international customary law. It is customary law, then, that 
provides the moral constraints regulating the commonwealth of Europe. Thus, what I have 
attempted to show so far is the importance of emphasising Burke’s idea of customary law as 
the main underlying principle for understanding Burke’s international relations theory. With 
this in mind, this leaves us to explore his conception of the law of nations, and how it gives 
Burke the necessary justification for intervention in France. Given the customary law aspects 
in Burke’s thought, grounded by his essential ideas of similitude and prescription as 
underpinning the European society of states, it may already be apparent that it, for this exact 
reason, differed fundamentally from Vattel’s conception of the law of nations.
The law of nations in Burke
As has already been shown, Burke’s conception of the law of nations was very different from 
some of the previous thinkers explored here exactly because of his underlying belief in the 
Commonwealth of Europe and thus its underlying law of customs. Thus, although, he drew on 
Vattel for authority on this point, he in fact presented a very different conception of the law of 
nations and how it was to be applied from the Swiss jurist. Rather, what informed Burke’s 
notion of the law of nations was not the abstract principle of natural law, but rather customs 
and manners.
488 Ibid., p. 243
489 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace F, p. 133
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As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, Vattel had argued that the law of nations 
was an application of the natural law to the moral person of the state in its mutual relations 
with other states, and he categorised the law of nations into a the necessary and voluntary. He 
wished to make a clear distinction between practices that were good and obligatory in 
themselves and practices tolerated out o f mere necessity. The voluntary law of nations had to 
observe the necessary law of nations in that the obligatory precept of it is contributory, in the 
mutual relations of nations, to the common good. The voluntary law of nations was effectively 
positive international law. For Vattel, our natural interdependence is consistent with 
agreements to establish communities or nations and this society of nations, thus, requires 
mutual assistance.490 As such the natural law was perceived as a continuous arbitrator between 
international and constitutional law. It was the normative moral code, to which all nations and 
individuals alike should adhere, but in international law, in the external legal and political 
relations between nations, this moral law was termed the law of nations. As we have seen, it 
was the idea that beyond the constitutional national laws nations, in safeguarding their moral 
right to independent existence, a law should apply in these relations.491
Before we go on exploring Burke’s particular conception of the law of nations, which 
was clearly conceived very differently from Vattel it is important to have a closer look at 
Burke’s theoretical standing with the natural law tradition. On an important note and although 
contested (by Peter Stanlis in particular), it in fact remains doubtful whether it is proper to 
place Burke in the natural law tradition, despite his appeal to it. Peter Stanlis argues, ‘The law 
of nations was for Burke the first qualification of the natural law, in the process of applying its 
eternal and universal moral imperatives to concrete, practical political affairs of men and 
nations.’ 492 God and religion in Burke’s writings seem on a whole to divide his interpreters.
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However, while Burke maintains that God is the source of all authority, this idea in his 
writings is ambiguous. Christianity in Burke is highly instrumental and serves more than 
anything else to be politically and socially useful, rather than appealing to some abstract truth. 
David Boucher astutely contends that Burke uses natural law for political ends; for instance, in 
the case of the impeachment of Warren Hastings (1732 - 1818) the prescriptive authority of the 
British Constitution was ‘reinforced [by Burke] with the rhetorical weight of Natural Law.’493 
Frank O’Gorman notes ‘that it is strange that a conception [natural law] which Burke alludes to 
only on a few occasions should be credited with such significance.’494 Indeed, on those 
occasions he invokes natural law, as for example in his speeches on the impeachment of 
Warren Hastings, he does so for the purpose o f driving home very specific political points, 
such as not even the universal law of God upholds the exercise of the sort of arbitraty power 
that Hastings exercised. Another scholar, Stephen K. White, argues that the interpretation of 
Burke as essentially a proponent of the classical and scholastic moral natural law is ultimately 
unsatisfying. Also, a further reason to desist from placing Burke in this tradition is that it is 
usually understood that within the natural law tradition, God is conceived as stable and 
unchanging in His relation to the world. As already alluded to, although far beyond the scope 
of this study to develop this with more care, in his philosophy, certainly for Burke God ordains 
the moral order he seeks to uphold. This is what he calls ‘the Great Chain of Being’. However, 
there is a sense in which this moral order cannot be taken in any absolute way. Providence, that 
is, for Burke, God’s relationship with the world, is uncertain. Humans do not follow a 
knowable script; rather our lives unfold according to the unexplained will of its divine
495instructor.
Natural law in Burke is, then, not the perpetual arbitrator in international relations in 
the profound way that Stanlis argues. As we have seen, Grotius contended that there were two 
ways of coming to know the natural law; by exercising right reason, a priori, and by the a 
posteriori method; the idea that the common good believed by all civilized nations must be
by no means a monolithic ‘unchanging corpus of moral wisdom’ (p. 36), and in such cases the historian 
must discriminate between the several schools of natural law. Most scholars that place Burke in this 
tradition of thought do so indiscriminately. Thus, statements which attempt to relate Burke to a single 
natural law tradition needs careful qualifications.
493 Boucher, Political Theories o f  International Relations, p. 315
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derived from the same source, which is God. The occasional appeals that Burke makes to the 
natural law are of this second order.496 This idea can be better pronounced in relation to the 
presumed antithesis to abstract speculative thought, which Burke held to be moral (political) 
prudence, referring to it as the ‘first o f virtues’ and ‘the God of this lower world.’ This idea, 
then, of moral prudence, is more of a natural arbitrator in international relations, than abstract 
principles of natural law. This way of looking at Burke’s relationship to the natural law is 
hardly the profound foundational natural law basis that some of his interpreters seek to place 
him on. As will become evident later, Burke relied on customs as a basis for international law, 
which clearly shows the workings of this idea of moral prudence in his political thought. 
Evidently, Burke followed Vattel (and Grotius) in pursuing symmetry between the individual 
and the nation, rather than the conceptions of the law that applied to and regulated them. The 
intercourse between nations, Burke asserted, were considered to rely too much on the 
instrumental part and claimed, ‘it is with nations as with individuals’. 497 As indicated, he 
expounded a common nature in man, which was substantially adapted by history, religion, 
manners, habits, institutions and customs. Unlike Grotius and Vattel’s use of the individual as 
an abstract analogy to an equally abstract conception of the state, Burke’s emphasis on the idea 
of the civil social man is important. The question of to what extent is there a universal nature, 
and in what it consists, is in Burke determined by his particular view of the civil social man in 
the Commonwealth of Europe and by the inherent similitude and manners they share.
He thus seems to suggest that we owe much more to the cultural inheritance that we 
share, and it is this notion that more than anything else establishes the mutual bond that exists 
between the individuals and nations. As he considered nations as moral essences and not 
merely geographical arrangements, the historical diversity of nations became a crucial moral 
fact, which emphasised Burke’s idea of ‘unity in diversity’ and the importance of appealing to 
prescribed international law, like the balance of power, to uphold the moral order of the 
commonwealth of Europe. The law of nations was not a mere pretence of treaties and 
conventions; the law was made for ‘great kingdoms; for the religion, the morals, the laws, the 
liberties, the lives and fortunes of millions of human creatures.’498 In Burke’s view, it was in 
common jurisprudence that the elements and principles of the law of nations were contained;
496 Boucher, Political Theories o f  International Relations, p. 316 -317
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this he asserted as ‘the great ligament of mankind.’499 On logical premises, therefore, he 
contended that international law was derived from constitutional law
‘It has ever been the method o f publick jurists, to draw a great part o f analogies on which they form the law of 
nations from the principles of law which prevail in civil community. Civil laws are not all merely positive. Those 
which are rather conclusions of legal reason, than matters o f statutable provision, belong to universal equity and 
are universally applicable.’500
This particular quote is often used to suggest that Burke’s ideas falls nicely within the natural 
law tradition. However, as I have sought to explain, this is not the case. First of all, this is an 
example of when a thinker is cited out of context -  this was also the case with Grotius and his 
‘impious hypothesis’ quote. What Burke wants to emphasise is that ‘distance of places does 
not extinguish the duties or the rights of men’501, and that something more than merely treaties 
and conventions underlies the law of nations. In this instance he appeals to previous public 
jurists whose method has been ‘to draw a great part of the analogies on which they form the 
law of nations from principles of law which prevail in civil community.’ However, this does 
not mean that his political philosophy is a recovery of these public jurists’ natural law, or that 
he subscribes to it. Rather, this example is used as a rhetorical devise; the Burkean method of 
appealing to previous juridical authority to support his case. When Burke talks of ‘legal 
reason’ here it is the idea of ‘artificial reason’ he is referring to. This reason is, as explained, 
not a result of philosophical manifestation, but instead the accumulations and refinements of 
experience. This analogy between civil laws and the law of nations, as will become clear, was 
vital for Burke’s premises of intervention in France, for as he argued, ‘[t]he right of man to act 
anywhere according to their pleasure, without moral tie, no such right exist. Men are never in a 
total state of independence from each other. It is not the condition of our nature [....]. The 
situations in which men relatively stand produce the rules and principles of that responsibility, 
and afford directions to produce in exacting it.’503 Thus, Burke argued that the French 
Revolution had no precedent in the prescriptions of constitutional law or therefore in the law of 
nations. In this way he asserted, ‘[w]hat in civil society is a ground of action, in political
499 Ibid., p. 124
500 Ibid., p. 135
501 Ibid., p. 135
502 Ibid., p. 135
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society is a ground of war.’504 The exercise of such jurisdiction was for Burke a matter of 
moral prudence. The law of nations in his writings was an incorporated part of what he termed 
‘the law of civil vicinity’, which corresponds to his idea of a wider moral international social 
context -  the Commonwealth of Europe. The proximity and habitual association of states 
subsequently meant certain rights and responsibilities. In civil law this was the law of 
neighbourhood, which was the right of a neighbour to protest and present his case to a judge 
when he ‘sees a new erection, in the nature o f nuisance, set up at his door’.505 Burke, thus 
applied this precepts of civil law to the relations among states
‘Now where there is no constituted judge, as between independent states there is not, the vicinage itself is the 
natural judge. It is, preventively, the assertor o f its own rights; or remedially, their avenger. Neighbours are 
presumed to take cognisance of each other’s acts. [....] This principle, which, like the rest, is as true o f nations as 
of individual men, has bestowed on the grand vicinage o f Europe a duty to know, and a right to prevent, any 
capital innovation which may amount to the erection o f a dangerous nuisance.’506
Intervention
Burke’s idea of the law of vicinity resonates in the fact that he could not conceive of state 
sovereignty as an absolute value as the guiding principle of order.507 This, as we have seen, 
stands in a somewhat contradiction to Wolff and Vattel, who exactly saw the principle of 
sovereignty as the guiding principle of law and order for international relations. As such, 
importantly for Burke then, the notion of reciprocal non-intervention could be overridden. For 
Burke, this ‘false principle’ clearly went against historical precedent, custom and thus the law 
of nations itself.508 As he stated ‘the rule of law, therefore, which comes before the evil, is 
amongst the very best part of equity, and justifies the promptness of the remedy [...] as it is 
well observed.’509
Although Burke writes only occasionally about the rules of war, it is unmistakably a 
principle which concerns him as a formulated principle embedded in the law of nations. During 
the so-called St. Eustatius affair in 1781, where Burke advocated against Britain’s, what he 
believed to be, unlawful seizure of private property in the Dutch island. This policy of
504 Ibid., p. 136
505 Ibid., p. 133
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confiscation, Burke contended was an ‘unprincipled violation of the law of nations’510 and he 
continued to avow that rules of war and conquest among civilized nations rests on these 
principles of law. Individuals as well as nations, as corporate bodies, were entitled to justice 
when caught up in war. As Burke emphasises, ‘[i]t was a first principle in the law of nations, as 
laid down by every writer, that to expound the rights o f war, we must conceive each party to 
have justice on its side [...].,5n In this, Burke followed Vattel. In presupposing that states were 
individuals in a state of nature they retained a natural equality. Vattel had emphasised that a 
nation retained a clause of non-interference on the part of other states into its internal affairs. 
However, he had argued that there was justification for intervention on one side of an 
‘irrevocably broken’ social union, which was the extreme case o f civil war, and only on the 
side of justice.512 It became one of Burke’s forensic justifications for intervention in France to 
convince the British administration that in the case o f a divided kingdom (i.e. France) by the 
law of nations, Britain had the right to intervene and was ‘free to take any part she pleases.’513 
However, nowhere did Vattel concede that parties could intervene according to their interests 
and invariably not in the way that Burke asserted. As already described, for Vattel other states 
can intervene, but armed conflict must already exist and a third party can intervene only on the 
side of justice. Thus, the use of Vattel as an authority in this particular instance serves to 
illustrate Hampsher-Monk’s point that Vattel could not provide Burke with the justification he 
needed for intervention in France. What Burke, as has been emphasised really needed was 
grounds for intervention on the basis of a regime change. But as we have seen, given Vattel’s 
strong adherence to the principle of sovereignty, which, as was argued, was also at the basis of 
his civil war theory, each party in a civil war has sovereignty under the law of nations, 
therefore, no one can judge the internal affairs of a state even if they are two competing parties 
in a civil war.
In summary as should already be clear, written authorities for Burke were the least 
binding evidence of the law of nations. As he says ‘This is a principle inspired by the Divine 
author of all Good; it is felt in the heart; it is recognized by reason; it is established by consent
510 Cited in Stanlis, ‘Burke and the Law of Nations’, p. 402
511 Cited ibid., p. 404
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[....] By conventions o f parties, this law o f nations was established and confirmed.’514 The 
‘consent’ that Burke is talking about, as we have seen, is in the tradition of customary practice 
and therefore in a Burkean sense much more fundamental and morally obligatory than the 
principles of the law of nations that Vattel was expounding. What Burke was referring to, was 
not the arbitrary law of nations, rather the opposite: for him, tacit consent implied subscription 
to common practices and long usage, that is, customary law. What binds the European nations 
was not so much the natural law and abstract principles, but rather customary law. Thus it is 
evident that Burke presents a very different law of nations and that on a foundational level it 
was superior to what Vattel called ‘the voluntary law o f nations’, that is, express agreements, 
in terms of regulating the relationship between states. Thus, it was Burke’s notion of 
customary law as basis for the law of nations that gave him the justification he needed for 
intervention in France. Before I explore how and to what extent he justified intervention in 
France, two other generally contested principles of international political thought need to be 
elucidated within Burke’s thought. They are his conceptions of reason of state and the balance 
of power, both of which serve to illustrate the conditions under which intervention in France 
could be justified.
Burke: the reason of state and the balance of power
In the case against Warren Hastings Burke argued that the exertion of arbitrary power, whether 
it be government or the individual was acting against justice and authority and thus substituting 
will for law.515 For Burke, all power ‘is limited by law, and ought to be guided by discretion 
and not by arbitrary will.’516 Burke contended that the true grounds of a policy could justify 
any necessary concealment by reference to the reason of state; however it could never justify 
that the rule of law was subverted by arbitrary will. Burke was sure to emphasise that ‘reason 
and state and common-sense are two things’, otherwise it would not appear to be an absolute 
necessity that had the British government pressing on with the peace negotiations with 
France.517 In the classical formulation of the reason of state political expediency should 
displace moral law and if so formulated, Burke would, as indicated, have been a strong
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contender against such a doctrine.518 Although Burke argues, throughout his career for a 
conception of the reason o f state in several different contexts, it is clear, however, that his 
conception conforms to a wider idea o f customary law.
David Armitage argues that it may seem a categorical error to identify Burke within a 
doctrine famously identified with Machiavelli. But he contends this Machiavellian schism 
between morality and politics is closed in Burke when one considers him as the heir to modem 
natural law tradition, revived by Grotius who followed the Stoics’ foundational principle of 
self-preservation. They, particually Cicero, determined the limits of self-preservation as a 
practical principle by strictly limited appeals in these cases to necessity in the interest of the 
common good.519 Ciceronian ‘necessity’ was very different from Machiavellian expediency. It 
depended on the criteria deployed and the circumstances in which it was invoked. Thus, the 
assertion that the consequentialism of a state’s self-preservation and natural jurisprudence are 
opposed at a deep level is therefore not necessarily tme. The idea that necessity has no law 
meant that reason of state could not be codified or legislated. Consequentially, circumstances 
that were cases of extreme necessity could not be determined and so, neither could occurrences 
where it could be permitted to override custom and law. Only the norms of which such 
exceptions applied could be laid down. As Burke pointed out, to act in the same manner in all 
cases would be to turn necessity into law. Matters of prudence, he argued, ‘are under the 
dominion of circumstances, and not of logical analogies. It [would be] absurd to take it 
otherwise.’ Gentili, for instance, argued that there was a dialectic distinction between the 
idea of state interests and general objective. By his general objective he was expounding more 
precisely an interest of the common rights of mankind, which in this way was not limited to 
natural rights. As such, he distinguished between state interests and objective humanitarian 
causes. For instance, in commenting on the war waged by the Athenians against the 
Lacedaemonians he asserted ‘ [t]his is an honourable cause for war and one which is based 
upon the common sentiments of humanity.’
The idea that necessity had no law, made the reason of state, in a moral sense, highly 
ambivalent. Legitimately contained within the doctrine was a natural necessity, which hence
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was justifiable and a mere reputed one, which were not.522 The Marquis of Halifax argued in 
1684
‘There is a natural reason o f State, an undefinable thing grounded upon the Common good of mankind, which is 
immortall, and in all changes and Revolutions still preserveth its Originall right o f saving a Nation, when the 
Letter of the law perhaps would destroy it.’523
Burke asserted these same concerns regarding the reason of state doctrine by stating that 
‘[njecessity, as it has no law, so it has no shame; but moral necessity is not like metaphysical, 
or even physical. In that category, it is a word of loose signification, and conveys different 
ideas to different minds.’524 In this sense, necessity was only justifiable if it benefited the 
whole community and therefore ultimately had the purpose of preserving society itself. Burke 
argued against Richard Price that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 had been ‘an act of 
necessity, in the strictest moral sense in which necessity can be taken’ and as such could not be 
held as constitutional precedence. This reason of state in the Grotian tradition of self- 
preservation did provide Burke with the justification that the French Revolution presented the 
same imminent danger as the case of the Glorious Revolution and that it therefore fulfilled the 
conditions of ‘necessity’, and that this for that reason warranted intervention. As Armitage 
contends ‘1789 was indefensible for just the same reasons that 1688 had been justifiable.’
He argues that Burke could then present his case that the French Revolution was exceptionally 
threatening because it endangered the states of Europe’s natural reason of state, which were 
their true interests.
However, are these the premises that Burke uses in his justification for intervention in 
France? Burke was very adamant in saying that the war against France was both ‘just and 
necessary.’527 What seems to be the case is that in this instance Armitage grounds his 
arguments on the historical and theoretical misapprehension brought to the fore by Hampshire- 
Monk. For although Burke had referred to Vattel’s just war theory, that the aggrandisement of 
a neighbouring power would be sufficient reason for just war, this sort of reason of state 
argument did not, as has already been demonstrated, provide Burke with the sort of
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justification he needed; an internal regime change in France. The idea that the common 
interests of states codified in international common law translates into natural reason of state 
seems to construe the doctrine o f reason of state into customary law. As we shall see, it was 
more the norms of such contended exceptions of ‘moral necessity’ that Burke expounded in 
conjunction with his reverence for international customary law. Integral to international 
customary law was, for Burke, the balance of power, which to a high degree provided the 
justification for manoeuvres in international relations in terms o f ‘moral necessity’.
As with the concept of the reason of the state, Burke’s conception of the balance of 
power was inevitablely differently conceived from more traditionally conceived ideas of 
balance o f power precisely because Burke viewed it in terms o f customary law -  that is it had a 
moral purpose to regulate and maintain the Commonwealth o f Europe. Far from viewing it in 
terms of ‘power politics’, or in realist or Hobbesian way, Burke emphasised a balance of power 
that was historically constituted and emerged in response to the need for certain constraints in 
the state system. It was for Burke one of the key foundations of a European state society and 
was imperative in regulating and maintaining the order o f this system. Because it was 
grounded in the very complex vision of the European commonwealth it was much more 
complexly conceived than that of his contemporaries; it presupposed, not only a composite 
functional balance of power policy, but also gave it a predetermined purpose towards 
maintaining this Commonwealth of Europe. Thus, Burke’s conception of the balance of power 
in fact reflected not only an international order, but also a moral order, and as such could not 
be purely descriptive, in contrast with what Vattel envisaged, and morally neutral, but was 
instead prescriptive and normative.
Burke clearly illustrated this by his direct statement that this new Revolutionary Empire 
could not be supported in any balance, nor could it be expected to be subject to the ‘publick 
law of Europe.’ As he noted, ‘[ejxploding, therefore, all sorts of balances, they avow their 
design to erect themselves into a new description of empire, which is not grounded on any 
balance, but forms a sort of impious hierarchy, of which France is to be the head and the 
guardian.’ 528As with his conception of the reason of state, Burke’s conception of the balance 
of power was related to the principle of non-intervention hierarchically so it could be justified 
as part of international law and thus allow for intervention in Revolutionary France, on military 
as well as ideological and moral grounds. And it was exactly because of such considerations
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that Burke positioned the idea of the balance of power at the heart of his justificatory 
arguments for intervention in the internal arrangements in France. Burke had to discursively 
emphasise a conception of the balance o f power as contributor to, not only peace in the 
international society, but also maintainer o f the moral order of the international system itself, 
which was part of his idea of the Commonwealth of Europe.
Burke presupposed that all countries accepted the balance of power. According to him 
it ‘had been ever assumed as the known common law o f Europe at all times, and by all 
powers’.529 His idea of the balance of power, was delicate and multiple.530 Burke even claimed 
that in the complex systems of the balance o f power, Britain was entrusted with the balance as 
it ‘was the power to whose custody it was thought it might be most safely committed.’531 
France, on the other hand, ‘as she happened to stand, secured the balance or endangered it.’532 
Indeed, Burke described her as the ‘author of the Treaty o f Westphalia.’ Therefore, it was 
always in the interests of Britain to ensure that French power ‘should be kept within the 
bounds of moderation.’534 For Burke, the regulation o f power in the international system was 
achieved by carefully controlling, directing and balancing it, so that its function became one of 
order and not disorder. He was very clear that it was owing to this system that ‘this small part 
of the western world [had] acquired so astonishing (and otherwise unaccountable) a superiority 
over the rest of the globe’; it was precisely in want of this balance of power system and policy 
that other civilisations had perished.535 Hence, it was a vigilant maintenance of the balance of 
power to which Europe owed its pre-eminence.
‘The same principle that make it incumbent upon the patriotic member o f a republic to watch with the strictest 
attention the motions and designs of his fellow citizens, should equally operate upon the different states in such a 
community as Europe, who are also the great members of a larger commonwealth.,5j7
The balance of power was for Burke the main stabilising institution in European politics; 
managed prudently it would preserve interstate order and international peace. He saw this
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management as being facilitated by several factors: firstly by international law, which he, as 
we have seen, called the ‘great ligament of mankind’ and secondly by various communal 
values. These were the ‘similitudes’ that the European nations shared. As suggested, these 
formed the basis of the European states’ underlying sense of unity, and by that they provided a 
collective commitment (and interest) to maintaining order.538 Thus, in Burke’s mind it was a 
regulatory mechanism that operated within the European international system, justifying both 
war and armed intervention in the internal governance of states, when such states constituted a 
general threat to the European Commonwealth. It was precisely these elements that for Burke 
constituted the balance of power as the common law o f Europe.539
As the balance of power constitutes a vigilant commitment by states in defence of 
Europe, he claimed that such cases of intervention ‘fill half the pages of history.’540 Several 
treaties ‘affirm the principle of interference’ as he calls it, which, alongside the principle of the 
balance of power comprised the public law of Europe. Thus, for instance, Burke argued that it 
is to well-timed and prudent policy and interference that Britain owes its laws and liberties, 
and indeed King George.541 Burke believed that international law allowed for intervention, 
both as a means of self-defence and against hostile intention. But importantly and rather
unconventionally, in justifying preventive intervention he included not only military-, but also
political and social threats.542 Thus, a threat does not necessarily come in the form of military 
aggression, but can also be in the form of maxims and doctrines, the kind that Burke found 
particularly destructive. In this way, a prudent balance of power policy accounts for both actual 
aggression from an aspiring hegemon, as well as an imminent threat, which exist in ‘pernicious 
maxims.’ 543 In such confrontations it is not only members of the international society who 
have the duty to respond, but it is also their right. Burke willingly goes much further than 
Vattel in emphasising that in situations such as this, the nations of Europe have a ‘perfect’ 
obligation to maintain the Commonwealth of Europe. To respond in the interest of preserving 
the European balance was for Burke, ‘so much the interest and duty of every nation.’544 
Although Burke recognises that there is a principle of non-intervention in international law, he
538 L. Knutsen, Torbjom L.: A history o f  International Relations theory (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, second edition: 1997), p. 160
539 Boucher, Political Theories o f International Relations, p. 320 - 321
540 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace, III’, Works, iv p. 222
541 Cited in Welsh, Burke and International Relations, p. 127. For Burke, the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 is an example of this
542 Here, he extended Vattel’s legal interpretation of international law. More on this see Fidler, Empire 
and Community, p. 50.
543 Welsh, Burke and International Relations, p. 127
544 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace, III’, Works, iv p. 237
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at the same time believes that it can be overridden in special circumstances. Any attempt to 
upset the general balance of the European system conferred a just cause of war, and war was 
for him the ‘sole means of justice among nations.’545
Hamphser-Monk contends that Burke’s need for internal intervention for regime change is 
directed against the balance of power policy, and he bases his argument on the fact that, 
ostensibly, Burke was not interested in weakening or containing France militarily .546 However, 
it seems clear that Burke was concerned about the threat French hegemony posed militarily, 
even though he mainly lamented the ideological threat. This I find particular problematic, 
because as I have sought to demonstrate, Burke’s understanding o f intervention is clearly part 
of his conception of the balance of power. It seems reasonable to suggest that his Letters on a 
Regicide Peace is aware of the delicate balances and the need to ensure that regimes do not 
upset it. What Burke in fact was seeking, was to provide a justification for why the balance of 
power principle should be attended to and upheld. It was not arbitrary and (ideally) it did not 
accentuate random policies, but rested instead on prescriptive vigilance and reinforced by 
presumption. It could not be descriptive because Burke did not view the balance of power as a 
system, which primarily had come about by various treaties; it was the common sympathies, 
which constituted ties and obligations. Also, it seems clear that Burke’s views on the balance 
of power were not a conception of intervention to preserve peace as such, but rather a 
conception to preserve the Commonwealth of Europe, which in this sence constitutes the 
greatest humanitarian urge as we shall see. Therefore, being part of Burke’s overall 
understanding of the international customary law underpinning the relationship of the 
European States, it served to predetermine the overall purpose of the balance of power toward 
prioritising the value of the Commonwealth of Europe above the independent interests of 
individual states in the system. This is shown by the fact that he emphasised the balance of 
power as being common law not universal law. As with his conception of the reason of the 
state, he set it up as a moral good, which was not based on mere prudence or on any abstract 
ideas, but instead reflected the community interests; and this community good came about 
through prescription.
Burke’s balance of power served an ideological function in that he raised it to a set of 
symbols, which in consequence provided a structure for, not only explaining state actions but 
also explaining policies in term of moral rightness. In this way, Burke’s balance of power was
545 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace, I’, Works, iv p. 156
546 Hamphser-Monk, ‘Edmund Burke’s changing justification for intervention’, pp. 76 -  77
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part of the moral dimensions of intellectual politics, because he clearly deemed it a force of 
good and a producer of peace and independence. Burke’s conception of peace went beyond 
peace treaties and was not the mere non-existence of an armed struggle. It was a precondition 
in terms of establishing a permanent connection through the common ‘similitude’ underlying 
the Commonwealth of Europe. For Burke then, as we shall see in the following, the 
international order could never be a mere question of security, as it rested more on 
international morality in terms of preserving the Commonwealth of Europe, rather than upon 
any arbitrary peace treaty or immediate territorial dispute. In the sense that the balance of 
power was prescriptive, equilibrium was not produced or presented without it being willed by 
states. So to reiterate: As with his conception of the reason of state, Burke’s conception of the 
balance of power was related to the principle o f non-intervention hierarchically so it could be 
justified as part of international law and thus allow for intervention in Revolutionary France, 
on military as well as ideological and moral grounds. And it was exactly because of such 
considerations that Burke positioned the idea of the balance o f power at the heart of his 
justificatory arguments for intervention in the internal arrangements in France. Burke had 
discursively to emphasise a conception of the balance o f power as contributor to, not only 
peace in the international society, but also maintainer of the moral order of the international 
system itself, which was part of his idea of the Commonwealth of Europe.
What I have established so far is that this idea of similitude and custom was underlying 
Burke’s conception of the law of nations and its political articulations of ‘reason the state’ and 
the balance of power. Now I will go on to analyse what this exactly meant for Burke’s idea of 
‘humanity’, how it gave Burke the justification he needed for intervention in Revolutionary 
France and in what way this intervention was in essence humanitarian.
Premises for intervention in France -  ‘moral necessity’ and humanity
Intervention for Burke worked on two levels of humanitarianism. On the one level atrocities 
were being committed in France that affronted the conscience of any decent man, and 
intervention was justified in order to save the violated. The violators, too, needed to be saved 
from themselves. On the second level, and related to his law of vicinity, or vicinage, 
intervention was necessary in order to avoid the destruction of the anciene regime of Europe. 
France constituted a threat to humanity, or at least to the civilisation of Europe. As we shall see 
below, it is this second level of humanitarianism that carries the weight in Burke’s argument 
and justification for intervention.
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In Thoughts on French Affairs Burke called 1789 the ‘Revolution of doctrine and 
theoretick dogma.’547 He asserted that the Jacobin design was to institute ‘an universal empire, 
by producing a universal revolution.’548 For Burke, the French Revolution was driven by three 
precepts, which he found completely alien to European civilisation: Jacobinism, Atheism, and 
Regicide. Combined with the new revolutionary system o f manners, he believed these posed a 
serious threat to the bases of order in European international society and directly accused the 
French Revolution of corrupting the manners and sentiments, which underpinned the 
Commonwealth of Europe. Burke pronounced that ‘the savage’ French system of manners ‘is a 
war with all orderly and moral society.’549 Thus the Revolution of 1789 ‘violates the right upon 
which not only the community of France, but those on which all communities are founded.’550 
As such, Burke believed that the French Revolution disturbed the core foundations of order 
and stability in Europe. In the reality o f the violent spirit of the revolutionaries, he purported, 
that it was only a matter of time before all the other states of Europe would fall to Jacobinism. 
By inciting rebellion, France had placed herself outside the traditional public law of Europe by 
demolishing ‘the whole body of that jurisprudence which France had pretty nearly in common 
with other civilised countries.’ In this way they had ‘not only annulled all their old treaties; but 
they have renounced the law of nations from whence treaties have their force.’551 France had
SS9 • • • •morally separated herself from her geographical entity, basing its ‘impious’ empire not on 
‘principles of treaty, convention, possession, usage, habitude, the distinction of tribes, nations,
f f T
or languages’, but instead on ‘physical aptitudes.’ Thus, peace with the Jacobins was the
same as defeat by them.554 But more profoundly, what Burke was implying was that because
France had so radically departed from the customary foundations of European society it did not 
even speak the same language as other European states when it came to their mutual relations
‘Before men can transact any affair, they must have a common language to speak, and some common recognized 
principles, on which they can argue; otherwise all is cross-purpose and confusion. [ — ] They professed a 
resolution to destroy every thing which can hold states together by tie of opinion [....] [and] avow their design to 
erect themselves into a new description of Empire, which is not grounded in any balance, but forms a sort of
547 Burke, ‘Thoughts on French Affairs’ (1791), p. 237
548 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace, III’, p. 248
549 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace, I’, p. 132
550 Ibid., p. 138
551 Ibid., p. 124
552 Burke, ‘Remarks on the Policy of the Allies’ (1793), p. 270
553 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace, IV’, p. 350
554 Harle, Vilho: ‘Burke, the International Theorist -  or the War of the Sons of Light and the Sons of 
Darkness’ in European Values in International Relations (ed Vilho Harle, London: 1990), p. 67
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impious hierarchy, o f which France is to be the head and the guardian. The law of this their Empire is anything 
rather than the publick law o f Europe, the ancient conventions o f its several States, or the ancient opinions which 
assign to them superiority or pre-eminence o f any sort, or any other kind of connexion in virtue of ancient 
relations.’555
The main argument of this chapter is the key notion that in the light of this threat Burke 
extended his theory of customary law into a duty to prevent violations of rights, and duty for a 
call of humanity. As he contends ‘it is one of the greatest objects of human wisdom to mitigate 
those evils, which we are unable to remove [....] Distance of a place does not extinguish the 
duties or the rights of men.’556 Burke then, appealed to the law of vicinity, and recognised that 
custom establishes, or helps to establish, a specific determination and duty, considered part of 
the law of nations, in order to react against this evil. As was argued above, prescribed 
customary law is thus the basic premise by which Burke justifies intervention in France. What 
is important here is that because Burke appeals to a law of nations being part of a wider 
customary international law it is adequately obligatory and it cannot be arbitrary abrogated. In 
this way, what is apparent in Burke’s political thought is his presumption of the validity of 
intervention in France. Customary law was laid down before the French Revolution and thus it 
was in the interest and duty of every nation in the name of ‘good faith and public integrity.’
Through all Burke’s writings on the French Revolution, in particular his Letters on a 
Regicide Peace, what is particularly noticeable is the language of ‘humanity’ and human 
sufferings that Burke is, rhetorically perhaps, employing. However, in using Burke’s discourse 
it seems reasonable to suggest that what he in fact argued, in the same way as Sepulveda had in 
relation to the Indians, was to save the French from themselves, and for the sake of humanity.
558Burke contended that a war against France would be ‘paying tribute to humanity’ and was 
pleading with the British government to ‘open its ears to the voice of humanity.’559 Along
these lines he further stated that the revolutionary faction in France was ‘directly contrary to
the common sense and common feeling of mankind’560 and reasoned that it was the common 
interest and duty of the nations of Europe to ‘furnish the happiness of mankind.’561 In this it 
can be argued that Burke is following Gentili in expounding the interests of the common rights
555 Burke, ‘Letter of a Regicide Peace III’, p. 247 - 248
556 Burke, ‘Letter of a Regicide Peace I’, p. 133 - 134
557 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace III’, p. 224
558 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace IV’, p. 325
559 Burke, ‘Letter of a Regicide Peace I’, p. 99
560 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace IV’, p. 324
561 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace III’, p. 271
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of mankind; or rather for Burke, the common rights o f all Europeans. Against any ‘regicide’ 
peace he therefore lamented:
‘It [the French Revolution] is not a revolution in government. [...] It is a destruction and decomposition of the 
whole society [...]. This Republick is founded in crimes, and exists by wrong and robbery; and wrong and 
robbery, far from a title to any thing, is war with mankind. To be at peace with robbery is to be an accomplice 
with it.’562
Promotion of ideas and laws that are not embedded in any customs is, for Burke, a violation of 
the common rights of mankind — the true general objectives prescribed by customary law. As 
Burke firmly asserts, ‘example is the school of mankind’563 and the French Revolution was a 
war against that example. These peace negotiations were not only against the publick law of 
Europe, but have steered the European nations away from common prudence.564 Being 
accomplished to the revolutionary dogma, this ‘treacherous peace’ was ‘malignity towards 
humankind.’565 I want to argue that in emphasising a common right of mankind, Burke was 
thus arguing for a humanitarian intervention which premise was part o f observing the common 
law of nature and nations. As Burke states many times, the French Revolution was aiming at 
the universal rule of theoretic dogma as it was ‘the social nature of man that impels him to 
propagate his principles, as much as physical impulses urge him to propagate his kind.’566 In 
this context the analogy between the common constitutional law and the common law of 
nations is further pronounced in the light of this continuing revolutionary communication 
across borders: ‘Our humanity, our manners, our morals, our religion, cannot stand with such a 
communication: the constitution is made by those things, and for those things; without them it 
cannot exist; and without them it is no matter whether it exists or not.’567 This is the effect of 
the regicide ‘vicinity’ and in this sense, as is indicated above; the moral prudence of 
intervention embedded within the law of nations is the only remedy towards this ‘enormous 
evil’. It is enforcing the sentiments of the truest humanity, as Burke contends, and here he is 
not only appealing to the common manners and sentiments, which prescribe our human nature 
and thus enforces our common humanity, but also to the divinity of that nature. In the shrill 
tones of his voice at time bordering on hysteria running through Letters on a Regicide Peace
562 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace I’, p. 139
563 Ibid., p. 143
564 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace III’, p. 243
565 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace IV’, p. 326
566 Burke. ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace IF, p. 170
567 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace IV’, p. 380
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Burke is lamenting the revolutionary faction is an evil spirit that informs the soul, lying deep 
‘in the corruption of our common nature.’568 In this way the near argument Burke is employing 
here in his justification for intervention is the saving of the souls of these people, which, 
although it aptly illustrates the desperation o f his polemics against the French Revolution, it is 
also an indicator of something Burke truly believed. He adamantly claimed ‘[t]he world knows 
that in France there is no publick, that the country is composed but of two descriptions; 
audacious tyrants and trembling slaves.’569 Not only was slavery, in Burke’s mind, abhorrent 
and immoral, but also what he was opposing was a revolutionary faction that would enslave all 
of Europe. In Burke’s own words France ‘prescribes the forms of peace to nations, and dictates 
laws to a subjected world.’570 Intervention was thus to save the liberties of Europe.571
The unnatural ‘cannibalism’ of the revolutionaries reveals a new species who ‘craft 
virtues on vices’ and ‘strike at the root of our social nature’, which will result in the total 
corruption of all morals and ‘the total disconnection of social life.’572 What is important in this 
context is that Burke endeavours to demonstrate the legality o f intervention in France within 
the existing law of nations. This reflects his respect for established wisdom, but moreover 
resonates with Burke’s belief in customary law being the guiding authority in terms of which 
justification must be sought. In direct reference to the natural and justifiable intervention 
policy Burke invokes the validity of customary law by remarking ‘the hand of authority is not 
always the most heavy hand’,573 However, in the ‘diversified mass of human misery’ our 
minds must make a choice; it is a choice between our community or a state of hostility.574 By 
this statement Burke clearly made his case for humanitarian intervention in France, justifying it 
on the grounds that the common rights of mankind were being violated, in particular, the 
personal liberty arising from the system of manners and the habitudes of life rather than from 
laws of the state.575 Thus, the moral necessity of intervention is firmly embedded in customary 
law and consolidates Burke’s emphasis on the universal equity of such an action. The threat 
that France posed was to alter the whole social state of Europe and conceptually Burke was 
appealing to the customary law of nations as a means of social justice.
568 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace IT, pp. 154 - 155
569 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace III’, p. 253
570 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace IV’, p. 365
571 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace III’, pp. 270 - 271
572 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace I’, pp. 126 - 130
573 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace III’, p. 261
574 Ibid., pp. 209-210
575 Burke, ‘Letters on a Regicide Peace II’, p. 181
193
Summarily, the historical methodological approach that Ian Hampsher-Monk employs 
by illustrating Burke’s changing justification for intervention does shows a certain 
inconsistency in Burke’s arguments regarding intervention; arguments which exemplify 
Burke’s need for rhetorical leverage against the background of a changing political situation, 
however, it does not change the premises o f Burke’s appeal for humanitarian intervention in 
France, which has been the main topic of this chapter. The critical point is, then, that the fact 
that Burke is arguing within the context of customary law, the origin of the law, in this case the 
right of intervention becomes less relevant than the authority o f that right. Thus, for Burke 
there was a clear obligation and a right to intervene in France, which was based on strong 
humanitarian grounds. It was part of the law o f nations and declaratory of what was already 
embedded in the international community -  a moral necessity to preserve and maintain the 
moral basis of the Commonwealth of Europe for the sake o f our shared humanity. And this 
humanity, as should be clear, was defined specifically in relation to this commonwealth.
Conclusion
What I have attempted to show in this chapter is the importance of Burke’s notion of 
international customary law as the informing principle of his political philosophy, and that it 
was this idea of international customary law that formed the moral basis of the Commonwealth 
of Europe. In this way, Burke appealed to the ancient customs and rules of the Commonwealth 
of Europe, which itself were legitimised by these customs. Burke’s whole philosophy is a 
recovery of the concept of the customary law tradition, which fits well with his general 
doctrine of tradition.576 Although the European states in the commonwealth had certain 
diversity in customs and political arrangements their polities and economies were derived from 
the same customary source which gave them their moral basis. And it was this moral basis 
which ultimately provided Burke with the justificatory grounds of intervention in France. 
However, for such reasons, it was not any conventional military intervention that Burke 
promoted. The deep customs and moral values that the nations in Europe shared provided the 
premises for the idea of intervention in France, that is, an unparallel moral necessity. From this 
that we can begin to understand the deep underlying humanitarianism, which grounded 
Burke’s thought. The ‘inhumanity’ of the French revolutionary doctrine was inhumane because 
it was alien to the shared morals and norms which lay at the heart of this Commonwealth of 
Europe. And so, following from this, Burke’s call for intervention in Revolutionary France
576 Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, p. 243
194
was based on strong humanitarian considerations. It was these considerations which provided 
him with the justification for such an undertaking exactly because of the wider moral 
obligations and laws regulating the relationship between the states of Europe. The clear duties 
that the European states had in maintaining this Commonwealth were much more obligatory 
than what Vattel had advocated. Burke’s idea of the Commonwealth of Europe presupposed 
that in times of great moral necessity any non-intervention principle grounded in state’s 
sovereignty could be set aside in order to address anything that would upset the moral balance 
of this Commonwealth. And the revolution in France did just that. It was for this reason, that 
Burke would advocate humanitarian intervention.
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Conclusion
I have argued that a nascent idea of humanitarian intervention was developing during the early 
modem period, but that its development was contingent on a particular historical context. This 
context was theologically laden and related fundamental rights and duties to obligations we 
owe to each other as members of humanity, nations and in personal relationships, in which a 
God given principle of self-preservation and natural sociability played significant roles. In this 
way it is quite distinct from the one we recognise today, because the conditions of belief have 
changed so significantly. Humanitarian considerations for intervention are contingent upon 
different moral belief systems. It is apparent that the doctrine has undergone a modem day 
renaissance in a different guise. In tracing the history o f the norms pertaining to humanitarian 
intervention it is clear that the concept of humanitarianism is historically transient and holds 
little conceptual resemblance to its contemporary namesake. Whereas today it is foundationally 
embedded in a human rights culture, which gives it its conceptual intelligibility, in past times it 
was anchored in very different foundation, the product of a different world view often 
grounded in a strong religious belief-system. In this way, what I set out to do in this study was 
to discover the different discourses that surround the idea of humanitarian intervention, which 
would be conceptually removed from the human rights culture that grounds our humanitarian 
urge today. I demonstrated that such a discourse emerged in the early modem period, and that 
there is in fact a gap in the literature regarding its proper exploration.
For the early modem thinkers humanitarian intervention was a key notion in their
writings on just war. They wrote after the discovery o f the New World and this event was
instrumental in setting the reference point within which they formulated their jurisprudential
ideas. Although the discovery of the Americas precipitated unprecedented atrocities on the part
of the Spanish conquistadores against the native people, it also inspired a serious intellectual
debate regarding the rationality and Christianization of the Indians. Also, it brought to the fore
questions of European legitimacy in their dealings with the rest of world. This study has shown
that a nascent notion of humanitarian intervention played an integral part of this early
intellectual debate. Many of the justifications were derived from purported contraventions of
the natural law, and were based on the claim that the natural rights of the Europeans were
being violated by the American Indians who had a duty to respect them. Cases such as human
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sacrifice, sodomy and cannibalism were an affront to humanity and intervention to save 
innocent victims was justified. However, as was the case with Vitoria, where such offences 
were not recognised as sufficient cause, contravening the law of nations provided ample 
justification. The examples were hindrances to the rights of passage and trade, but were most 
importantly formulated within the doctrine of terra nullius, where attempts to prevent seizure 
of ‘vacant land’ gave just cause for war. This was done on the ground that the world was held 
in common. The fact remains, however, that despite the various legal and theological 
trepidations at the time, natural rights, instead of protecting the Indians against the brutality of 
the Europeans was used to justify their subjugation.
The Spanish Thomists retained a strong belief that the Spanish colonialists had just 
cause for waging war against the Indians on the grounds that they had violated the universal 
natural rights which were given by nature and therefore by God. Despite this, they were some 
of the most sympathetic commentators of the day. There were elements in their writings that 
constituted indisputable endeavours to move beyond the application of just war theory to the 
case of the American Indians to make the precepts of the natural law universal, while at the 
same time seeking to protect innocents against unlawful aggression and usurpation. For Vitoria 
and Suarez their humanitarianism had its moral foundations in the natural law, from which 
obligations of intervention were derived. Although their humanitarian arguments revolved 
around serious issues such as saving people from abhorrent practices like cannibalism, human 
sacrifice and sodomy, to concerns for rescuing people from themselves in the interests of the 
civilising process, it nevertheless belonged to the concessive law of nature. As such, concerns 
such as these established obligations to intervene in another country on humanitarian grounds. 
But for two main reasons these were not perfect obligations. Firstly, humanitarian intervention 
lacked the specification of who has the obligation to intervene, which was a concern for most 
of the early modem thinkers. This, of course is something which echoes in contemporary ideas 
of international ethics. Secondly, the enforcement of humanitarian intervention hinged on the 
fact that it was not deemed absolutely necessary for the common good. Except for Sepulveda 
and Burke, this was the case for all the early modem jurists explored here.
Vitoria and Suarez affirmed a strong idea of universal morality, which was grounded in 
the law of nature. From the law of nature, precepts emerged which underlined the acceptability 
of intervention for humanitarian reasons when innocents were being harmed, or to restore the 
common bond of humanity by punishing crimes against the natural law. For both thinkers, but 
Vitoria in particular, right intent was absolutely central for the idea of humanitarian
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intervention. The only legitimate justification for war was the violation of rights. However, to 
determine whether such violated rights precipitated intervention on humanitarian grounds, first 
it had to be established whose rights and what rights were being violated and by whom. 
Obligations of humanitarianism were derived from the natural law because violated rights 
concerning innocents pertained to natural law principles. But, such obligations were 
conditional upon right intent. This moral obligation of helping innocents from being harmed 
was actionable under the jus gentium, but it had its moral basis in the natural law. Thus, in 
absence of state practice humanitarian intervention was derived from customary opinion under 
the ju s gentium.
More emphatically than Vitoria and Suarez, Gentili’s idea of humanitarian intervention 
was founded on the notion of the common bond of humanity, the societas gentium, which, if 
broken, was a serious crime against humanity and therefore against the law of nature. Such a 
breach should require action on the part of individuals or sovereigns to make reparations in 
order to restore the bond and punish the perpetrators. This idea echoes later on in Burke’s 
thoughts on humanitarian intervention. What seem to have been the most central aspects of 
humanitarian intervention for these early writers, Sepulveda being the exception, were that 
humanitarian intervention was not deemed to be a moral necessity. It was from the meticulous 
work of Suarez that humanitarian intervention was perceived to be a righteous act, but not an 
absolute moral precept. In this way it fell under the law of nations because it was understood as 
encompassing the actual exercise of the law of nature’s concessive principle. Suarez’s original 
contribution was, thus, that natural law did not consist merely of restraining power, commands 
and prohibitions; it also defined an area of permissiveness where agents were free to choose 
the right action. Whether Grotius was keen to admit it or not, this formulation was imperative 
for his later development of the idea of humanitarian intervention.
What was particularly interesting with Grotius was his conceptual attempt to 
mitigate the religious disputes of the day, by positing a non-sectarian law of nature. This has 
led some modem scholars such as Richard Tuck, Knud Haakonssen, and also Martha 
Nussbaum to misinterpret his scholarship as signalling the beginning of the secularisation of 
the natural law tradition. However, such misconceptions have lead to a serious 
misunderstanding of Grotius’s political philosophy, and the conceptual implications are far- 
reaching. If Grotius had indeed presented a secular natural law tradition, then the moral 
obligation of humanitarian intervention would solely have its source in human agreement and 
conventional international law. Given that many of the issues relating to international law, the
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rights of the seas and of the appropriation of large tracts of the Americas, a natural law that 
was not firmly grounded in more than custom and convention would not have been forceful 
enough to apply. For Grotius, the source of fulfilling our obligations was to God, whether 
grounded in our objective rights or subjective rights. Those moral obligations of humanitarian 
intervention required a third party to intervene to punish crimes against the law of nature. For 
Grotius crimes such as cannibalism and the sacrifice of people demanded punishment, and 
states had a natural right to do so. There is a moral obligation for third party intervention, 
which is mandated through our natural rights to punish crimes against nature. For Grotius, any 
notions of humanitarian intervention are grounded in his theory of punishment. In this way, 
states have the right to punish crimes that violate the natural law, and the issue of jurisdiction 
is irrelevant. Wars of punishments were sanctioned by nature, which holds the jurisdiction for 
the whole of mankind. Grotius was one of the first thinkers to address the issue of states as 
actors in the law of nations, and developed an emerging idea of the moral person of the state 
with rights and obligations different from the individual. Nevertheless, states were for Grotius 
not founded upon the principle of sovereignty, which is exactly why he was able to present a 
theory of universal punishment. Because it is difficult to determine who should exact 
punishment, humanitarian intervention remains for Grotius in the sphere of imperfect 
obligations. Humanitarian intervention does not, for these very reasons, constitute an 
infringement of sovereignty, which it undoubtedly did for Pufendorf.
Pufendorf developed Grotius’s notion of states but grounded their obligations and 
rights on the principle of sovereignty. This conceptual move had a remarkable effect on an 
obligation on the enforcement of humanitarian intervention. In fact, for Pufendorf, 
humanitarian intervention was not justified because it could not be enforced by international 
law. However, that did not mean that this excluded a strong universal morality; on the 
contrary, his political theory presents us with a strong moral basis grounded in the natural law 
from which we can identify instances of ‘humanitarian’ crimes. His differentiation of 
congenital and adventitious obligations was important here because although they are not 
equally enforceable, they are nonetheless equally morally obligatory. In this sense, moral 
obligations for Pufendorf were aspirational in the international sphere. Pufendorf s strong 
theory of sovereignty and legalism have made him the historical proponent of statism, but this 
is yet another example of scholarly misconceptions not adequately developing an idea in its 
proper time and place. I have argued that the positing of a strong principle of sovereignty for 
Pufendorf implied, instead, a very strong notion of humanitarianism. It conceptually served to
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limit atrocities committed by colonialists against the American Indians, and was formulated to 
address and protect religious dissent of the time. It was to address such humanitarian issues to 
begin with that a strong principle of sovereignty had to be proposed. Although Pufendorf s 
ideas of moral obligations towards our fellow man could not be enforced internationally, his 
theory of sovereignty offered more protection conceptually to groups such as the American 
Indians, than theorists such as Sepulveda and Grotius had proposed.
Thinkers such as Wolff and Vattel were inspired by Pufendorf, and built on his idea of 
the moral person of the state. However, unlike their German predecessor, they did not deny the 
existence of the law of nations nor the belief in its enforceability. Instead, both Wolff, and 
especially Vattel brought about the modem era of international law and subjected the moral 
person of the state to the law of nations. The consequences of conceiving the sovereign state as 
subject of international law and as the main actor in international relations had a strong impact 
on the idea of humanitarian intervention. Both thinkers posited that sovereign states had a duty 
of assistance towards each others, but the sovereign integrity of the state came before 
considerations of humanitarian assistance and duties to others. This was the core of 
formulating states’ humanitarian duties in imperfect terms. However, what was notable with 
the newly formulated principle of sovereignty was that unlike Grotius there was no longer a 
conception of a right to intervention. Furthermore, Vattel sought to redeem what he viewed to 
be deficiencies of W olffs theory in relation to assisting the oppressed subjects of a tyrant. 
Such intervention was nevertheless envisaged in terms of a strong principle of state 
sovereignty, and he did not take the argument beyond civil war.
Unlike the other thinkers explored here, Sepulveda and Burke are extremely interesting 
because they formulated their ideas of humanitarian intervention in absolute terms -  but for 
very different reasons. Sepulveda’s ideas, in particular, demonstrated how the purported 
universalist principles derived from the Christian culture was imposed on the Native American 
culture in order to argue that they fell well below its standards and would therefore be forced to 
act in accordance with them. Sepulveda first and foremost presented his argument for 
humanitarian intervention as a mean to save the Indians from eternal damnation in the hope of 
saving their souls. In this way, the imperative was the need to rescue them from themselves 
and bring them into the bounds of Christianity. This was therefore the obligations of all 
Christians alike. The Indians needed to be subdued and forced to accept Christianity because 
they were incapable of rationally receiving the word of God through education. His main 
justification for such action was that the American Indians fell into Aristotle’s category of
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natural slavery; they were capable of understanding and carrying out instructions, but not of 
formulating and executing their own rational plans. Given the incapacity of the American 
Indians for rational thinking, the Spaniards would be doing them a service in showing them the 
error of their ways and in making the land more productive by the efficient exploitation of 
nature. It was therefore, natural, and humane, that the Spaniards fulfil their duty in guiding 
these unfortunate people.
Burke also posited a strong underlying morality, the Commonwealth of Europe, which 
bound the European states. This gave his idea of humanitarian intervention particular force. 
What formed the moral basis of this commonwealth was his idea of customary international 
law. Burke appealed to the ancient customs and rules o f the Commonwealth of Europe, which 
itself were legitimised by these customs. Although the European states in the commonwealth 
had certain diversity in customs and political arrangements their polities and economies were 
derived from the same customary source which gave them their moral basis. The deep customs 
and moral values that the nations in Europe shared made humanitarian intervention in France 
an absolute moral necessity. There was, in this, a deep underlying humanitarianism which 
grounded Burke’s thought. The French revolutionary doctrine was ‘inhumane’ because it was 
alien to the shared morals and norms which lay at the heart of this Commonwealth of Europe. 
Burke’s call for intervention in France was therefore based on strong humanitarian 
considerations. The wider moral community which regulated the relationship between the 
European states had clear duties to maintain this Commonwealth. Burke’s idea of the 
Commonwealth of Europe presupposed that in times of great moral necessity any non­
intervention principle grounded in state’s sovereignty could be set aside in order to address 
anything that would upset the moral balance of this Commonwealth. The revolution in France 
did just that. It was for this reason, that Burke could advocate humanitarian intervention.
From the above, we see that the ideas of humanitarian intervention in these thinkers are 
conceptually contingent upon a specific historical period. I have argued that contemporary 
scholarship seems to somehow have taken a wrong turn in not recognising this, and that the 
mistake lies in the fact that modem ideas pertaining to humanitarian intervention do share 
similar features to the ones found in the early modern period. Both Gentili and Burke presented 
ideas about individual obligations to the wider international community in the interest of 
humanity. Pufendorf recognised the nascent tensions of the universalism of moral standards 
versus the particularism of state sovereignty and sought to reconcile the two by making the 
moral person of the state subject of the former. Grotius, for instance, proposed strong
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obligations of third party intervention on the basis of obligations and natural rights to punish 
moral transgressions. Vitoria and Suarez presented ideas of just war and the use of force and 
emphasised the importance of right intent. However, as emphasised, although appearing to be 
similar on the surface; early modem ideas o f humanitarian intervention and contemporary 
humanitarian intervention contain deep foundational and conceptual differences. It is clear, that 
modem thinkers such as Martha Nussbaum, Theodor Meron, and James Muldoon have been 
complicit in such scholarly misconceptions by assuming that these similarities hold a common 
conceptual base, and are therefore the same. This present study has shown that this is not the 
case; they are, instead, conceptual dissimilar. In fact, we even notice the changing conceptual 
justifications of the idea of humanitarian intervention in the early modem period itself. For 
instance, Burke’s humanitarian considerations bear very little conceptual resemblance to the 
Spanish Thomists’. Saving the souls of the French through military intervention meant 
something very different from what Sepulveda proposed, when he advocated intervention to 
save the souls of the American Indians. Striking at the root of the social nature of humanity by 
the unnatural ‘cannibalism’ of the French revolutionaries is far removed from Sepulveda’s 
anxiety of the Indians’ unnatural behaviour of cannibalism and sodomy. In this way, the 
epistemological authority that Nussbaum and Meron seek in past understandings of 
humanitarianism for their contemporary projects, are misguided. The faint echoes of Grotius’s 
‘human fellowship’ and its underlying moral obligations o f humanitarian intervention are just 
that, mere echoes, and do not do the foundational groundwork that Nussbaum wants.
As such, the idea of humanitarian intervention has a long historical heritage. By 
understanding the general historical context in which we discover our moral consciousness, we 
come to understand what shocks the moral conscience of mankind, and how, for centuries, the 
idea of humanitarian intervention was at the centre of international ethics. Our humanitarian 
urge for such interventions changes, but the central place it holds in international debates 
remains unchanged.
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